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Fourth of July fireworks as seen over Luce
Hall (in a recent summer, less rainy than
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had to be postponed). Dewey Field, on the
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from which to watch the fireworks display,
which the city of Newport puts on annu-
ally over the harbor, just to the south of
the Naval War College.
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Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as the forty-eighth
President of the Naval War College on 22 August 2001.
Relieved on 9 July 2003 by Rear Admiral Ronald A.
Route, he reported for duty as Superintendent of the
U.S. Naval Academy, in the grade of vice admiral, on
1 August 2003.
Vice Admiral Rempt is a 1966 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy. Initial assignments included deploy-
ments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9) and
USS Somers (DDG 34). He later commanded USS
Antelope (PG 86), USS Callaghan (DDG 994), and
USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). Among his shore assign-
ments were the Naval Sea Systems Command as the ini-
tial project officer for the Mark 41 Vertical Launch
System; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff as the
Aegis Weapon System program coordinator; director of
the Prospective Commanding Officer/Executive Officer
Department, Surface Warfare Officers Schools Com-
mand; and Director, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements
Division (OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral
Rempt also served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Orga-
nization, where he initiated development of Naval
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, continuing those ef-
forts as Director, Theater Air Defense on the CNO’s
staff. More recently, he was Program Executive Officer,
Theater Air Defense, the first Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy for Theater Combat Systems, the first
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense,
and Director, Surface Warfare (N76) on the CNO’s
staff. He holds master’s degrees in systems analysis from
Stanford University and in national security and strate-
gic studies from the Naval War College.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
A mind once stretched by a new idea never regains its original
dimension.
—Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
IT IS DIFFICULT TO DESCRIBE concisely the mission of institutions
like the Naval War College, but if one were called upon to do so in
three words or less, it would be to create new ideas. New ideas are
incredibly powerful, and for this reason they are frequently viewed
with skepticism and wariness. An old adage says that the only thing more diffi-
cult than getting a new idea into a mind is getting an old one out!
New ideas can arise from many sources, and they can be driven by everything
from desperation to quiet contemplation. It can be argued, however, that the best
ideas are born from study, reflection, and careful analysis of options—plus pas-
sion and drive. It is this process that we seek to nurture at the Naval War College.
The Newport complex, which includes the Naval War College, the Navy War-
fare Development Command, and the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group, serves as
fertile ground for creativity. This process is facilitated by:
• Faculty, student, and staff research and experimentation activities that are
conducted in a free and risk-accepting atmosphere.
• The study of current global security events within the context of relevant
historical precedents and classical principles of war.
• Mentorship from a world-class faculty that includes proven scholars/
educators and experienced military operators.
• Close and frequent interaction and seminar discussions among students
from all military services and key civilian agencies within the national
security arena.
• The opportunity to understand better, learn alongside, and socialize with
top-quality military officers from more than sixty different nations.
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• Sharing ideas with visiting lecturers ranging from service chiefs and
combatant commanders to world-renowned authors, statesmen, and jurists.
• Having the luxury to step back from operational demands for a year to
concentrate exclusively on professional development and intellectual growth.
• Taking advantage of superb academic resources such as the Eccles Library,
extensive historical archives, and an informative museum and naval curator.
• Participating in sophisticated war games and crisis exercises with joint and
fleet staffs, and with senior federal, state, and local government officials.
• Seeing concepts developed, gamed, tested in fleet experiments, and
introduced to the theater of war with great effect.
• Working and studying in a unique collegial atmosphere where new ideas
are welcomed and new perspectives are encouraged.
Creative license exists, in part, as the result of the academic freedom that un-
derpins all of the College’s activities. This is reflected in the college’s formal
guiding principles, which include the following statement:
In order to maintain the quality of an NWC education and the ability to engage in
research and other scholarly activities at the highest standards, we are guided by our
commitment to:
• Safeguard individual academic freedom and the academic integrity of the
institution.
• Maintain our academic independence and ownership of our curriculum.
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
MISSION
The Naval War College serves the nation by providing graduate and profes-
sional maritime and joint military education, advanced research and study,
gaming, and public outreach programs, to:
• Educate future leaders
• Prepare U.S. and international military officers and civilians to meet
national security challenges as senior leaders in naval, joint, inter-
agency, and multinational arenas.
• Enable students to develop and execute the national military strategy
and conduct maritime and joint operations applying sound strategic
and operational art.
• Define the future Navy
• Develop advanced strategic and operational concepts for employ-
ment of naval, joint, and multinational forces.
• Assist the Chief of Naval Operations in defining the future Navy and
its role in national security.
• Provide leadership in shaping the global maritime order to foster
peaceful use of the world’s oceans.
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No one can count, track, or document the host of new ideas and concepts that
arise from this intellectual crucible. But in recent months we have seen evidence
of creativity in efforts that served as the foundation for the Navy’s vision known
as “Seapower 21”; in the development of operational concepts for the employ-
ment of a new class of Littoral Combat Ships; and in dozens of point papers and
crisis-management games that have helped establish the nation’s new homeland
security posture. Countless other innovations and concepts have no doubt
emerged in the seminar rooms, auditoriums, and game cells of the Newport
complex and its extended locations around the world.
As Justice Holmes so astutely noted, once the habit of developing new ideas is
developed, it will help generate new ideas for the rest of a career and over an en-
tire lifetime. Education early in one’s career guarantees the maximum return on
the investment represented by the time and effort dedicated to it. For our Navy
and our officers, it is our investment in the future.
In the final analysis, education generates new ideas. New ideas are needed to
transform the military services to meet new challenges effectively—and it is
transformed forces that will best be able to protect the nation in the demanding
and uncertain decades ahead.
RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
VISION
The Naval War College will be the world’s most respected institution for
educating and inspiring innovative leaders who think strategically and act
decisively to direct naval, joint, and multinational operations to achieve na-
tional security objectives.
• We will be foremost in providing the nation’s military leaders and states-
men with rigorous analysis, independent research, and robust war gam-
ing to resolve critical national security issues.
• We will continue to lead the world in the conduct of “original research
in all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with
war or the prevention of war.”
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General Richard B. Myers became the fifteenth chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 2001. In this capac-
ity, he serves as the principal military adviser to the presi-
dent, the secretary of defense, and the National Security
Council. Prior to becoming chairman, he served as vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for nineteen months.
General Myers was born in Kansas City, Missouri. He is
a 1965 graduate of Kansas State University and holds a
master’s degree in business administration from Auburn
University. The general has attended the Air Command
and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama;
the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Penn-
sylvania; and the Program for Senior Executives in Na-
tional and International Security at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University.
General Myers entered the Air Force in 1965 through the
Reserve Officer Training Corps program. His career in-
cludes operational command and leadership positions in
a variety of Air Force and joint assignments. General
Myers is a command pilot with more than 4,100 flying
hours in the T-33, C-37, C-21, F-4, F-15, and F-16, in-
cluding six hundred combat hours in the F-4.
As the vice chairman from March 2000 to September
2001, General Myers served as the chairman of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, as vice chairman of the
Defense Acquisition Board, and as a member of the Na-
tional Security Council Deputies Committee and the
Nuclear Weapons Council. In addition, he acted for the
chairman in all aspects of the Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System, including participation in the
Defense Resources Board.
From August 1998 to February 2000, General Myers was
Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace De-
fense Command and U.S. Space Command; Com-
mander, Air Force Space Command; and Department of
Defense manager for space transportation system contin-
gency support at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. As
commander, General Myers was responsible for defend-
ing America through space and intercontinental ballistic
missile operations. Prior to assuming that position, he
was Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force
Base, Hawaii, from July 1997 to July 1998. From July
1996 to July 1997 General Myers served as assistant to
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon;
and from November 1993 to June 1996 he was Com-
mander of U.S. Forces Japan and Fifth Air Force at
Yokota Air Base, Japan.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 4
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss4/1
SHIFT TO A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force
In ancient India, six blind men encountered an elephant for the first
time and quickly began to squabble about the nature of elephants;
The first blind man bumped into the elephant’s side and declared that
the beast was like a wall;
The second, discovering the ear, concluded it was like a fan;
The third blind man came across the tail and thought the elephant to
be very much like a rope;
The fourth, encountering the elephant’s leg, was sure the animal resem-
bled a tree;
Finding the tusk, the fifth blind man proclaimed the elephant to be like
a spear;
And the sixth, grasping the elephant’s trunk, concluded the giant pachy-
derm most resembled a snake.
We all know from the ancient Oriental story of the six blind men and theelephant that how we perceive something determines our understanding
of it and, by implication, our response to it. With that in mind, the U.S. military
must shift from a regional to a global view of our security environment in order
to understand and respond better. In the past, America’s security needs were
served adequately by having its uniformed leaders in Washington maintain the
global vision, while the majority of U.S. military organizations maintained a re-
gional or functional focus. However, to provide effectively for the nation’s de-
fense in the twenty-first century, we must all come to understand and appreciate
the global perspective.
Examining trends in the global security environment and the ways in which
the U.S. military has organized to deal with past challenges provides the founda-
tion for understanding the implications for America’s armed forces today, as we
transform our military into one that is ready to provide effective missile defense,
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information operations (IO), space operations, and other capabilities that do
not respect our traditional regional boundaries.
TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
During the last decade of the twentieth century, we witnessed dramatic shifts in
the global security environment. Revolutionary technological advances and mon-
umental political changes rendered our world safer in some ways, though less pre-
dictable and arguably less stable. While students of international affairs have
debated the broader meaning and impact of globalization, defense professionals
have worked to understand the security implications of these global trends.
Technological changes since 1990 have occurred at an extraordinary pace.
Consider for a moment where you were and what you were doing as the Berlin
Wall came down. How many people at that time owned a cellular phone or a per-
sonal computer, had logged onto the Internet, or knew what a global positioning
satellite system was? Whereas television news coverage of the Vietnam War took
thirty-six to forty-eight hours to reach American viewers, stories of the Gulf War
were broadcast around the world instantaneously. During the Gulf War, the Ca-
ble News Network was unique in providing continuous coverage of global news.
Now, several major networks in the United States provide coverage of global
events as they happen, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a
year—not to mention the variety of international news programs produced and
broadcast by foreign broadcast corporations. Al-Jazeera provides programming
that shapes perceptions of the United States in much of the Arabic-speaking
world. Imagery satellites capable of better than one-meter resolution were the
sole purview of superpowers but are now operated by companies in the United
States and Europe for the benefit of whoever is willing to pay for the images. In
August 2002, commercial satellite images of airfields in the Horn of Africa were
broadcast around the world, allegedly showing potential staging areas for at-
tacks against Iraq. For those who missed the news, the satellite photographs were
available on the Internet.
The political changes in the 1990s were no less staggering. As a fighter pilot, I
spent the first twenty-five years of my Air Force career studying Soviet fighter
aircraft that NATO would have had to confront in deadly combat if the Cold War
ever heated up. Now Soviet fighters that could be seen in the West only in classi-
fied photos are performing at air shows over America’s heartland. Today, officers
from the former Soviet Union pursue professional military education at our
staff colleges and war colleges, and three former Warsaw Pact states have joined
NATO. The end of the Cold War lowered the threat of nuclear Armageddon and
brought an end to many of the proxy wars through which the two sides struggled
to exert their influence. But the Cold War imposed on international affairs a
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certain element of stability and predictability that no longer exists. There is an
alarming number of customers—including states and nonstate actors—seeking
to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, includ-
ing long-range ballistic missiles. In short, the technological and political
changes that have improved our quality of life and brought us all closer together
can also be perverted to empower those who would do us harm.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
As we chart our way ahead, we do not begin with a clean sheet of paper. We must
first understand how we arrived at our current way of organizing for national se-
curity if we are to understand why we are better off organizing functionally or
globally for some mission areas rather than relying entirely on regional combat-
ant commands. At the same time, we should appreciate, not abandon, the value
of regional expertise in implementing our national security strategy and na-
tional military strategy.
The experiences of the Second World War and early Cold War helped to dis-
pel lingering illusions about America’s security and its proclivity for isolation-
ism; those experiences drew America’s new international responsibilities into
tighter focus. Responding to America’s changed role in the world, Congress
passed the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Coun-
cil, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. While Con-
gress legislated the overarching security structure, President Harry S. Truman
established the first Unified Command Plan (UCP), creating our regional and
functional combatant commands. Among these newly created commands were
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM),
U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), and the Strategic Air Command
(SAC). The containment policy our armed forces helped to support was a global
one, but there was arguably little need for our regional commanders to focus
globally. In any case, the regional commanders lacked the technological means
to gain and maintain a global perspective.
The first Unified Command Plans merely codified the command structures
that existed at the end of the Second World War. What had once been General
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s command became USEUCOM; General Douglas
MacArthur’s command became Far East Command; and Admiral Chester
Nimitz’s command became USPACOM. There were other regional commands
with responsibilities for Alaska, for the Caribbean, and for guarding the north-
eastern air approaches to the United States, but there were also vast areas of the world
not assigned to any combatant command.1 When our first combatant commands
were established, the service chiefs played an active role in the commands and
served as the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s executive agents in overseeing the commands.
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From the outset of the Cold War, regional commands focused on their re-
gions while the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept a global perspective. Although this ar-
rangement served the nation well enough to see us through the Cold War, there
were signs of trouble as early as 1951, when President Truman dismissed General
MacArthur in the midst of the Korean War. After serving as Chief of Staff of the
Army in the 1930s, MacArthur had lived in Asia until his dismissal by President
Truman in 1951. He first served as military adviser to the Philippine govern-
ment. Then, during the Second World War, he was made commander of U.S.
troops in the southwest Pacific area. After the war, MacArthur became military
governor of Japan, overseeing its occupation and reconstruction. With the out-
break of the Korean War, General MacArthur’s Far East Command provided the
U.S. underpinning to the United Nations war effort. In response to MacArthur’s
protest against limited objectives in the Korean War—“no substitute for vic-
tory”—the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, in-
formed Congress that he and the Joint Chiefs unanimously agreed that in the
global struggle against communism, a wider war in Asia represented “the wrong
war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”2 Though
partly a clash over the utility of limited objectives in war, the disagreement
largely reflected the two sides’ differing perspectives—MacArthur’s Asia-centric
regional perspective and the Joint Chiefs’ global perspective, which had to ac-
count for Europe as well as Asia.
In the fifty-six years since the first Unified Command Plan, our combatant
command structure has been expanded geographically and empowered legally.
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act strengthened the role
of our combatant commands, and with UCP ’02, the last remaining unassigned
regions of the world—Russia, the Caspian Sea, Antarctica, and the countries of
North America—were finally placed within our combatant commanders’ areas
of responsibility (AORs). Now the entire globe is encompassed within the AORs
of our five regional combatant commands—U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Com-
mand (USPACOM), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and U.S.
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
In addition to regional combatant commands, the United States has had
functional combatant commands since the inception of the UCP. In fact, Strate-
gic Air Command was technically the first, formally becoming a combatant
command just two weeks before USPACOM, USEUCOM, and USLANTCOM.
Still, today’s functional unified combatant commands are relatively recent
creations that began with the establishment of U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM) in 1985.3 In the decade and a half that followed, successive ad-
ministrations established U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM),
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U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The rise of
these functional commands highlights the reality that some military missions or
responsibilities can be better fulfilled by carving out functions from our re-
gional commands’ responsibilities than by having the functions dispersed
among our regional commands.
The newly established USSTRATCOM—formed by joining the capabilities
and resources of USSPACECOM and the original USSTRATCOM—is taking on
some missions that had been unassigned previously and that overlap the re-
sponsibilities of our regional combatant commands. USSTRATCOM’s nuclear
focus broadened considerably with the latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
signed by the secretary of defense in December 2001. In addition to specifying
the road ahead for America’s nuclear arsenal, the 2001 NPR also introduced a
new strategic triad. The old triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles has given way
to a triad of strategic offensive capabilities, strategic defenses, and the infra-
structure and research and development needed to sustain America’s strategic
capabilities. Strategic offensive capabilities include nonnuclear, even
nonkinetic, strikes as well as traditional nuclear force employment. As described
in the NPR, the new triad is enabled by command and control (C2), intelligence,
and planning capabilities. The president’s decision to combine USSPACECOM
and USSTRATCOM to form a new U.S. Strategic Command was a major step in
fulfilling the vision for a new strategic triad. Despite its familiar name, the new
command is as different from the former USSTRATCOM as it is from the former
USSPACECOM. It is an entirely new command—and greater than the sum of its
two predecessors. Obviously, the new USSTRATCOM will have global responsi-
bilities, and its commander and staff must have a global perspective for dealing
with threats to U.S. security.
USSOCOM has also been given new responsibilities and a greater role in the
global war on terrorism. The very expression “global war on terrorism” high-
lights the global approach needed for dealing with the problem of terrorism. At
the first Defense Department press conference of 2003, the secretary of defense
announced the change of focus at USSOCOM, pointing out that “Special Oper-
ations Command will function as both a supported and a supporting com-
mand.”4 In the past, USSOCOM has, with very few exceptions, been the
supporting command to our regional combatant commands. Obviously, terror-
ist networks today have a global presence, with members and cells around the
world, and we can no longer adequately counter the scourge of terrorism by rely-
ing solely on regional strategies. We also need a global approach to the problem.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. MILITARY
The establishment of a new USSTRATCOM and an expanded role for
USSOCOM does not come at the expense of our regional combatant com-
mands. This is not a zero-sum equation. Our regional combatant commands
provide essential regional expertise; they provide an enduring basis for U.S.
presence around the globe; they are the keys to successful theater security coop-
eration with our allies and friends; and they provide the basis for pursuing mul-
tinational interoperability and military coalitions. In peace and in war, our
regional combatant commands provide direction to, and C2 over, U.S. military
activities around the world. The challenge for our armed forces today is to bal-
ance these regional responsibilities with the need to address missions that are
global in nature.
Whether we divide our combatant commanders’ responsibilities and author-
ities along functional lines and address them on a global basis or instead choose
to deal with them along regional lines, we create “seams.” Seams—that is, the dis-
continuities where one command’s responsibilities end and another’s begin—
are unavoidable, unless we take the impractical step of making one commander
responsible for everything, everywhere, all the time. However, seams can be-
come vulnerabilities that our adversaries might exploit. Therefore, when organiz-
ing our combatant commands, we strive to place seams where it makes the most
sense to place them—where they provide us the greatest effectiveness and efficien-
cies and present our adversaries with the least opportunity to do us harm.
Missions that cross all regional boundaries require a global approach. One
of those is computer network defense. Electrons do not respect geographic
boundaries, and requiring each of our geographic commands to plan inde-
pendently for protecting computer networks would create unacceptable
seams. Recognizing this, we assigned the lead for computer network defense to
USSPACECOM in 1999. This assignment of a global mission to a commander
with a global perspective was a precursor of the new missions assigned to the
new USSTRATCOM.
Many inherently global military mission areas are of increasing importance
to our security and cannot be addressed well from a regional perspective. Mili-
tary mission areas that are inherently global include the following: integrating
missile defense across areas of responsibility; certain elements of information
operations; space operations; global strike operations; certain intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities associated with global strike, mis-
sile defense, IO, and space operations; and countering terrorism.
Missile defense is a responsibility of all of our regional combatant com-
mands. However, no regional combatant command, even the newly established
USNORTHCOM, is better suited than any other to integrate missile defense
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operations across AORs in support of the president’s stated goal of providing
protection for the U.S. deployed forces, allies, and friends. When missiles in a
distant theater can be used against targets anywhere on the globe, the United
States needs global ISR and global command and control to integrate its missile
defense capabilities—which, by the way, include offensive capabilities to pre-
empt or prevent missile attacks. We cannot afford to think of missile defense
merely in terms of actively intercepting missiles after they have been launched.
Certain elements of information operations similarly require a global per-
spective and better integration of our nation’s capabilities. While information
operations should become a core warfighting capability of all of our combatant
commands, certain IO activities could create effects of such a magnitude that fo-
cusing on regional consequences would be unnecessarily restrictive and ulti-
mately unhelpful. Even when the effects of information operations are limited to
a single area of operations, a global perspective will be needed to ensure that the-
ater IO is compatible with IO in other AORs. A global perspective will often pro-
vide the essential starting point for success, whether we are attempting to get a
message across to an adversarial audience that spans more than one theater, con-
ducting electronic warfare activities to inhibit long-distance communications,
performing computer network operations, or carrying out military deception
programs. Even within a single theater, USSTRATCOM will provide “value
added” to the regional combatant commands by integrating efforts that have
previously tended to be “stovepiped” in different organizations (e.g., C2 warfare,
psychological operations, electronic warfare, computer network attack).
Space operations present another military mission area where a regional fo-
cus is inadequate and a global perspective is needed. Given the vital role space
operations play in global communications, one cannot always determine pre-
cisely where space operations end and information operations begin. In the past,
the supported-supporting relationships between regional combatant com-
mands and U.S. Space Command were predominantly one-way, with
USSPACECOM supporting the regional commands. In the future, we are much
more likely to see regional commands supporting the new USSTRATCOM to
ensure the success of military operations in space. This change in roles will re-
quire our regional combatant commands to develop a deeper appreciation for
the global perspective of America’s security needs.
Given the nature of threats facing America in the twenty-first century, in-
cluding fleeting targets, such as mobile ballistic missiles or leaders of terrorist
networks, we must develop the ability to undertake appropriate military action
rapidly anywhere on the globe. Such action could be taken by today’s long-range
bombers, shipborne weapon systems, or special forces, but new global capabili-
ties will be needed in the future. Regional combatant commands could play
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supported or supporting roles in global strike operations, depending on the sce-
nario and weapon systems involved. However, one need look no farther than our
current global war on terrorism to appreciate the need for a global perspective in
planning for and prosecuting global military operations.
Global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities will be needed
for gathering indications-and-warning data and otherwise to enable global
strike, space operations, certain elements of IO, and integrated missile defense.
Moreover, global C2 capabilities are needed to enable integrated global missile
defense, facilitate global strike, integrate regional operations with global opera-
tions, and integrate regional operations in one area of operations with those of
another. Knitting together various regionally focused ISR activities is unlikely to
yield a coherent global perspective. Simply put, a relevant global perspective
cannot be obtained without ISR activities that are, to some degree, globally co-
ordinated and directed—a function the Defense Intelligence Agency performs.
What is new is that given the low-density/high-demand nature of many of our
ISR resources, regional combatant commands are more likely than before to be
required to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities in
support of global operations tasked to USSOCOM or USSTRATCOM.
Often discussions about the need to shift from a regional focus to a global per-
spective lead to debates about supported-supporting relationships, and inevita-
bly someone will make the claim that functional combatant commands should
always support regional combatant commands. Implied, if not stated, is the be-
lief that conducting operations or executing missions is the sole purview of re-
gional combatant commands and that no functional combatant command
should conduct operations in a regional combatant commander’s AOR. Such
hard-and-fast rules have never existed, and supported-supporting relationships con-
tinue to depend on the situation and mission objectives. That is why supported-
supporting relationships are spelled out in planning orders, deployment orders,
execution orders, in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and in operations plans
and concept plans. Moreover, the term “supported” does not imply sole re-
sponsibility for execution. A supporting combatant commander can execute
or conduct operations in support of the supported commander—something
USTRANSCOM does every day. Our combatant commanders ultimately sup-
port the president and the secretary of defense in the pursuit of American secu-
rity, and the array of possible command relations between combatant
commanders should not be constrained unnecessarily. To the extent we can harness
the ability to observe and operate globally, without self-imposed artificial limi-
tations, we will generate new military capabilities to add to the ones that we have
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today, thereby yielding a greater number of military options from which the
president can choose.
The president and secretary of defense must maintain a global perspective,
and so must the military officials charged with supporting them. While commu-
nications from the president and the secretary of defense to the combatant com-
manders normally pass through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Joint Chiefs and the chairman are not in the chain of command. If there was ever
a time when our nation’s security could be adequately provided by having uni-
formed leaders in Washington maintain a global perspective while commands
around the globe kept exclusive focus on their regions, that time has long since
passed into history. To fulfill faithfully the “commander’s intent” from the presi-
dent on down, combatant command staffs, service staffs, the Joint Staff, and U.S.
officials serving on allied staffs must appreciate our commander in chief ’s per-
spective—a global perspective. If we attempt to do otherwise, we will surely end
up like the six blind men of the ancient Eastern parable in their first encounter
with an elephant, endlessly disputing the nature of something we fail to perceive
fully. By shifting our view from a regional perspective to a global perspective, we
will better comprehend and respond to America’s security needs in the
twenty-first century.
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U.S.-RUSSIAN NAVAL SECURITY UPGRADES
Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead
Morten Bremer Maerli
For a decade, the U.S. Department of Energy has worked cooperatively withRussia to install modern nuclear security systems for weapons-usable mate-
rial. The effort is known as the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
(MPC&A) program; its mission is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation
and nuclear terrorism by rapidly improving the secu-
rity of all weapons-usable nuclear material in forms
other than nuclear weapons in Russia, the NIS (newly
independent states), and the Baltics.1 The program
has substantially increased security for large amounts
of vulnerable nuclear material.2 Hardening storage fa-
cilities against outside but also, even especially, inside
threats is a high priority. Site-tailored and integrated
enhancements include such features as entry/exit bar-
riers and control measures (such as traps, gates, locks,
and portal monitors), personnel access controls, in-
trusion detection systems, alarm communications,
video surveillance, response measures, and computer-
ized systems for nuclear material accounting.3
Notwithstanding successes achieved against the
threat of nuclear theft, however, the bulk of the prolif-
eration challenge remains; hundreds of metric tons of
nuclear material lack improved security systems. As of
March 2003, the Department of Energy (DoE) had as-
sisted Russia in protecting about 228 metric tons, or
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38 percent, of its weapons-usable nuclear material.4 The vast majority of the re-
maining material is at sites in the nuclear weapons complex where, due to Rus-
sian national security concerns, access has been limited and DoE has not been
able to initiate work.
The Department of Energy alone now administers in Russia more than a
dozen distinct nonproliferation programs designed to reduce the risk of nuclear
material or expertise falling into the hands of terrorist organizations and “states
of concern.”5 But there has been an unfortunate tendency to view the various
nonproliferation programs one by one rather than all together. According to
Leonard S. Spector, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Arms Con-
trol and Nonproliferation, there is a need for an approach that recognizes and
addresses cross-program synergy, impacts, and investment opportunities.6 In-
deed, in March 2003 the U.S. General Accounting Office recommended that the
DoE reevaluate its plans for securing Russia’s nuclear material and, with DoD,
develop an integrated plan to ensure coordination of efforts to secure Russia’s
nuclear warheads.7
This article examines the sources of the extraordinary progress of the naval
security upgrades for the fresh, unirradiated naval fuel and nuclear weapons,
and attempts to balance justified security concerns with the need for openness.
The progress made suggests that valuable lessons can be learned from the
U.S.-Russian naval security upgrade program, lessons that could improve on the
mere formalization of access substitutes and contribute to other security up-
grades as well, possibly even to other nuclear nonproliferation activities.
Inherent and legitimate security concerns, however, effectively limit the in-
formation that can be made public from the naval MPC&A program. In fact, the
progress to date could not have been made had not the American and Russian
sides found an effective way to share and at the same time protect sensitive
information.
The assessment is based on interactions with key personnel and on the (lim-
ited) open-source information available on naval MPC&A upgrades. The article
starts with a brief overview and a summary of the historical background and
current status; it then proceeds to an evaluation of the pros and cons of the naval
MPC&A approach. The final section describes future challenges and steps, and
presents recommendations for applying elsewhere the experience of naval Mate-
rial Protection, Control, and Accounting.
OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES
From the very beginning, access to Russian nuclear sites has been a significant
stumbling block for U.S.-Russian cooperation on fissile-material security and
nuclear weapons. There has been a lack of clarity on both sides as to kinds of
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access needed, when, for whom, and most importantly, for what purposes.8 As a
result, for instance, all new security contracting at the most sensitive nuclear-
weapons complexes has been suspended since the fall of 1999, pending decisions
and agreements on access.
The Russians have been reluctant to grant the U.S. access to buildings in the
nuclear weapon complexes because of national security concerns and domestic
laws and regulations. The idea of “substitute” arrangements, or “assurances”—
whereby, for instance, photos and video would supplement or substitute for
physical access to sensitive facilities—is under investigation and has been ap-
plied at some Russian sites.9 High-level talks and working groups between DoE
and the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MinAtom) have been initiated to
negotiate overarching and acceptable agreements for the provision of necessary
assurances. Such solutions are intended to be a pragmatic way of avoiding the
most profound sensitivity issues, but they may not address fully the underlying
problems of distrust.
As of January 2003, U.S. teams had obtained or anticipated obtaining access
to thirty-five of the estimated 133 buildings with nuclear material in Russia’s nu-
clear weapons complex. At the remaining buildings (74 percent of the total),
DoE had no access to design or confirm the installation of security systems.10 The
level of access has thus changed very little since February 2001 (see table 1). In
reality, therefore, progress has been limited for much of the most proliferation-
attractive material in the nuclear weapons complex. In contrast, the American
team working on security upgrades for the Russian navy reports access to all sen-
sitive facilities having fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel (see table 1).
DoE has made significant progress protecting buildings at civilian and naval fuel
storage sites and is nearing completion of its security upgrades at these sites. As
of January 2003, DoE had completed work at 78 percent (eighty-five of 110) of
the buildings at these locations.11
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TABLE 1
ACCESS TO FISSILE MATERIAL SITES
Percentage, as of January 2001
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material
Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: February 2001), p. 8.
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The naval MPC&A team has clearly been better able to overcome distrust and
deal with sensitivity issues. It has been given access despite the secrecy and classi-
fication of the design and composition of Russian naval reactor fuel. DoE has
forged productive working relationships with officials of the Russian navy, over-
come security concerns, and negotiated access appropriate to verify installed
physical protection and accounting systems.12 On the basis of this trust, in 1999
the teams moved from protecting fissile material to naval nuclear weapons. By
January 2001, security upgrades were initiated at forty-one of forty-two naval
weapon sites.13 As of March 2003, DoE reported that security had been im-
proved at thirty-three of thirty-six naval weapon sites, the needed access having
been provided.14 The United States expects to finish security upgrades for four
thousand Russian naval nuclear warheads by 2005.15 DoE has, however, scaled
back its plans to assist operational naval sites that support deployed nuclear
weapons, to comply with January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines that preclude
assistance to most operational sites.16
HISTORY AND STATUS OF NAVAL MPC&A
Russia may hold as much as eighty to eighty-five metric tons of HEU for subma-
rine fuel.17 The fuel’s enrichment levels make it a proliferation risk, and econom-
ical and political turmoil has put fissile material management in the former
Soviet Union under unprecedented stress. In the post-Soviet period, the Russian
navy has had severe problems providing satisfactory storage and protection for
its fresh reactor fuel.18 Originally, decaying fences and simple padlocks often
provided the only security.19
After less than a half-decade of work, however, the DoE MPC&A program for
fresh Russian naval fuel storage facilities has made good progress in reducing the
vulnerability of large amounts of HEU—all at highly sensitive installations—to
theft or diversion.20 According to DoE, all the fresh fuel of the Northern Fleet
and at the Pacific Fleet has now been consolidated at two modern storage bunk-
ers, expanded and secured with U.S. assistance.21 In addition, the United States
has assisted in physical protection upgrades for storage ships and auxiliary ships
involved in refueling operations.22 The first fresh fuel–storage security enhance-
ment, at the SevMash submarine production plant in Severodvinsk, was com-
pleted in the fall of 2001. In early 2001, a second facility at the plant was added to
the list to receive security upgrades.23 By June 2003, these security upgrades were
in their final stages.
The HEU naval fuel reduction line at the Machine Building Plant at
Elektrostal, outside Moscow, remains outside the U.S.-Russian cooperative
MPC&A scope, though some work has been done on the facility’s low-enriched
uranium line. From Elektrostal, the fuel is transported by rail to naval storage
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facilities, where it is stored until needed. The fuel is shipped by truck to refueling
locations. Fuel consolidation made transportation security a more pressing is-
sue; security enhancements for truck shipments of fresh naval fuel, including ar-
mored trucks, have been completed.24 Security for rail shipments, on the other
hand, is being considered as part of a separate transportation security project
with MinAtom.25
The foundations for Russian naval MPC&A were laid in March 1995 when
the then commander in chief of the navy, Admiral Gromov, requested assistance
and cooperation between the Navy, the Moscow-based Kurchatov Institute, and
possibly the United States on upgrades for naval fuel storage and handling.26
(The Kurchatov Institute, which provides a wide range of services for the Rus-
sian navy, had by then become a key player in U.S.-Russian security cooperation; 27
the institute operates independently from MinAtom and is free to initiate coop-
eration and sign contracts and agreements with external parties.) The month
before, Admiral Gromov had participated in a MPC&A demonstration and
technical discussions at the institute. U.S. cooperation through the separate
Russian-American Laboratory-to-Laboratory MPC&A Program was explored
over the ensuing months. (It produced the first security upgrades at the institute
itself, to Building 116, late in 1994.)28
Since July 1993, attempts to steal nuclear fuel had occurred in the Northern
Fleet (as of early 1996, five known attempts. Since then, no new thefts have been
reported; see table 2). All of these thefts involved “insiders” with direct or indi-
rect access to and knowledge about the material. Cooperation with the DoE
through the Kurchatov Institute was a way for the Russian navy to deal with the
problem. In September 1995, the first MPC&A discussions between U.S. techni-
cal experts and the Russian navy were held at the institute. By the end of the year,
all necessary approvals had been obtained to allow the collaboration to go for-
ward.29 In 1996, this cooperation advanced beyond the talking stage and began
to achieve concrete results.30
In February 1996 a course in U.S. approaches to vulnerability assessment was
conducted through the Kurchatov Institute; it included a demonstration of “As-
sess” software for the Russian navy. The next month, representatives from the
Russian navy visited the United States. In May the same year, representatives
from the DoE and U.S. national laboratories, the Kurchatov Institute, and the
Russian navy met in Moscow. A protocol establishing the scope and approach of
MPC&A work was signed. The American program leader and the Russians
agreed that there should be one small, coherent, and experienced U.S. team to
handle all projects. The U.S. side therefore put together a four-person team, with
highly qualified personnel from four different national laboratories, to work di-
rectly with the Russian navy.
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The U.S. side saw and managed the entire “naval sector” as one integrated
program. There was a need to move fast and efficiently, as the Russian navy was
watching developments closely. Following a visit by Admiral Gromov to the
United States in April 1995, American experts had been invited to Site 49, the
main storage site for fresh fuel near Murmansk since May 1994.31 In cooperation
with the Kurchatov Institute, the new expert team designed a set of security up-
grades for the facility, provided necessary new technologies, and funded con-
struction. In parallel, the U.S. team was working at Murmansk Shipping
Company (MSCo) to secure the fresh fuel of the nuclear-propelled icebreaker
fleet. Necessary upgrades focused on the auxiliary ship Imandra—moored at the
Atomflot harbor, north of Murmansk—which carried fresh nuclear fuel; on
port perimeter security enhancement; and on access control. The work at MSCo
began with a site visit in June 1996, followed in September by the first-ever
U.S.-Russian vulnerability assessment. By the end of 1996 the U.S. and Russian
teams had a conceptual design ready.
In July 1996, the Russian navy, the Kurchatov Institute, and DoE issued a joint
statement that they would “cooperate to ensure the highest possible standards of
control, accounting and physical protection for all storage locations of the Navy
of the Russian Federation, containing fresh highly enriched uranium fuels for
naval nuclear reactors.”32 The statement solidified cooperation and a protocol
achieved in a meeting in Moscow in May the same year.
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THEFTS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM, NORTHERN REGION
Source: Rensselaer W. Lee III, ”Recent Trends in Nuclear Smuggling,“ in Russian Organized Crime: The New Threat? ed. Phillip G. Williams (London: Frank Cass,
1996), pp. 118–19, with minor additions.
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A comprehensive agreement with the Russian navy for MPC&A at all naval
sites was formalized in a high-level protocol signed in December 1997 by a new
commander in chief of the Russian navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, and the
secretary of energy, Federico Pena. On this occasion the Russians again stressed
the importance of maintaining a cohesive and highly qualified team, leaving the
U.S. side with little choice but to keep the original personnel. The Russian navy
deemed the threats to the Northern Fleet the most severe.33 When, two years
later, DoE established a similar, but more limited, set of projects for the Pacific
Fleet, it was with the same team.
In January 1999 the scope of nuclear material protection, control, and ac-
counting cooperation with the Russian navy was expanded.34 New initiatives in-
cluded further upgrading of nuclear fuel storage facilities, a feasibility study for
dismantling aging submarines, and the securing of naval spent fuel that repre-
sented a proliferation threat. The program was broadened to include a naval
training facility in Obninsk. More importantly, the security upgrades discussed
above were to be extended to the Russian navy’s nuclear weapon installations as
well as fuel sites.35
On 31 August 2000 an “umbrella” agreement was signed between the U.S. De-
partment of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Defense solidifying this realm
of cooperation and outlining expanded future joint work in nuclear material se-
curity. By this agreement the Russian navy formally became the Russian execu-
tive agent for implementing the cooperative program.36
Other U.S. agencies are far from reaching the level of collaboration with the
Russian Ministry of Defense that DoE has achieved. The Russian Ministry of
Defense has not provided the U.S. Department of Defense with any access to nu-
clear weapon installations.37 However, 34 percent of the fencing paid by the
United States has been installed to address external threats at fifty-two Russian
nuclear weapon sites. In sum, the progress of the Defense Department’s
“Weapons PC&A program,” with the Twelfth Main Directorate of the Russian
Ministry of Defense, has been limited.38 For the most part, the Defense Depart-
ment has hardly been able to move beyond testing the MPC&A equipment to be
installed.39 The high-level agreement between the DoE and the Russian defense
ministry was thus a very important breakthrough.
An overview of completed and ongoing DoE naval facility security upgrades
as of June 2003 is given in tables 3A and 3B.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESS IN NAVAL MPC&A
The examination that follows of the reasons for the progress made in U.S.-
Russian naval security upgrades is based primarily on interviews with key
American personnel. There are essentially five reasons, all of which are likely to
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play important roles in the final outcome of the program:40 strategic goals and
approaches; organizational structure and work methods; compliance with do-
mestic laws and with licensing and certification requirements; high-level in-
volvement and support; and finally, sustainability.
Strategic Goals and Approaches
For the fresh-fuel security upgrades, the Russian and American sides shared in-
terests and purposes from the beginning. Several thefts of naval HEU fuel
prompted the Russian navy to make contact with the United States, and the
Americans were eager to limit the diversion of the proliferation-attractive mate-
rial. The efficiency achieved in implementation was a direct consequence of the
work done for the Murmansk Shipping Company at Atomflot and on board the










































ship; PM 12, PM
74 same class
PM 12

















U.S.-SUPPORTED NAVAL MPC&A UPGRADES
a. Capacity expansion, physical upgrades, computerized control and accounting. Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Ken N. Luongo, Renewing the Partner-
ship: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, Russian American
Nuclear Security Advisory Council, August 2000), p. 60; and David Lambert et al., “Upgrades to the Russian Navy’s Consolidated Storage Locations and Fuel
Transfer Ships,” Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management (n.p.: 1998).
b. U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312
(Washington, D.C.: February 2001), p. 34.
c. New building has same upgrades as Site 49, with hardened entrance portal.
d. DOE Press Release, “Secretary Richardson Hails Completed Security Upgrades at Ceremony in Russian Far East,” US R-00-226, 1 September 2000, available
at U.S. Department of Energy, energy.gov/HQPress/releases00/seppr/pr00226.htm.
e. Detection, communications, intruder delay, response, control, and accountability.
f. GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation, p. 8, n. 6.
g. Large capacity for fresh and spent fuel, liquid radioactive waste.
h. John Brook Wolfsthal, Cristina-Astrid Chuen, and Emily E. Daughty, eds. Nuclear Status Report 6 (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Af-
fairs; and Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2001), p. 134.
i. Carries submarine fuel from Chzhma ship repair facility to Gornyak shipyard. Ibid., p. 146.
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Imandra. The Russian navy appreciated the demonstrated U.S. interest and
commitment, and as a result, for the first time the Department of Energy had an
opportunity to work directly with the Russian Ministry of Defense.
At the outset of the cooperation with the Russian navy, a step-by-step ap-
proach was chosen, in which the Russians decided upon each next step. Every
project thus depended on the success of the previous one, and progress was
closely watched. As one of the American project members stated, “There was
zero tolerance for failure.” Later, urgent improvements (generally finished
within six months) were pursued in parallel with preliminary design work on
comprehensive security upgrades at the same locations. The comprehensive
projects would be negotiated and then implemented according to the agreed
plans.41 As the upgrades proceeded, it became more and more apparent to each
party that its counterpart was committed to make the program work.
Organizational Structure and Work Methods
The initial organization chosen for the naval upgrades was “flat,” a pragmatic,
highly efficient structure. Communication was free among all parties involved.
U.S. team members could personally contact high-level Russian navy counter-
parts. This drastically increased interaction and allowed for quick problem solv-
ing when needed.
The naval MPC&A program was thus a true child of the teamwork spirit of
the early days of U.S.-Russian cooperation.42 The new MPC&A approach in-
cluded willingness to use Russian equipment and contractors.43 The program
also offered a more flexible approach to verification. Instead of a strict on-site
inspection regime, a more cooperative and less adversarial approach was cho-
sen. American and Russian MPC&A experts would sit down together and jointly
assess the situation before and after the security upgrades. What the U.S. team
might lose in terms of insight through formal inspections it was likely to gain
through a voluntary and informal flow of information.
Cooperation between DoE and the Russian navy is governed by confidential-
ity agreements. Information shared within the joint working group that has not
previously been published in the public domain can be released only by consent
of all parties involved. This effectively precluded external assessment or supervi-
sion, but it probably helped increase significantly the information flow within
the group.
The naval MPC&A upgrades are supported by formal documents on all levels
and at all stages of the work. Everything from working plans to protocols and
agreements had (and has) to be approved by all parties. This arrangement allows
formalized delegation of responsibilities and a transparent working environ-
ment. Some overarching agreements have, however, been put in place after the
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projects were well advanced, either to boost or expand ongoing activities or for
corrective reasons.44
The Russian side identifies facilities in need of upgrading. In the design of op-
timal security solutions, however, the two sides work together. A joint vulnera-
bility assessment is performed with the Assess computer model, after discussions
on the input data. Design consensus is not only sought but essential before imple-
mentation of individual upgrades. For example, one facility lacked a sufficient
guard force. No money was released nor further work authorized before the Rus-
sians increased the guards there. (It was this experience, moreover, that made the
Russians realize the need to consolidate the fuel at fewer sites, as no upgrades
would be made at other facilities without similar guard force improvements.)
The Kurchatov Institute serves as a general contractor and an agent for the
Russian navy, as the navy itself is not allowed to sign contracts with U.S. labora-
tories. In addition, the institute often executes work tasks. Vulnerability














































































U.S.-SUPPORTED NAVAL MPC&A UPGRADES (cont’d)
a. Upgrades for detection, intruder delay, response, and material accounting.
b. U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312
(Washington, D.C.: February 2001), p. 34.
c. Upgrades completed on three (Sovjetsky Soyuz, Vaigach, Yamal) out of eight ships as of summer 2003.
d. U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312
(Washington, D.C.: February 2001).
e. Northwestern Russia and Far East, locations unknown. All are inside operational naval bases. Total 260 metric tons of nuclear material, number of war-
heads unknown.
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assessment and preliminary designs are typically assigned to Kurchatov, as is the
establishment of training programs. The institute can subcontract negotiated
tasks; it is the parent company of Atomservice (AS), which performs all types of
civil engineering and construction work. Other security subcontractors are
Eleron and Escort Center; the American team can go directly to these firms if the
Kurchatov Institute is not involved.
The United States pays only for work completed, and not for overhead costs
to the Russian participants. Completed security upgrades are certified in writing
by the Russian navy and are generally inspected by American representatives. All
work performed must be documented and results demonstrated prior to pay-
ment. Every contract is negotiated separately. U.S. laboratories now sign con-
tracts directly with their Russian counterparts, after approval by Department of
Energy headquarters. However, attempts have been made to centralize these
contracts on the U.S. side, as part of an attempt to track negotiations more
closely and to streamline and expedite contacts.
Compliance with Domestic Laws and Regulations
Security systems are designed in accordance with vulnerability assessments and
technical specifications jointly agreed upon. Russian contractors then build the
systems to the agreed design. The systems typically consist of a wide range of
components, including foreign equipment bought in Russia. However, as long as
these components are precertified by relevant Russian authorities, final designs
and systems are regarded as Russian. This eases often-complex issues related to
certification, taxation, and maintenance.
In parallel with the upgrades, a documentation project has been initiated to
assess the current MPC&A regulatory status of the Russian naval nuclear mate-
rials and to determine what the governing regulations and guidelines are.45
While the United States recognizes the relevance of Russian laws and regula-
tions, it is not likely to pay for measures not indicated by vulnerability assess-
ments even if they are required by Russian law. The Russians are, however, free to
include such features themselves. One example is radiation monitors; Russian
law calls for them, but because they do not directly improve security, they are not
normally installed at U.S. expense.
High-Level Involvement and Support
The Russian navy’s Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security
plays an essential role in this collaboration. The inspectorate is led by Admiral
Nikolai Yurasov. The admiral is well regarded within the Navy, and his interest in
and promotion of these security upgrades have been instrumental in the success
and progress of the program. Russian high-level support extends to the head of
the Northern Fleet, a fact that has eased interactions with headquarters-level
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bureaucrats and military opponents of this collaboration. It has, moreover, cre-
ated an important vehicle for communication with other Russian agencies, like
the forces of the Ministry of Interior, which protects facilities of the Russian
Economic Ministry, and the Federal Security Service (FSB).46
The fact that the Navy quite early acknowledged an internal security problem
and declared a genuine interest in fixing it has been important for the support it
has received. MinAtom, in contrast, has tended to put less emphasis on the in-
side threat and to regard MPC&A deficiencies as primarily an economic prob-
lem. International expertise and cooperation thus easily become secondary in
MinAtom’s eyes to obtaining domestic funding for upgrades. Cultural and orga-
nizational differences in the two organizations are also likely to have played a
role. A naval chain of command seems to have eased communication of and re-
inforced directives from Moscow to the facilities where installations were to take
place, limiting the effect of any local intransigence.
On the American side, however, if the naval MPC&A program had top-level
support in DoE, it may have lacked high-level interest. In the beginning, the
small program was not perceived as very important and was more or less “left
alone.” This may have actually, if paradoxically, helped in the initial stages of the
program, as it gave the U.S. side discretion to build the strong foundation its
Russian counterpart was looking for. The American team was not afflicted by
personnel replacements, and all participants soon knew each other. Internal
rules establishing a well defined process, mode of cooperation, and working
structure were quickly put in place. That experience of building up working
groups contrasts, to some degree, with DoE collaborations with MinAtom.
There, in an attempt to manage the program and prevent personnel “burnout,”
the U.S. side has changed personnel and administrative procedures quite fre-
quently, probably to the detriment of the long-term effort.
The role of the U.S. Navy in the early stages of the naval MPC&A cooperation
has been given little or no attention. The initial hope was to get the U.S. Navy “on
board” and initiate reciprocal visits and activities for Russian counterparts to
American naval bases. This, however, has been unacceptable to the U.S. Navy, so
much so that the American MPC&A community is concerned that the whole
collaboration would fail if the Russians asked for such visits. (They have never
demanded or requested any such reciprocity.) Further, to limit the risk to sensi-
tive nuclear information, the U.S. Navy has insisted that only personnel unfa-
miliar with its activities be involved in cooperation with the Russian navy. (The
American team members, handpicked from national laboratories, had indeed
little knowledge of U.S. naval secrets.) These initial objections having been met,
the U.S. Navy backed the program. Its endorsement was of great importance in
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terms of domestic political and bureaucratic support for the program. Through-
out the project, the U.S. Navy has been regularly updated as to progress.
Until recently, and while DoE has always dealt with overall policy issues and
provided oversight, the American team has continued to enjoy a fairly free and
open environment with respect to discussions with Russian counterparts on
technical issues. However, as the naval MPC&A program has grown and matured,
so also has high-level interest on both sides, and with it requirements for over-
sight and control. The recent expansion of MPC&A upgrades to naval nuclear-
weapons installations has also produced closer follow-up and tighter reins.
Further, on the American side, increasing interagency and congressional interest
has required closer project management and an increase in staff at the federal
level. The result has been more complicated and lengthy procedural approaches,
and in turn slower processes and prolonged negotiations, all of which create
frustration at the working level. It has, moreover, limited the interaction and
communication among technical project participants on both sides, reducing
the possibility of quick problem solving when needed.
Sustainability
The training of Russian naval personnel is an integral part of the MPC&A pro-
gram, vital to its long-term operation. A goal of the training program is to instill
in managers a culture of sustainable commitment to MPC&A activities.47 A se-
ries of two courses has been developed and presented at the Kurchatov Institute.
An MPC&A fundamentals class consists of class lectures and practical training
at various facilities. The objective of the second training course is to prepare na-
val personnel to work independently in their particular areas at naval facilities.
In addition, to validate the long-term performance of the installed systems, a
program has been initiated to deal with their life-cycle management. The
Kurchatov Institute has been given this task under a separate contract. The pro-
gram provides a structured way of ensuring the performance and integrity of all
components (including the guard force) of an upgraded system, through regular
(annual) testing, and the program has been the preferred approach of the Rus-
sian Ministry of Transportation. The program reveals whether everything is in
place and identifies special needs, like additional training, maintenance, or spare
parts, as well as problems with software, hardware, or procedures. Life-cycle
management is a quantifiable way of addressing long-term risk reduction and
sustainability of measures put in place. Moreover, structured follow-up rein-
forces the sincerity and commitment to the joint cooperation of all involved.
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FUTURE CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD
The naval MPC&A program now having been successfully implemented, and in
view of the remaining challenges in fissile material security, the theme for the fu-
ture must be expansion. Specifically, the scope of the naval MPC&A cooperation
could be extended, and the naval approach could be extended to U.S.-Russian
MPC&A cooperation as a whole.
Expanding the Scope of Naval MPC&A Cooperation
Notwithstanding the accomplishments of naval MPC&A, there is unfinished
business, as well as room for further improvement in the cooperation with the
Russian navy. As Russian naval facilities are not subject to any form of indepen-
dent supervision or licensing, the long-term quality and sustainability of the
measures now in place are hard to evaluate and protect. Thus, an independent
review of the overall integrity of the integrated systems put in place would be
highly desirable.
The life-cycle management program now introduced is a step in the right di-
rection, but there is a risk that the highly pragmatic U.S. approach taken has ne-
glected Russian laws and regulations—and in a way that may undermine the
long-term security goals of all parties. Certainly, due to budgetary constraints
and the necessity for speed, none of the security systems installed are likely to
meet domestic American standards. The installed accounting systems for fresh
fuel were developed without access to classified Russian fuel information, mak-
ing their value somewhat uncertain.48 Moreover, the guard force is an integral
component in the MPC&A system, yet its mode of employment is novel for Rus-
sian security forces and still poorly understood.
Further, spent naval fuel may contain both plutonium and highly enriched
uranium, and therefore may constitute a proliferation risk; in particular, naval
fuel with low burn-up and extended cooling periods is potentially attractive to
would-be proliferators, both states and subnational groups.49 Currently, the U.S.
MPC&A mandate excludes all of this material. Irradiated Russian naval nuclear
fuel in fact remains highly enriched;50 taking into account its cooling time, it
does indeed pose a threat from a proliferation standpoint.51 This threat will only
increase with time.
Moreover, while the Russian navy has declared that all its fresh fuel in the
northern region has been consolidated into one building, Site 49, where it is pro-
tected, there has been no independent verification. As recently as 1996 the num-
ber of storage facilities to be covered was not known; anecdotal reports indicate
that fresh fuel dumps had been established on the Kola Peninsula as backups for
crises.52 Thus, there is a risk that the Russian navy has not included all depots
needing upgrading—and Site 49, though newly expanded, is reportedly already
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full. No U.S. teams have visited even the known old facilities to verify that noth-
ing was left behind in consolidation. Again, therefore, an independent review
analysis would be highly desirable, to increase confidence in system perfor-
mance and coverage. Such an overall, independent assessment should also be of
interest to the Russian navy, as it would boost security and possibly strengthen
the prospects of expanded American funding.
The inclusion of nuclear weapon sites in the naval MPC&A program is an im-
portant and particularly gratifying development. Russia has indicated that it
would like improved security systems installed at additional weapons locations.
However, as of March 2003, Russia has provided only limited information about
new nuclear weapon locations and security conditions.53 The needed informa-
tion ought to be presented as soon as possible, again to secure future funds and
allow prudent long-term planning.
Finally, the naval program’s establishment of close working relations and
consolidation of fuel at centralized storage facilities has created a sound basis for
an overall Russian HEU accounting exercise. The naval MPC&A may therefore
act as a springboard to increased transparency and possibly future nonintrusive
verification measures for highly sensitive fuel cycles—that is, material with clas-
sified parameters, like the fuel used for naval propulsion or excess fissile material
from dismantled nuclear weapons.54
Extending the Naval Approach
Russia and the United States have come a long way in their nuclear security co-
operation. Yet, as mentioned, the majority, and probably the most challenging,
of the needed MPC&A upgrades in the Russian Federation lie in other coopera-
tive programs for protection of weapon-usable material. Several calls have thus
been made for the need to revitalize U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation.55
In this regard, there is a particular need for a comprehensive review of coopera-
tive security programs to assess strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures.
The focus should be on identifying lessons and determining how to use them to
solve current and future problems.56
The pragmatic, coherent, and flexible stepwise approach of the initial naval
MPC&A upgrades has pointed to a highly efficient way of solving access prob-
lems and achieving results at sensitive facilities. Naval MPC&A would be a useful
“case study,” a source of working methods that might be fruitful at other sensi-
tive facilities in the Russian nuclear-weapon complex. Currently, however, such
unusual program approaches are not held up to broad scrutiny, except on a
piecemeal or even accidental basis, since there is no regular discussion of policy
implementation standards.57
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Ideally, the naval MPC&A experiences could be shared in the forum of a joint,
overarching U.S.-Russian technical committee overseeing the MPC&A pro-
gram, and then distributed to other MPC&A personnel through seminars or
guidelines on achieving program objectives. Policy makers and bureaucrats
could be invited to workshops and briefed on different MPC&A working ap-
proaches. This not only would help them identify best practices and pertinent
differences in national safety and security cultures but could create a foundation
for extended and coordinated threat-reduction support from a wider range of
contributors, such as Western Europeans, who have a self-interest in seeing all
MPC&A programs sustained and strengthened. Naval MPC&A experience
could, moreover, be fed into ongoing access discussions and negotiations be-
tween the Russian and American parties, to help them better determine what
kinds of access are needed, to what, and to what ends.
In the early stages of the U.S.-Russian MPC&A cooperation, a joint steering
group dealt with overall planning and discussions, and developed a joint plan
(including a section on the flexible-assurances approach). This coordinating
group was eliminated in the fall of 1995, after internal disagreements on the Rus-
sian side about who should be in charge of the group. One option would be to
revive this group, making sure that its composition met the criteria of all parties.
A twofold approach could be considered. A U.S.-Russian MPC&A steering
group could deal with the policy aspects and coordination of MPC&A activities.
An equivalent joint technical coordinating group could, on the basis of the naval
approach, identify and refine technical approaches that have been valuable.
Sustainability is typically seen as a “Russian” issue, one of merely overcoming
deterioration due to organizational, structural, technological, and cultural fac-
tors.58 However, there seems to be a need to address the sustainability of sound
MPC&A policy and practice as well. It may be hard to rebuild the collaboration
if it is somehow destroyed; the benefits of maintaining the novel U.S.-Russian
working relationships achieved seem obvious. In recent years, bureaucratic fac-
tors have hampered the effective implementation of U.S. nonproliferation poli-
cies in Russia.59
With the expansion of security upgrades to the area of naval nuclear weap-
ons, and with increased U.S. and Russian federal interest in the project, further
changes of the “rules of the game” may be deemed necessary to allow high-level
authorities on both sides to follow the developments more closely. If so, much care
should be given to avoiding new procedural difficulties. The future of U.S.-Russian
naval security upgrades, and the MPC&A program in general, may strongly depend
on how well trade-offs are chosen between progress and strict oversight.
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The results of the naval upgrades confirm that U.S. and Russian experts
working together in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect can significantly
reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation by improving systems of nuclear mate-
rial protection, control, and accounting.60 As evidenced by the naval MPC&A
program, a flexible and nonadversarial cooperative approach is likely to avoid
many of the problems other parts of the MPC&A program are facing and thus to
achieve the shared long-term goals of sustained nuclear security.
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WHY RUSSIA AND CHINA HAVE NOT FORMED AN
ANTI-AMERICAN ALLIANCE
Richard Weitz
Since the Cold War’s end, many analysts have expected China and Russia to co-operate vigorously to counter U.S. geopolitical superiority.1 Although Chinese
and Russian leaders have collaborated on some issues, substantial obstacles have
impeded their forming an anti-American bloc. This failure of the two strongest
countries with both the capacity and (arguably) incentives to counterbalance
U.S. power and influence in world affairs suggests why the United States contin-
ues to enjoy unprecedented global preeminence. This article analyzes why Rus-
sia and China have not allied against the United States and offers policy
recommendations on how to avert such an anti-U.S. bloc in the future.
At their third November summit in 1997, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin (then the
presidents of their respective countries) set for their two countries the goal of estab-
lishing a “strategic partnership for the twenty-first century.” During subsequent
meetings, they reaffirmed this commitment and jointly criticized NATO’s interven-
tion in Kosovo, U.S. plans to develop ballistic missile defenses (BMD), and other
American policies they opposed. The many comparable
statements by representatives of the two governments,
the large number of meetings between senior Chinese
and Russian officials, and Russia’s extensive arms sales to
China intensified expectations that the two govern-
ments would form an anti-American bloc.2 At this time,
U.S. intelligence agencies undertook a major initiative to
analyze evolving Chinese-Russian relations and their
implications for the United States.3
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Notwithstanding these plausible expectations, however, the normalization of
Chinese-Russian relations during the past decade has proceeded for reasons
mostly unrelated to any joint effort to counterbalance the United States. For in-
stance, the quality of Russian arms purchased by China has been impressive, but
these transactions alone do not constitute a Chinese-Russian military alliance.
Furthermore, the two countries’ policies on a range of important issues have been
uncoordinated and often conflicting. Finally, although the two governments have
signed border and other security agreements signifying the end of their Cold War
hostility, nondefense economic ties and societal contacts between Russia and
China have remained minimal compared to those found between most friendly
countries, let alone allies.
POST–COLD WAR IMPROVEMENTS IN RUSSIAN-CHINESE
RELATIONS
Chinese-Russian relations improved along several important dimensions dur-
ing the 1990s, but how one assesses the extent and significance of these changes
depends on what metric and starting point one uses. For example, ties between
Moscow and Beijing might be said simply to have experienced a “regression to-
ward the mean” from their excessively poor state during the 1960s, 1970s, and
early 1980s. The changes look so impressive only because Sino-Soviet relations
were so problematic before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet
Union in 1985. Ties between Russia and China have come to resemble those one
would expect to exist between two neighboring countries sharing important in-
terests and concerns but differing on many others. Indeed, despite recent im-
provements, relations between China and Russia remain less harmonious than
those existing between Germany and France, the United States and Mexico, or
Russia and India.
Border Stability and Arms Control
During the past decade, China and Russia largely have resolved the boundary
disputes that engendered armed border clashes in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
and they have demilitarized their lengthy, 2,640-mile shared frontier. (The sec-
tion to the east of the Russian-Mongolian border is 2,606 miles long; that to the
west is thirty-four miles.)4
Border demilitarization talks began in November 1989. They soon split into
parallel negotiations, one on reducing military forces along the Chinese-Russian
frontier, the other on establishing confidence and security building measures in
the border region. In July 1994, the Russian and Chinese defense ministers
agreed to a set of practices to forestall incidents. These measures included ar-
rangements to avert unauthorized ballistic missile launches, prevent the
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jamming of communications equipment, and warn ships and aircraft that might
inadvertently violate national borders. In September of that year, Chinese and
Russian authorities pledged not to target strategic nuclear missiles at each other.
They also adopted a “no first use” nuclear weapons posture with respect to each
other.5 In April 1998, China and Russia established a direct presidential hot
line—China’s first with another government.6 China has also signed multilateral
security agreements with all the adjoining former Soviet republics.
These security agreements reflect a common Chinese and Russian desire to
manage instability in the volatile neighboring region of Central Asia.7 At their
December 1999 encounter, Jiang told Yeltsin, “China is ready to cooperate with
Russia, and make use of the meeting mechanism between China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the links with Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, in order to promote stability in Central Asia.”8 Both governments
fear ethnic separatism in their border territories, emanating in part from Islamic
fundamentalist movements in Central Asia. Russian authorities dread the pros-
pect of continued instability in the northern Caucasus, especially Chechnya and
neighboring Dagestan. China’s leaders worry about separatist agitation in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, where deadly uprisings have occurred
since the 1980s. Of the ten million non-Han Chinese in Xinjiang, eight million
are Turkic and have ethnic and religious links to neighboring Turkic popula-
tions in Central Asia.9 From Beijing’s perspective, the security agreements also
facilitated the favorable revision of its borders with Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.10 Chinese and Russian policy makers also have wor-
ried about the activities of Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United
States in Central Asia.
The institutional manifestation of these shared Chinese and Russian interests
in Central Asia initially was the so-called “Shanghai Five,” a loose grouping of
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. On 26 April 1996, the five
governments signed in Shanghai a treaty on military confidence-building mea-
sures that imposed restrictions on military deployments and activity within a
hundred-kilometer (sixty-two-mile) demilitarization zone along their mutual
frontiers. On 15 June 2001, these governments, along with Uzbekistan—a coun-
try that had not participated in the original Shanghai Five, which initially fo-
cused on border security, because it does not adjoin China—formally
established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).11 (Both India and
especially Pakistan also have expressed interest in joining.)12 Building on the
arms control achievements of the Shanghai Five, the SCO has sponsored exten-
sive, senior-level consultations on several issues, including crime, narcotics traf-
ficking, economic development, transportation, communication, energy, the
war in Afghanistan, and terrorism, which has become its most important issue
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of concern. The parties are establishing concrete mechanisms to facilitate such
cooperation—including annual meetings of their defense, foreign, and prime
ministers—as well as formal structures to interact with nonmember govern-
ments and other international institutions. In particular, they agreed in Septem-
ber 2002 to form a SCO secretariat in Beijing, which will be headed by Zhang
Deguang, China’s current Russian-speaking ambassador to Moscow, who will
serve a three-year term as the SCO’s secretary general, supervising a four-
million-dollar budget.13 The previous year, they established a regional anti-
terrorist center to share intelligence and coordinate responses to terrorism.
The latter agency has an initial staff of approximately forty and resides in the
Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, where a Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) antiterrorist center already functions.14 The SCO members also signed
a formal twenty-six-point charter in St. Petersburg on 7 June 2002, and a
“Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism”
at their June 2001 summit. (The juxtaposition of these three terms highlights the
priority the organization’s members place on countering ethnoseparatism and
antigovernment dissent as well as terrorism per se.) In October 2002 China and
Kyrgyzstan conducted the first bilateral antiterror exercise within the SCO
framework, involving joint border operations by hundreds of troops. It marked
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s first maneuvers with another
country’s military.15 The Chinese military also transferred small arms, ammuni-
tion, and other military equipment to Kyrgyz security forces, and they have not
opposed neighboring Kyrgyzstan’s permitting Russian warplanes to deploy at
Kant airbase, near Bishkek, or the basing of U.S. forces at Manas International
Airport.16 Other SCO members have announced their intention to conduct
analogous exercises.
Since the USSR’s collapse, Chinese leaders have favored a preeminent security
role for Russia in Central Asia, as a hedge against untoward changes in the re-
gion’s political status quo and the growth of radical Islamic and American influ-
ence. They also believe a Russian-dominated regional security environment
would allow for the region’s economic development by Chinese and other firms,
especially in the important realm of energy, and permit China to concentrate on
more vital issues—such as Korea and Taiwan.17 The Russians have sought and wel-
comed this Chinese support. Through the SCO, Moscow recognizes as legitimate
Chinese interests in Central Asia, and China finds a mechanism to promote these
interests, in close cooperation with Russia. The newly independent states of Cen-
tral Asia have become not objects of rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, as was
once expected, but a major unifying element in Chinese-Russian relations.
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Mutually Supportive Policy Statements
During the past decade, Chinese-Russian joint statements typically have criti-
cized various American policies. Although these pronouncements normally
have not referred explicitly to the United States, the target was obvious. In place
of an American-dominated international system, the two governments fre-
quently have called for a “multipolar” world in which Russia and China would
occupy key positions, along with Europe, the United States, and perhaps Japan.
They evidently have hoped that such a system would establish a geopolitical bal-
ance that would prevent one great power (e.g., the United States) from dominat-
ing the others.
Chinese and Russian officials also regularly endorse each other’s domestic
policies. Russian representatives have not challenged China’s human rights
practices in Tibet or elsewhere, and they have not backed American-sponsored
UN resolutions criticizing its internal policies. For their part, Chinese officials
have expressed understanding for Russia’s military operations in Chechnya de-
spite other foreigners’ complaints about excessive civilian casualties.18 Such
statements have reflected both governments’ commitment to uphold traditional
interpretations of national sovereignty, which severely limit the right of external
actors to challenge a state’s internal policies. Russian and Chinese officials likely
have found it easier to interact with each other than with their Western interloc-
utors, who constantly importune them to improve their human rights and other
domestic practices.
Beijing and Moscow also frequently express a desire to strengthen the role of
the United Nations in international security. As permanent members of the Se-
curity Council, their vetoes (or even the threat of them, as was the case in March
2003 concerning the then-imminent Iraq invasion) allow them to prevent the
United States and its allies from obtaining formal UN endorsement of any mili-
tary operations they oppose. NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo without
UN approval evoked outrage and dismay in both capitals. China, Russia, and the
other governments of the Shanghai Five publicly affirmed at their July 2000
summit that “they will unswervingly promote the strengthening of the United
Nations’ role as the only universal mechanism for safeguarding international
peace and stability” and that they “oppose the use of force or threat of force in
international relations without the UN Security Council’s prior approval.”19
Russian Arms Sales to China
Russia’s arms sales to China have constituted the most salient dimension of the
growing security cooperation between the two countries. Since the two govern-
ments signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation in December
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1992, China has purchased more weapons from Russia than from all other coun-
tries combined. Estimates of the annual value of these deliveries range from
seven hundred million to a billion dollars during the 1990s, and 1.5 to two bil-
lion dollars during the three years ending in 2002.20 Since the resumption of Rus-
sian arms sales, China has ordered Su-27 and Su-30 advanced fighter aircraft,
Mi-17 transport helicopters, Il-72 transport aircraft, A-50 warning and control
aircraft, SA-10 and SA-15 air defense missiles, T-72 main battle tanks, armored
personnel carriers, Kilo-class diesel submarines, several Sovremenny-class de-
stroyers (equipped with supersonic Sunburn SS-N-22 antiship missiles), and
other advanced conventional military systems or their components. In 2002
alone, China reportedly ordered two Sovremenny destroyers and eight Kilo sub-
marines, and sought to buy forty Su-30 fighter-bombers.21 Furthermore, in Febru-
ary 1996 China bought a multiyear license from Russia to assemble two hundred
Su-27s (without the right to export them to third countries).22 Keeping these sys-
tems operational will require China to import Russian spare parts for years.23
Economic rather than strategic considerations largely explain Russia’s deci-
sion to sell advanced conventional weapons systems to China. Russia has both
surplus arms stocks and excess defense production capacity. This combination
has resulted in widespread insolvency among Russian defense firms, and high
unemployment and low wages in regions that had heavy concentrations of de-
fense enterprises in Soviet times.24 From 1991 to 1995, Russian government or-
ders for products of a military character fell by more than 90 percent.25 In 1998,
the Russian armed forces did not buy a single tank, aircraft, or nuclear subma-
rine.26 Russia’s leaders believe, however, that if it is to remain a great military
power, their country needs to maintain a healthy defense industry. They appre-
ciate that many Russian companies require increased investment to develop the
advanced systems that proved so effective for Western militaries in the Persian
Gulf, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They also have proven suscep-
tible to defense managers’ arguments that a revived Russian military-industrial
complex would help promote recovery in other economic sectors.27 Since the im-
poverished Russian government cannot place enough orders to keep its defense
enterprises healthy, Russian officials have encouraged the firms to sell their wares
abroad. By the end of the decade, Russian defense firms exported approximately
four-fifths of their armaments production.28
China and Russia, however, engage in other forms of military cooperation be-
sides arms sales. A 1993 agreement permitted the Chinese to recruit Russian
weapons specialists to work in China, and Russian aerospace institutes have em-
ployed Chinese ordnance experts.29 A Hong Kong newspaper reported in 2000
that Chinese enterprises had hired more than 1,500 weapons specialists (includ-
ing many in nuclear physics and aerodynamics) from the former Soviet
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republics.30 Another Hong Kong paper claimed that “hundreds” of Russian ex-
perts have helped develop China’s missile technology.31 The two countries also
regularly exchange officers and defense information expertise. In October 1999,
for example, the Chinese and Russian defense ministries agreed to discuss
changes in their military doctrines and to organize joint training.32 Frequent vis-
its take place between senior military officials, including annual meetings of de-
fense ministers.33 Contacts between midlevel military officers, especially those
in charge of border security units and military units in neighboring Chinese and
Russian territories, have grown as well. From 1991 to 1997, 5,205 Russian mili-
tary advisers went to China and 1,646 Chinese defense specialists graduated
from Russia’s military academies.34 The first Chinese-Russian naval exercise, be-
tween two warships of the Russian Pacific Fleet and vessels of the Chinese East
Sea Fleet, based in Shanghai, occurred in October 1999.
IMPEDIMENTS TO DEEPER GEOPOLITICAL COOPERATION
Managing their lengthy border demands a minimal level of cooperation be-
tween China and Russia. Their governments have had to work together to regu-
late trade and migration flows, resist such illegal transnational activities as
smuggling and narcotics trafficking, curb international terrorism and regional
separatism, and implement arms control and demilitarization agreements that
permit them to redeploy or reduce military units. They also perceive mutual
benefits (and a mutual dependence) in their arms trade. The Chinese govern-
ment seeks military modernization, and Russian companies need the money.
Nonmilitary Economic Ties Remain Limited
Russian-Chinese economic exchanges not involving arms sales also have grown
during the last decade, but much less dramatically. Russian consumers, unable
to afford newly available but expensive Western imports, initially showed great
interest in acquiring cheap Chinese products. The Russian government, besides
desiring to satisfy this demand and help China generate income to purchase
Russian arms, has also sought to entice Chinese investment in the impoverished
Russian Far East. A member of a Russian delegation visiting Beijing in March
2000 explained, “Russia wants to balance its trade with China so that it does not
depend so much on military sales. [It] also hopes to attract Chinese investment
into Russia.”35 Although most Chinese investors prefer more enticing opportu-
nities in Southeast Asia, Chinese merchants have eagerly sought to sell goods, in-
cluding food and services, to Russian consumers.
Despite these mutual interests, economic intercourse between Russia and
China has remained limited. Bilateral trade did triple between 1988 and 1993
(from $2.55 billion to $7.68 billion). The initiation of Russian arms sales to
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China provided the main impetus for this upswing, but a March 1992 bilateral
trade agreement and a relaxation of visa requirements, which encouraged pri-
vate traders to shuttle inexpensive manufactured goods and agricultural prod-
ucts across the border, also helped.36 This economic recrudescence resulted in
China’s becoming Russia’s third-largest export market and its second most im-
portant trading partner after Germany. (Russia became China’s seventh-largest
commercial partner.)
Nevertheless, while Russian manufacturers have been able to sell weapons to
China, as well as some advanced technology in the fields of nuclear energy and
aerospace, Chinese importers have preferred to acquire most other categories of
advanced technology from the West. Russian government and business leaders
reacted with dismay in 1997 when the Chinese rejected their tender to help con-
struct hydroelectric power generators for the Three Gorges Dam. Rather than
reward Russia for its political and military cooperation, the Chinese govern-
ment selected on commercial grounds a consortium of European firms for the
$750 million contract. Grandiose Russian proposals to sell oil, gas, and surplus
electric power in Siberia to China also remain unfulfilled. The ineffective legal,
regulatory, financial, and insurance systems of both countries confront traders
and investors with additional obstacles. As one Russian analyst lamented,
Sino-Russian trade continues to “rely disproportionately on ‘shuttle-traders’
and arms dealers.”37 As of the end of 2002, only 1,100 firms involving some Rus-
sian capital have invested in China (with an estimated $250 million), and less
than five hundred enterprises with some Chinese capital have invested in Russia
(with approximately the same $250 million volume of investments).38 Few of the
many registered Russian-Chinese joint ventures have become functional.39
As a result of these impediments, Chinese-Russian trade flows have fallen
far short of the ambitious goal their presidents established at their April 1996
summit—twenty billion dollars by the year 2000. When Jiang and Vladimir
Putin, Russia’s new president, met in Beijing in July 2000, they termed their bi-
lateral economic and trade relations “unsatisfactory.”40 The chairman of the
Russian Duma’s International Affairs Committee, Dmitri Rogozin, acknowl-
edged, “Moscow and Beijing are primarily concerned at the imbalance between
political and economic cooperation, which is effectively zero today.”41 Much
commerce still involves barter arrangements rather than the hard currency deals
Russia, which typically enjoys a substantial trade surplus with China, so desper-
ately wants. Even arms sales suffer from this problem. In 1993 China remitted
four-fifths of the purchase price of Su-27 aircraft in the form of goods.42 Arms
purchases also produce constant disagreements over the prices and technical
specifications of weapon systems, as well as Chinese pressure for offsets (favor-
able nonfinancial side-agreements, such as licenses). Russians prefer to sell
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off-the-shelf items, while the Chinese favor joint or licensed production arrange-
ments that transfer Russian technology and manufacturing capabilities to China.43
The discrepancy between China’s stagnant economic relations with Russia
and its burgeoning commercial ties with many other countries has been re-
flected in a steady shrinkage in the percentage of Chinese foreign commerce in-
volving Russia. The bottom line is that whereas during the heyday of the
Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s over half of China’s total annual trade involved
Russia, the corresponding figure today is approximately 2 percent. (In 2000 and
early 2001, only 3–5 percent of Russia’s trade was with China.)44 From Beijing’s
point of view, its annual bilateral trade with the United States and with Japan,
each worth over a hundred billion dollars, towers over its yearly trade volume
with Russia, which has never exceeded eleven billion. Revealingly, China and
Russia largely ignored each other when seeking to enter the World Trade Organi-
zation (Russia has yet to become a full member). Notwithstanding the comple-
mentary nature of their arms sales, both countries are basically competitors for
foreign investment from American and other Western sources.
Still a Top-Down (and Skin-Deep) Process
Encounters between Russian and Chinese leaders have become institutional-
ized. A pattern of annual summits between presidents developed during the
1990s. Furthermore, the prime ministers of the two countries agreed in Decem-
ber 1996 to meet biannually in a format similar to the “Gore-Chernomyrdin”
framework initiated by the former American vice president and the Russian
prime minister. This structure employs a preparatory committee, headed by vice
prime ministers, that addresses a range of security and nonsecurity issues. Bilat-
eral working groups of lower-level officials iron out details and manage imple-
mentation of agreements. Meetings also regularly occur between Chinese and
Russian foreign, defense, and economic ministers. The two countries have
signed over a hundred intergovernmental agreements and a comparable num-
ber of interregional and interagency accords.45
But contacts among the two countries’ regional authorities and private citi-
zens have lagged far behind those of senior officials. For many years, local politi-
cal dynamics in the Russian Far East presented serious barriers to cross-border
trade and other contacts between Russians and Chinese. Although Russians liv-
ing near China desired Chinese consumer goods, many of them feared illegal
Chinese immigration could lead to their de facto incorporation into China.46
Former Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev even remarked that “persons of
Chinese nationality are conquering the Russian Far East through peaceful
means.”47 A few years later, in February 1998, Chinese prime minister Li Peng felt
compelled to say that the increased flow of Chinese citizens into Russia did not
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represent a “secret colonization.”48 In fact, aside from those few Chinese business
people who find Russian spouses, most Chinese traders see Russia mainly as a
place to make money—not as a home.49
The source of much anti-Chinese feeling in Russia has been the demographic
and economic disparities existing between Russians and Chinese, which have
encouraged Chinese migration to Russia. The seven million inhabitants of the
Russian Far East (representing about 5 percent of Russia’s total population, and
about five hundred thousand fewer inhabitants than in 1992) live in a region of
2.4 million square miles (representing around 28 percent of the Russian Federa-
tion’s total area), a mean population density of only 1.3 persons per square kilo-
meter. In contrast, over a hundred million Chinese live in the border provinces
of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, resulting in a population density fifteen to
twenty times greater. Furthermore, China’s rapid economic growth has ob-
scured the fact that its standard of living still lags behind that of Russia. North-
eastern China has not experienced the rapid economic growth or prosperity of
the southeastern part of the country, and its aging heavy industries cannot pro-
vide adequate employment for local workers. Chinese laborers who work in
Russia typically earn higher wages than they would at home.50
The failure of economic and social exchanges to follow the paths desired by
the two central governments represents a telling example of the top-down na-
ture of the Chinese-Russian rapprochement. The improved relations between
their leaders have not extended to the larger societies. Igor Ivanov, Russia’s for-
eign minister, recently revealingly described “genuine people-to-people diplo-
macy” between Russians and Chinese as “an untapped potential for further
consolidation of our relations.”51 Even at the elite level, the men and women who
once lived and studied in the former USSR are yielding their leading positions,
through retirement or death, to English-speaking technocrats.52 Unlike among
Europeans, or between Europeans and Americans, grassroots ties linking ordi-
nary Russians and Chinese remain minimal. Tourism, cultural exchanges, and
other unofficial contacts lag far behind the growth in security relations. In terms
of popular values and culture, the two nations also sharply differ.53 The partner-
ship between the Chinese and Russian governments remains a largely
elite-driven project that, lacking deeper social roots, could wither as easily as the
earlier Sino-Soviet bloc.
Anti-U.S. Cooperation: Rhetoric versus Reality
Foreign policy cooperation between Russia and China has been much more visi-
ble in their joint approach to Central Asia than in other important areas—
despite their leaders’ calls for foreign-policy “coordination.”54 Their genuine desire
to counter what both consider excessive American power and influence in the
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post–Cold War era manifests itself mostly rhetorically. Since the early 1990s, the
two governments have issued numerous joint communiqués in which they have
denounced various U.S. policies and called for a multilateral rather than a uni-
lateral (i.e., American-led) world. They also jointly sponsored resolutions in the
United Nations urging respect for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
which limited the U.S. ability to deploy defenses against Russian (and, by exten-
sion, Chinese) ballistic missiles. Most recently, they urged the United States and
its allies not to intervene militarily in Iraq without UN (e.g., their) approval.
Despite their common rhetoric, the two governments have taken no substan-
tive, joint steps to counter American power or influence. For example, they have
not pooled their military resources or expertise to overcome U.S. ballistic-missile
defense programs. One Chinese official threatened such anti-BMD cooperation
shortly after Yeltsin’s December 1999 visit to Beijing.55 The Director General for
Arms Control of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Sha Zukang, repeated the warn-
ing in May 2000.56 But such threats ended after Putin, on his July 2000 visit to
Italy, proposed that Russia and NATO cooperate to defend Europe against mis-
sile strikes—despite prior acknowledgment that Chinese officials were “suspi-
cious about Russian initiatives to create a non-strategic missile defence system in
Europe.”57 When asked about the prospects of a joint Chinese-Russian response
after the December 2001 U.S. decision to withdraw formally from the ABM Treaty,
President Putin told journalists, “Russia is strong enough to respond on its own to
any changes in the sphere of strategic stability.”58
An important indicator of the shallowness of Sino-Russian ties has been their
failure, despite the Russia-China “partnership,” to adopt a mutual defense agree-
ment such as the treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance that Mos-
cow and Beijing signed in February 1950. Representatives of both governments
have consistently dismissed the suggestions of such Russian analysts and politi-
cians as Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Duma Committee for Defense, and
A. V. Mitrofanov, chairman of the Duma Committee on Geopolitics, that a gen-
uine military alliance be established.59 Although both governments agreed in
July 2000 to begin drafting a Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighborliness,
Friendship and Cooperation, and signed it in July 2001, they made clear that
neither party had sought a military component in the accord.60 In addition, the
Chinese and Russian militaries have neither trained together nor taken other
steps that would allow them to conduct joint combat operations—even if their
governments wanted them.
Diverse Approaches toward Asia
The limits of foreign-policy harmonization between China and Russia are most
visible in East and South Asia, where the two governments have adopted sharply
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divergent positions on important issues. For instance, despite their mutual con-
cern about the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Russia and China
have persisted in supporting their respective Cold War allies—India in the case
of Russia, and Pakistan in the case of China. PLA analysts and other Chinese se-
curity specialists continue to see India as a potential threat to China’s security.61
For these reasons, the Chinese have expressed irritation at Russia’s commitment
to provide India with nuclear reactors for its civilian nuclear power program.62
The Chinese also have resented Russia’s willingness to sell India advanced weap-
ons that Moscow has not offered to China, including certain fighter planes and
other military technology.63 Russian representatives reportedly have urged the
two governments to improve their relations, but with seemingly little effect.64 In
July 2001, a Russian newspaper reported that “informed sources” believed that
the Indians had rejected “through diplomatic channels” an effort by one of the
directors of the Russian aviation industry to involve the Chinese in a Russian-
Indian effort to develop a “fifth-generation combat aircraft.”65
Although Russia and China share important concerns on the Korean Penin-
sula, they have pointedly declined to coordinate their policies there. Neither
country desires a war or the use of weapons of mass destruction in Korea. They
both also want to keep the North Korean government mollified as they im-
prove their own ties with South Korea. But in both 1994 and 2002–2003, they
resisted separately U.S. threats to impose international sanctions against
North Korea to deter Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons. Moscow
refused to renew the 1961 Soviet–North Korean Friendship and Mutual Assis-
tance Treaty, which had a military intervention clause, when it expired in Sep-
tember 1996. The two governments agreed only to a watered-down treaty of
friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation in February 2000. The new
document provides for nothing more than consultations in the case of security
threats. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov described military cooperation
and sales between Russia and North Korea as of mid-2000 as “virtually absent,”
owing to the latter’s financial problems.66 Russia began in 1996 to provide South
Korea with “defensive weapons,” to cover the commercial debt with Seoul that it
had inherited from the USSR. In contrast, former president Jiang Zemin stated
that China had no plans to abrogate its defense treaty with North Korea.67 As a
result, China has become North Korea’s closest ally.
Most tellingly, Chinese representatives resisted giving Russia a formal role in
the four-party negotiations on establishing peace in Korea. As leaders of a state
bordering the peninsula, Russian officials were understandably concerned
about the implications for their security of either Korea’s nuclearization or re-
unification. Although neither development would necessarily have threatened
Russia directly, either could have affected U.S. and Japanese defense interests,
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which in turn would have influenced China’s security policies, all of which
would have affected Russia. For these reasons, Russian representatives com-
plained that the agenda, goal, and membership of the four-party talks were too
narrow and declared that the future of Northeast Asia “cannot be decided unless
all countries in this region participate.”68 In July 2003, a Russian Foreign Minis-
try spokesperson said that Russia’s participation in any multilateral talks regard-
ing the situation on the Korean Peninsula would be “logical.”69
With respect to Japan, Russia and China likewise have coordinated only rhet-
oric—and their statements have not always converged. Although the joint April
1997 Russian-Chinese declaration did affirm opposition to “enlarging and
strengthening military blocs,” Russian officials have evinced much less concern
about U.S.-Japanese security ties than their Chinese counterparts.70 (Chinese
leaders desire neither a strong U.S.-Japan alliance, which could work to contain
China, nor a weak alliance, which might collapse and lead to Japan’s remilitari-
zation.)71 On a visit to Japan in May 1997, then Russian defense minister Igor
Rodionov even praised the Japanese-American alliance as contributing to re-
gional security, an assessment shared by other Russians anxious about China’s
increasing economic and military strength in East Asia.72 From Moscow’s per-
spective, periodically joining Beijing to denounce U.S.-Japanese defense coop-
eration elicits, at minimal cost, Chinese declarations against NATO enlargement
and other Western policies the Russian government opposes. The appearance of
an embryonic Russian-Chinese united front toward Japan also encourages To-
kyo to moderate its claims of sovereignty over the Russian-occupied southern is-
lands of the Kurile chain—Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, known
in Japan as the “Northern Territories.”73 One could expect the Japanese to recall
that they were the principal target of the three previous treaties between Mos-
cow and Beijing (in 1896, 1924, and 1950). During the last decade, Chinese offi-
cials have expressed renewed support for Russia’s position on the Kurile issue.74
After supporting Japan during the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese government
adopted a neutral stance in the 1990s following the USSR’s disintegration. The
status quo, in fact, best promotes China’s security interests. The unresolved
Kurile dispute impedes a close Russian-Japanese relationship and helps place
Beijing in the advantageous position of having better relations with Moscow
and Tokyo than they have with each other.75
Furthermore, Russia has offered only declaratory and symbolic support for
China’s stance on Taiwan. In September 1992, Yeltsin recalled Russia’s unofficial
diplomatic mission from Taipei and signed a decree committing Russia to a
“one-China” policy. He made these decisions after Beijing had protested that a
Yeltsin aide had visited the island and signed an accord on exchanging
semiofficial representation between Russia and Taiwan.76 During his visit to the
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People’s Republic of China three months later and subsequently, he said that
Russia would maintain only nongovernmental relations (i.e., nonofficial eco-
nomic and cultural links) with Taiwan.77 The connection between Chinese sup-
port for Russia’s policies in Chechnya and Russian support for China’s position
on Taiwan manifested itself clearly in the text of the December 1999 joint com-
muniqué following the second informal summit between Yeltsin and Jiang:
“The Russian Side supported the principled position of the People’s Republic of
China with regard to Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China voiced its support
to the Russian Federation’s actions aiming to fight terrorism and separatism in
Chechnya.”78 As with Beijing’s own relations with Taipei, however, these political
differences have not impeded substantial economic ties between Moscow and
Taipei. Taiwan regularly ranks on an annual basis as Russia’s fourth-largest trad-
ing partner in Asia. Furthermore, Chinese officials have complained repeatedly
that local Russian officials have established excessively close links with the Tai-
wanese government.79
The question of which country would lead a Chinese-Russian alliance pres-
ents a major psychological impediment to the formation of any formal bloc. Un-
like in the 1950s, Chinese authorities will no longer follow Moscow’s guidance in
international affairs as a matter of course. Influential Russians in turn have
evinced little interest in according Beijing primacy. Foreign policy analyst
Dmitry Trenin observed that China, rather than Russia, would likely lead any
geopolitical coalition against the United States: “Having refused to become the
USA’s junior partner, Russia could turn into the PRC’s vassal.”80 This impedi-
ment likely becomes stronger as Russia’s military power, its main source of polit-
ical influence in East Asia, declines and China’s economy surges ahead. During
the 1990s, whereas China’s GDP increased by 152 percent, Russia’s declined by 47
percent.81 As Putin himself noted, this divergence in growth rates has resulted in
a stark transformation in the balance of economic power between the two coun-
tries since 1990, when China and Russia had approximately equal GDPs.82 Today,
although the Russians’ per capita gross domestic product is still approximately
four times greater than that of the Chinese, China’s aggregate GDP is four or five
times Russia’s.83 Many influential Russians fear the long-run implications for Rus-
sia’s security of China’s growing economic and military potential.84
For their part, Chinese leaders have displayed more reluctance than their
Russian counterparts even to suggest that they aim to establish an anti-
American bloc. They studiously ignored then Russian prime minister Yevgeni
Primakov’s suggestion of a tripartite alliance among China, Russia, and India.85
The Chinese describe their relationship with Russia as a “strategic partner-
ship,” the same phrase they use to characterize their ties with the United
States.86 They have characterized China’s approach to Japan in similar terms.87
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Chinese representatives repeatedly affirm that “three noes” govern their policy to-
ward Russia: “no alliances, no oppositions, and no targets against a third country.”88
The current global war on terrorism has provided a further telling example of
how China and Russia have failed to unite to counter American preeminence—
even in the neighboring region of Central Asia. Neither government actively op-
posed the vast increase in the U.S. military presence there, which has seen
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and several other governments host U.S. military bases
on their territory. Rather than offer joint or even unilateral resistance, the Rus-
sian and Chinese governments have contented themselves with gaining Wash-
ington’s tolerance for their respective “antiterrorist” campaigns in southern
Russia and western China. The Russian military even assisted allied operations
in Afghanistan with intelligence and other support. Although Russian leaders
opposed the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq, their diplomats cooperated more with
the French and German governments than with their Chinese colleagues in
seeking to avert the attack.89
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The decade-long improvement in Russian-Chinese relations has yet to evolve
into an anti-American bloc—and it probably won’t. Although both govern-
ments complain about various U.S. economic and security policies, their oppo-
sition on specific cases has been largely uncoordinated and rhetorical. While
they denounce “hegemonism” and use other code words to criticize American
foreign policy, they have preferred to deal with the United States bilaterally
rather than as a united front. Even their mutual opposition to NATO’s military
campaign against Serbia, which the allies justified on human rights grounds that
Russian and Chinese officials feared could later be used against them, did not
prompt them to create an anti-U.S. or anti-NATO alliance. Instead, Russian offi-
cials eventually pressured the Serbian government to yield to Western pressure.
Similarly, neither the May 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bel-
grade nor the April 2001 midair collision between an American EP-3E surveil-
lance aircraft and a Chinese fighter induced Beijing to seek still closer strategic
ties with Moscow. After failing to extract concessions from Washington on unre-
lated disputes (such as the terms for China’s entry into the World Trade Organi-
zation), Chinese authorities decided to downplay the events. They evidently
feared that their outcries about the bombing and the midair incident, combined
with the negative fallout from the Chinese nuclear spy scandal in the United
States, were excessively damaging Chinese-American ties. Moscow and Beijing
also eventually accepted the U.S.-led military operation against Iraq and sup-
ported a new U.N. Security Council resolution that authorized the occupying
powers to govern the country until a new indigenous government emerged.
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Cooperation between China and Russia has remained limited, episodic, and
tenuous. The two countries support each other on some issues but differ on oth-
ers. Thus far, their fitfully improving relationship has not presented a major pol-
icy challenge to the United States or its allies. Russian arms sales have not been of
sufficient quantity or quality by themselves to enable China to defeat the more
technologically advanced militaries of Taiwan or Japan. In fact, China has im-
ported less military equipment in dollar terms than either of those countries.
The PLA typically buys small quantities of advanced weapons in order to learn
about their technologies and how to counter them.90 As a result of this practice
of selective modernization, only a few “pockets of excellence” exist within the
PLA. Most of the Chinese military still relies on pre-1970s Soviet defense tech-
nology. China’s ability even to maintain its complex, imported weapons systems
or make the doctrinal and organizational changes necessary to employ modern
military technology optimally in combined arms operations remains question-
able.91 The expected increase in the quality of China’s defense industries, the
continued decline of Russia’s military-industrial complex, and Russia’s stated
refusal to sell its most advanced weapon systems to a modernizing PLA could
decrease the importance of the Sino-Russian arms trade in the future.
The Chinese-Russian rapprochement appears so prominent largely because
it contrasts so vividly with their recent enmity and because they both lack close
allies. Resentful about lying outside the core American-European-Japanese axis
now dominating international politics, they naturally both try to gravitate to-
ward the West and simultaneously seek mutual solace for their isolation in each
other’s loose embrace. In some respects, they are following the path set by Ger-
many and the USSR during the 1920s with their Rapallo Treaty and cooperative
military programs. Ironically, the better ties between the two countries, as well
as Russia’s improved relations with France and Germany, may work in Washing-
ton’s favor by reassuring foreign observers concerned about potential American
hegemony.
The U.S. government nevertheless should pursue several policies designed to
prevent Russia and China from developing a genuine strategic alliance, which
could impede the attainment of important American foreign-policy goals. Al-
though the probability of such a bloc is low, the negative consequences for U.S.
policies in East Asia and elsewhere could be quite severe should one emerge.
Washington also needs to hedge against the possibility that unanticipated fac-
tors beyond its control will engender such an anti-American coalition.
Continued efforts to maintain strong U.S.-Japanese security ties represent an
essential hedging strategy against a Chinese-Russian military bloc, however im-
probable. The U.S.-Japanese alliance, unlike the weaker Sino-Russian align-
ment, involves extensive cooperation, and not only in the military sphere. More
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generally, U.S. officials should continue to retain robust military forces in the
Asia-Pacific region. Reductions in the size of the U.S. military presence in the
western Pacific could prove possible or even necessary, but they should proceed
in a deliberate manner and in close consultation with other governments. Re-
gardless of the numbers involved, the military presence, combined with
nonconfrontational commercial policies, reassures Asian countries about the
value of maintaining good relations with the United States. The likelihood that
most countries neighboring China and Russia would side with the West against a
Sino-Russian bloc presumably deters these two governments from seeking one.
U.S. policy makers also should continue to encourage reconciliation between
Russia and Japan. Better ties between Moscow and Tokyo would give Moscow an
alternative to aligning with China on Asian security issues. Furthermore, better
commercial ties between Moscow and Tokyo could improve the prospects that
the two countries will satisfactorily resolve the Kurile Islands dispute, perhaps
through some creative shared-sovereignty arrangement. But most Japanese and
other foreign investors will not enter Russia until Russian lawmakers create a
more favorable domestic economic climate.92 In the interim, enhanced coopera-
tion to deal with such mutual, low-level threats as drug trafficking and environ-
mental degradation might help start a reconciliation between these logical
economic partners.
Additional arms control measures could substantially improve regional mili-
tary transparency. Unfortunately, East Asian militaries traditionally have shown
little enthusiasm for arms control.93 Clarifying the quantity and quality of Rus-
sian arms sales to China warrants top priority. Seeking to guard against a
worst-case scenario, other countries might respond to the sales by increasing their
own defense efforts, which in turn could heighten security anxieties in China and
perhaps Russia. From such security spirals, dangerous arms races can arise.
American officials should try to deprive their Chinese and Russian counter-
parts of opportunities to confront the United States jointly. When negotiating
divisive issues with these two countries, U.S. representatives should employ in-
stitutions in which either China or Russia, but not both, are members. For this
reason, the new NATO-Russian Council or the Organization for the Security
and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) would provide a better framework than the
UN Security Council for resolving military differences between NATO members
and Russia. Similarly, Russian and Chinese concerns over American TBMD, or
U.S. complaints about Chinese and Russian commercial and legal practices
(such as those affecting intellectual property rights), are best handled bilaterally.
In this respect, the current practice of excluding Russia from the four-party
peace talks on Korea has the advantage of not encouraging concerted Chinese-
Russian action on that issue.
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As a general rule, however, Washington should try to include Russia in East
Asian institutions or negotiations. Such a policy would recognize that
two-thirds of Russia’s territory lies in Asia and that many Russians identify their
nation as Eurasian. Overtly trying to circumscribe Russia’s role in East Asia
would encourage Moscow to turn more toward China. Integrating Russia into
East Asia’s numerous (though weak) institutions would provide for Russian rep-
resentation independent of Beijing.
Two objectives that might well come into conflict are limiting joint Chinese-
Russian institutional involvement and pursuing important arms control goals.
China’s exports of ballistic missiles and technologies related to nuclear weapons
already work against U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Furthermore, China’s re-
fusal to participate in strategic nuclear arms control negotiations could impede
U.S.-Russian progress in this area. Inviting Chinese representatives to enter into
exclusive trilateral arms control talks with Russia and the United States might
induce their participation, since it would underline China’s status as a great
power. Issues warranting trilateral discussions could include reducing strategic
nuclear forces, banning antisatellite weapons, and especially managing ballistic
missile proliferation.
In this regard, U.S. ballistic-missile defense programs should not even appear
to undermine the viability of Russia’s or China’s nuclear deterrents. The fact that
both Russia and China possess secure retaliatory nuclear forces removes a com-
mon factor underpinning most military alliances—shared vulnerability. Each
state can defend itself, by itself. China’s and Russia’s assured capacity to launch a
retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States or other countries (including
each other) allows them to regard U.S. military superiority with a degree of equa-
nimity.94 No currently envisaged U.S. BMD architecture could negate this capac-
ity, and the quixotic pursuit of one would drive China and Russia closer together.
American efforts to dissuade Russia from selling arms to China will have to
focus on especially disruptive systems. For reasons discussed earlier, Russians
will want to continue to sell weapons to China. A comprehensive U.S. attempt to
bloc Russian arms sales would prove counterproductive, but reasoned argu-
ments about the need to avoid transferring weapons that could enhance the
PLA’s ability to project military power far beyond China’s borders might per-
suade some Russian policy makers worried about harming Russia’s relations
with Washington or its Asian allies.
Russia and China will continue to work together to pursue common goals, but if
the events of the last few years—especially the U.S. military interventions in Ser-
bia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—have not galvanized them to form an anti-American
alliance, it is hard to envisage what will. The global war on terrorism should if
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anything improve relations among China, Russia, and the United States because
their governments all consider radical Islamic terrorism their most pressing se-
curity threat. Just as fears of a revanchist Russia or an expansionist China have
faded in official Washington during the past year, so policy makers in Moscow
and Beijing have become preoccupied with problems other than potential
American hegemony. If a new great power alliance emerges in Eurasia, the
United States will more likely be its member than its target.
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GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE AGE
OF TERROR
Ideas, Domestic Politics, and the International System of States
Donald Abenheim
As the shock waves in the realms of ideas and geopolitical strategy rolled out-ward from Ground Zero on 11 September 2001, the edifice of German-
American security and collective defense shuddered
and soon piled up collateral damage in Washington,
New York, Paris, Berlin, and beyond. In the aftermath
of the terror attacks, culminating in the spring 2003
Anglo-American-Australian-Polish blitzkrieg against
Baathist Iraq, the German-U.S. bond, a basic element
of the Euro-Atlantic security order that has prevailed
for more than a half-century since the end of World
War II, seems to be in the process of collapse. Germany
and the United States are publicly at odds, and the ties
that bind our countries appear to have disintegrated
into vituperation and invective that recall the world of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 If
this cornerstone of the international system of states
changes further for the worse—and any significant
German retreat from the U.S. and North Atlantic ori-
entation that has sustained liberal democracy and
prosperity in and around the Federal Republic of Ger-
many for decades counts as “for the worse”—unpre-
dictable consequences will follow for the United States
and the world order most congenial to it.
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What accounts for the rift between Washington and Berlin at present? No sin-
gle cause emerges from an examination of this situation that hopes to go beyond
the facile, reactive, if not jingoistic, analyses of the chattering classes in Berlin
and Washington. Rather, the current strain is wrought of a convergence of
forces, complicating manifestations of history, ideology, experience, and ambi-
tion that have always swirled around the German-American relationship, how-
ever inchoately. For a variety of reasons, these factors have coalesced to
exacerbate tensions and produce a troubling reaction in the last several months
since the American coalition against terror marched to war, first in Afghanistan
and then in Iraq. This article examines these complicating factors and the cir-
cumstances that have made them so virulent of late.
The following focuses on the German side of the problem, first tracing the
role of ideas in German politics and society, the ideological framework on which
the current debate is built.2 Simply put, in the first instance, since the origins of
such ideas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there have endured mutu-
ally negative images in Germany and the United States as concerns politics, soci-
ety, and culture among political elites;3 these well-worn negative images have
taken on a new virulence in the present crisis because of the upswing in nation-
alist sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic in the wake of Bin Ladenist terror.
Secondly, these ideas interact with domestic political figures and factors that, in
the German case, have been particularly important in the transformation of ex-
ternal relations since the waning phase of the first Gerhard Schröder cabinet af-
ter 11 September 2001.4 That is, Schröder is very different from Helmut Kohl as
concerns German-American relations, and his source of power and influence in
German politics differs from those of his Atlanticist predecessors. Thus, the
analysis here turns to the role of German domestic politics in Berlin’s external
policy today, developments that have not always met with much understanding
among foreign policy elites on these shores.
Third, there is the matter of security and defense policy in Germany, particu-
larly the German aversion to extraterritorial operations—an aversion that, al-
though such policy has given way to a much more global orientation since 1990,
continues to brake German enthusiasm for sending soldiers overseas compared to,
say, the British and French.5 As we shall see, in the formation of security and defense
policy in Germany and the United States, the forces dubious about U.S. diplomacy
and strategy in Germany find their echo, as it were, in those figures and institutions
skeptical of the phenomena recently caricatured by Robert Kagan.6
Finally, the article takes up the implications for the future of a continuing or
worsening German-American split. This issue is central to the emergence of
“New Europe” versus “Old Europe” and the long-term effects of this diplomatic
revolution in the wake of 11 September 2001.
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FROM ENTENTE TO CONFLICT
The U.S.-German amity that now seems so precarious is hard won and vitally
important to the United States and to the world.7 The security and defense ties
between Washington and Bonn, and later Berlin, represented the success of
statecraft that for the first time in modern history forged a durable Central Eu-
ropean bond to the Anglo-Saxon and Atlantic realm, a connection that had been
impossible in the years from 1848 until 1949.8 Whereas the rise of German
might in the era 1870–1939 was a leading source of concern for American mak-
ers of policy in the era of the world wars, the integration of German power into
the international system of states became a symbol of peace and stability in the
years from 1945 until 1990. It also drove the reconstruction and reorientation of
Western Europe, which formed a reliable—and reliably democratic—ally for the
United States during and after the Cold War.9
The high point of the German-American relationship came in May 1989, as
the border that divided Germany and Europe first began to hemorrhage deni-
zens of the East bloc intent on a better life in the West. In the Rhineland city of
Mainz, the first President Bush gave a speech in which he identified the United
States and the Federal Republic as “Partners in Leadership” and inaugurated an
era of good feeling that obtained through October 1990 and German unifica-
tion.10 The events of this period and G. H. W. Bush’s estimation of the German-
American bond marked a fitting conclusion to the Cold War and the century of
world wars.
Of course, for all the mutual esteem that Germany and the United States fos-
tered for each other in the years after World War II, the leaders of both countries
endured in their personal diplomacy episodes of strife and discord that affected
German-American relations. In the first years of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG), the Americans wrongly thought that Kurt Schumacher, the leader
of the socialist opposition to Konrad Adenauer’s Atlantic statecraft, was a na-
tionalist holdover, if not a neo-Nazi.11 After the climax of the Berlin crisis in the
summer of 1961, Adenauer believed that John Kennedy had lurched away from
the Atlantic statecraft and nuclear strategy of the Eisenhower administration;
Adenauer himself shifted toward Charles de Gaulle at the end of his tenure.12
Ludwig Erhard’s chancellorship ended abruptly in 1966, partly as a result of
Lyndon Johnson’s overbearing attempts to make Germany shoulder additional
burdens of Western defense in the era of the Indochina war.13 Richard Nixon and
Henry Kissinger believed that Willy Brandt ventured too far toward Moscow in
1969–70 with his abandonment of Adenauer’s Cold War policies toward Central
and Eastern Europe.14 Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter, despite their shared
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left-of-center political views, disagreed sharply about the means and ends of
North Atlantic Treaty Organization strategy in the second half of the 1970s.15
Still, clashes of personality and vision did not disturb the depths of German-
American affinity. Not so very long ago, news reports carried images of Chancel-
lor Helmut Kohl and President Bill Clinton, two large men meeting over
heart-attack-inducing plates of fettuccini in Georgetown as they consolidated
the gains of statecraft that had emerged from the end of the Cold War. There and
later, amid the organ-meat-oriented delicacies of Kohl’s home region, the Palati-
nate, the conservative German leader and the Democratic American president
later expanded NATO and led German-American diplomacy to new heights of
cooperation and effectiveness. It may be, though, that these feasts heralded the
last hurrah of the comfortable transatlantic entente.
The present condition of the German-American connection surely contrasts
with the recent, but seemingly long gone, past. The German chancellor waged a
populist campaign against U.S. foreign policy to win reelection in 2002. Ameri-
can and German diplomats have been on opposite sides of the green felt tables at
the United Nations Security Council and the North Atlantic Council amid
name-calling and feats of diplomatic sleight of hand that do no honor to the
memory of Dean Acheson, Konrad Adenauer, or Lucius Clay. A senior American
official has grouped Germany with Libya and Cuba as examples of countries op-
posed to U.S. interests. Other voices are calling for boycotts of German goods—
demands echoed in sporadic, informal refusals by German companies to supply
goods to the U.S. market—or punitive acts of defense “realignment” that will
greatly weaken the German-American bond. Beyond giving vent to frustrations
at a relationship gone seriously awry, such rhetoric augurs a troubled future.
Moreover, these pronouncements, as well as the yellow journalism of the tabloid
electronic press, recall the escalation of words and events between the sinking of
the Lusitania in the spring of 1915 and the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917.
The present breakdown in German-American relations began to take shape
after the initial shock of September 2001 dissipated and U.S. armed forces coun-
terattacked the terror network in the Hindu Kush; at the same time the United
States gave short shrift to any substantial NATO support in the Afghan opera-
tion, putatively as a means of avoiding the perceived setbacks of the 1999 NATO
campaign in Kosovo. This phase has reinvigorated in part of the American body
politic an anti-European and anti-German feeling not seen for decades, doing at
the same time much the same among certain elites in Germany who have been
anti-American in times past, notably from the mid-1960s until the early 1980s.
If this development had antecedents in the past, however, never did these phe-
nomena cross the threshold in bilateral relations that was traversed in 2002.
6 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
70
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss4/1
IDEAS AND THEIR CONFLUENCE IN GERMAN
DOMESTIC POLITICS
This writer was in Slovenia on 11 September 2001, as part of the construction
of what in other circles is now called “New Europe.” While waiting to return to
the United States from Vienna, he watched the reactions of people in Central
Europe to the calamity here. One saw sympathy for America, the victim, and
fear of further attacks targeting other Western powers—a combination that
led to expressions of solidarity that echoed the North Atlantic Council’s invok-
ing of Article V of the NATO pact within hours of the attack. Such compassion
was surely genuine, but in some sectors other sentiments soon emerged. From
the earliest moments of the aftermath, one also saw the beginnings of misun-
derstanding based on old anti-American prejudices in both the popular dis-
course and political formulations of certain elites and makers of opinion. This
misapprehension concerns the inability of certain Germans to interpret fully
American history and U.S. ideas about policy and war that appear to contra-
dict what has become, for more than a few members of the present generation
of power holders in Germany, a dogma of peace in all circumstances. Professor
Jeffrey Herf has best described this phenomenon as, first, an underestimation
among the German left of the vices of appeasement in the era 1933–39—that
is, the inability to understand the failures of the West to preempt the Nazi re-
gime and the high price the world was to pay;16 and second, as the tendency to
engage in a form of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (“transformation through prox-
imity,” a term coined in 1963 by Brandt’s press spokesman, Egon Bahr) in every
conceivable diplomatic situation, whether such statecraft is warranted or not.
The present German leadership views events inflexibly in terms of its own dis-
tinct ideological legacy.17
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder holds office as a Social Democrat, a
representative of Germany’s largest center-left party, in coalition with the Green
Party, the latter having emerged in the political and social upheaval of the late
1960s and 1970s, and now part of the political establishment. The Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD) is also the country’s oldest political party, in the sense that its
members today trace their direct organizational and ideological roots to the
middle of the nineteenth century, the era of Bismarck’s German unification and
the nation’s tumultuous first republican experiment. The SPD is also the party
that most stoutly resisted the Nazi march to power in 1930–33. It is a party with a
strong pacifist tradition, or at least a deep skepticism about the use of armed
force. Nonetheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, key Social Democratic figures had
signal roles in the establishment of a new army in the FRG. In no small part be-
cause of the party’s experiences with the totalitarian left both before and after
the Nazi regime, the SPD, unlike many European socialist parties, actively
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resisted communism before 1933 and after 1945, particularly in the form of par-
ties led more or less openly from Moscow during the Cold War.
At the same time, however, the party remained dubious of the free market, see-
ing itself as the arbiter of a “third path” to resolve the tensions of capital and labor,
as well as the geopolitical conflict between the capitalist West and the totalitarian
East. Before and after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949,
this habit of thought translated to resistance to American antisocialist influences
in western Germany, while the new center-right party, the Christian Democratic
Union, at pains to distinguish itself from the reactionary and nationalist tradition
of the prewar right, adopted a strong, pro-American stance. Helmut Kohl repre-
sented such policy from 1982 until 1998, as does the present leader of the opposi-
tion, Angela Merkel. The fondest Social Democratic notions of an independent,
neutral Germany, forging a middle way between great powers, endure in the SPD’s
theoretical substance today. At the same time, the anti-Soviet, pro-Atlanticist
wing of the SPD that held sway from the end of the 1950s until the early 1980s—
best represented by the career of Helmut Schmidt (chancellor 1974–82)—has no
effective successors in Schröder’s cabinet or in the left-of-center camp of German
politics as a whole.
In this vein, the present German-American troubles might be said to have
their distant origins a quarter of a century ago when Helmut Schmidt passed the
apogee of his power and many of the personalities on both sides of the present
German-American tensions perhaps first developed antipathies for one another.
These developments transpired in the second half of the 1970s, amid the col-
lapse of superpower détente and the revival of the Cold War in 1979–80, the pe-
riod of the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the
election of Ronald Reagan. Before the present epoch of terror, then, the potential
for a German-American clash came into starkest relief during the debates be-
tween 1977 and 1987 about the deployment of the so-called Euromissiles,
NATO’s response to Soviet nuclear blackmail.18 The answer of the German left to
such statecraft reflected a misreading of the 1930s by pro-détente forces trans-
muted into the late 1970s and early 1980s. German advocates of an opening to
Moscow misunderstood the fact that the Soviet attempt to overawe the West
with the SS-20 medium-range rocket was born of motives that brooked no com-
promise. Further, the far left in Germany failed to appreciate the efficacy of the
North Atlantic strategy of the dual-track approach of the Harmel doctrine—
which, beginning in December 1967 and continuing until 1989, fostered a re-
duction of East-West tensions but also sufficient NATO defense in the face of the
Soviet theater and strategic buildup.19 The sudden end of the Cold War obviated
the debate amid national unification in peace, but the return of war to Europe
and elsewhere in the 1990s revealed that the discordance of thinking about force
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and statecraft had hardly vanished. Despite what seems to be consensus in the
FRG on the Schröder cabinet’s refusal to back the “coalition of the willing” in the
war against Iraq, this German conflict about force and statecraft has grown far
more intense since 11 September and will likely persist in the wake of the annihi-
lation of the Iraqi armed forces in March–April 2003.20
This phenomenon of a far left that can conceive of statecraft only with an ex-
plicit critique of U.S. policy of strength has a Doppelgänger in a strain in Ameri-
can political thought that is ascendant at the moment. The opposite of an
anti-American Gerhard Schröder is the anti-European and especially anti-
German-socialist dogma that might be said to exist among the foreign-policy
elites of the American right.21 Beyond traditional doubts in some U.S. quarters
about European and German socialists, or outright opposition to them, a
Europhobic school of thought has operated in part of the American foreign-policy
elite since at least the early 1970s.22 This group originally doubted the goals of Willy
Brandt’s statecraft and later deplored any lessening of tension with the Warsaw
Pact—which, in their view, could only lead to the “Finlandization” of Western Eu-
rope.23 This school also worried in 1983–84 that a red-green coalition would result
in a new diplomacy à la Tauroggen and Rapallo, with the FRG marching alongside
the USSR against the West.24 Surely the work of Robert Kagan, which asserts un-
bridgeable ideological differences between Europe and the United States—that is,
the pithy Venus-and-Mars analogy of strategic geography—takes more than a page
from the book of these Europhobes and the strategic debates of their day.25
In other words, Germany’s leftist anti-Americanism collides in the United
States with rightist anti-German or anti–continental European sentiments in
the current debate over grand strategy. These two notions cause an escalatory
diplomatic blow and counterblow of name-calling and invective, as witnessed in
the months before the outbreak of war in late March 2003.26
THE PRIMACY OF DOMESTIC POLITICS IN GERMANY’S
FOREIGN POLICY
With the beginning of the new century, the political burdens arising from the
conjuncture of German unification and weaknesses of the German social mar-
ket economy (which were detectable even before 1989) became ever more
daunting. The tasks of economic and social renewal preoccupy the national
leadership amid a widespread sense of social and political entropy and crisis.
These concerns receive little or no sympathetic analysis among political elites in
the United States, who dismiss the advent of peace along the European Cold War
battlements and the extension of NATO and the European Union as a sideshow
at best. This circumstance leaves Atlantic-minded Germans feeling abandoned
by their elder sibling, the United States.
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In this vein, for instance, the catastrophic floods of summer 2002 in the five
new federal states only served to make Germans more concentrated on their
own affairs versus the wider world. Much like the Chernobyl explosion of 1986,
the event accentuated the importance of ecological international relations—
that is, the floods in Dresden seemed an augur of global warming, a threat more
palpable than al-Qa‘ida kamikazes in jetliners. More enduringly, Schröder’s at-
tention is dominated by Germany’s economic straits, as the country comes to re-
semble 1970s Britain before the Thatcherite free-market coup de main. In the
last decade, the economic growth rate in Germany has averaged 1.6 percent—
the rate in 2002 was a dismal 0.2 percent.27 Officially, unemployment hovers
near 12 percent, a figure that includes neither the underemployed nor women
who, though now jobless, can be counted as housewives. In the eastern part of
the country, where workers by law earn no more than 80 percent of the wage that
a western German worker makes for the same job, the unemployment rate is
much higher, and disaffection for the state and society, expressed through ex-
treme politics and violent gang activity, runs concomitantly high.
It goes without saying, then, that the German leadership has plenty to worry
about at home. Interestingly, the war in Iraq may ultimately help ease Germany’s
economic woes, as it might activate an “exception clause” in the European
Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, which the Germans could cite as a reason for
suspending strict criteria that the Federal Republic cannot meet in its current con-
dition. Under the exception clause, hefty fines for recent violations would be dis-
missed, and the way for increased deficit spending to spur the economy would be
cleared.28 Nonetheless, the head of Germany’s labor office, a Social Democrat, in-
sists that the war and “geopolitical uncertainty” are hindering recovery.29
The political cast of the wartime economic analysis in Germany continues the
basic domestic-political fact of anti-Americanism as a campaign issue. Chancel-
lor Schröder stood for reelection in the summer of 2002. His once-popular cabi-
net had by then become enfeebled by the national economic sclerosis, unable
and increasingly unwilling to free itself from the vise grip of the trade-union
movement, where many cabinet members found their ideological home, to say
nothing of their electoral support. However, the economy—particularly the dra-
matic policy initiatives that the moribund German market would require—made
for difficult contests for politicians interested in being all things to all voters.
As the German election campaign took shape—and as the focus of U.S.
counterterror strategy shifted from the Afghan expedition against the Taliban
and al-Qa‘ida to preparations for the military overthrow of the Saddam Hussein
regime—the SPD also found itself circumscribed by the pacifism of its coalition
partners. These partners were the Green Party and the so-called Party of Ger-
man Socialism (PDS), the Stalinist successor to the former communist party of
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the German Democratic Republic. The PDS kept a strong hold on voters’ hearts
and minds in the eastern part of the country—in part by promising the
anti-American peace platform that the East German leaders had always talked
about but never delivered.
Thus, when Schröder’s challenger from the center right, Edmund Stoiber, the
Bavarian minister-president (governor), asserted on the campaign stump that
Germany should support the United States against Iraq in the war on terrorism,
Schröder found himself another issue. Schröder’s camp seized on Stoiber’s posi-
tion to exploit several factors in domestic politics. With his ever more strident
expressions of opposition to U.S. strategy, the incumbent chancellor appealed to
pacifists and to skeptics of Germany’s Western orientation in the ex-GDR. Fur-
ther, he put the pro-American heirs of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl on
the defensive and, either by accident or by design, emboldened the fringe right
and left in their latent anti-American phobias. At the climax of the September
campaign Schröder’s justice minister, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, long critical of the
administration of justice in the United States, in a talk to union members in the
southwestern German state of Baden-Württemberg likened the American presi-
dent to Adolf Hitler—just one week after the first anniversary of the 11 September
attacks.30 Her comments brought about her resignation from the Schröder cabinet
immediately after he won reelection, but her swift departure did nothing to di-
minish the escalation of vitriol and bad feeling between Berlin and Washington.
Herein reemerged the dilemma of German socialism and state power, force
and statecraft, that has operated since the end of the nineteenth century. Once
more, then, the unhappy experience of German socialists with armed power and
the international system loomed within domestic politics. Surely in years to
come the Schröder election strategy of 2002 and its attendant effects will stand
alongside earlier episodes that tore the SPD apart.31 The most recent of these ul-
timately self-destructive allergic reactions to the use of armed force occurred
when the left wing of the SPD sandbagged Helmut Schmidt over NATO strategy
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. When the dust and rhetoric settled, the So-
cial Democrats no longer held the chancellor’s office and the new German lead-
ers faced some long-term repair work to the German image abroad, particularly
in the eyes of the U.S. policy elite. Schröder’s version of the new era, however,
might yet prove to be even more profound in its long-term effects.
SECURITY AFFAIRS IN THE GERMAN VIEW
The November 2002 North Atlantic Council summit in Prague invited seven
“Partnership for Peace”/Membership Action Plan countries to accede to NATO.
To the extent that the meeting played out cordially, it falsely presaged a lull in the
name-calling between Washington and Berlin. However, the American
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rejoinder to the Schröder election campaign soon followed; a senior Washing-
ton official compared Germany’s resistance to U.S. policy on Iraq (alongside that
of France in the UN Security Council) to the actions of such rogue states as
Libya and Cuba. Not to be outdone, Europe-bashers in Congress called for the
boycott of German goods as well as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from that
country. The Federal Republic, along with France, constituted, in the view of
certain senior American officials, “Old Europe,” an epithet intended to highlight
a disparity with the newly democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe,
which constituted a “New Europe.”32 This “other” continent formed a pillar of
the U.S.-led coalition against terror and weapons of mass destruction. To under-
score this new diplomacy the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and several Central
and Eastern European countries declared their support for the U.S. campaign
against Iraq in the Wall Street Journal of 30 January 2003.33 Henceforth Madrid,
Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, and Warsaw would be the leading European part-
ners of the United States. As the military buildup against Iraq gained speed in
late February 2003, an American effort within the North Atlantic Council to
provide for the collective defense of Turkey as well as the protection of facilities
in Western Europe prompted a nonconsensus demarche by Belgium, France,
and Germany.34 This diplomatic impasse briefly appeared to herald the final col-
lapse of the 1949 Washington Treaty establishing NATO and the success of
French statecraft to detach the Federal Republic of Germany from its Atlantic
foundations and erect an anti-Anglo-Saxon continental bloc.
The crux of the problem for the Germans lies in the knotted issues that attend
combat outside their borders, as well as the abhorrence of war by the body poli-
tic and nearly all foreign-policy elites, who regard armed conflict solely in terms
of futile tragedy. The anti-Washington and anti-London diplomacy visible in
Berlin and Paris in the first weeks of 2003 derived most immediately from the
collapse of transatlantic consensus about terror and weapons of mass destruc-
tion—in addition to the increasing personal antipathy between Schröder and
Bush. However, German refusal to be dragged into other people’s fights is pro-
verbial, going back to Bismarck and his attempts in 1879–88 to keep the second
German Empire out of the Habsburg adventures in the Balkans that would have
alienated Petersburg and thus shattered Bismarck’s European system.35 Even in
1914–18 and 1939–42 there remained a certain grand strategic misunderstand-
ing or indifference to areas beyond continental Europe narrowly defined (that is,
the so-called Kontinentalblick), notwithstanding the Flottenverein (imperialist
Navy League) and Vaterlandspartei (wartime pre-Nazi Fatherland Party) war
aims of 1916 and Nazi propaganda of 1941.
Such indifference and caution reemerged in the Federal German leadership
after 1949. This policy was dictated by national division, as well as by the
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strategic conditions of the Cold War that impelled Bonn to keep the United
States and the United Kingdom linked to the defense of Central Europe but at
the same time to avoid French colonial warfare, later that of the United States, in
Indochina. Indeed, skepticism of what later was called “out of area” (a reference
to the geographical limits embodied in Article VI of the Washington Treaty) was
central to the defense clauses of the German constitution, the Basic Law, drafted
in the 1950s.36 The Basic Law banned the waging of a war of aggression, made
collective security through the United Nations the highest goal of statecraft, and
limited the mission of the armed forces to defense. Statements by the German
cabinet as recently as the early 1980s insisted that the Germans would stay out of
non–Article V contingencies and adhere to the NATO battle lines of the
Thuringian Salient and the North German Plain. Of course, at this same time,
the United States became increasingly engaged in the Middle East because of the
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran and Leonid Brezhnev’s Afghanistan.37
When the precursors of the first Gulf War occurred in the summer of 1990,
amid the process of German unity, the Kohl government watched the United
States withdraw a significant portion of its forces from the FRG and hurl them
into combat against Iraq, while the United Kingdom and France sent their sol-
diers to the Gulf as well. For their part, the Germans provided behind-the-scenes
logistical and financial support—measures that bestirred much domestic furor
about “out of area” adventures and a militarization of German foreign policy.38
The next years saw a fight between the Kohl government’s interventionist inter-
pretation of Article 24 and the SPD opposition’s constructionist adherence to
Article 87a—that is, the Bundeswehr exists solely for national defense in the nar-
rowest sense. As the war in ex-Yugoslavia grew more awful, Germans appalled
first by Saddam Hussein’s missile bombardment of Israeli cities and now by
Slobodan Milosevic’s sieges of Vukovar and Sarajevo turned the political mo-
mentum toward an alteration of the constitutional status quo.
Finally, in the summer of 1994, the Federal German constitutional court de-
cided in favor of the Kohl cabinet.39 The “no to out of area” syndrome was abated
by a policy of gradual steps—from a hospital in Cambodia to the expeditionary
force in Somalia, to the German peacekeeping task in Bosnia, to the combat role
in Kosovo and its aftermath, and most recently, to the security-building phase of
the campaign in Afghanistan.40 The Bundeswehr of 2003 maintains some nine
thousand troops outside of Germany, which, granted the decline of its strength
since 1990, is a substantial number. Nonetheless, this accomplishment tends to
be denigrated by Americans who perpetually misunderstand, for partisan rea-
sons, such issues of defense-burden sharing.41
This transformation of German security and defense to responsibilities be-
yond the horizons of Central Europe received little positive recognition in the
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United States, just as the social and economic burdens of national unification
have often been overlooked.42 In the view of some it is as if the management of
the FRG has failed, in its hostile takeover of a failed rust-belt industry, to treat its
newly acquired property with sufficient sangfroid. The West had won, and Francis
Fukuyama’s “end of history” had eventuated. Why did the Germans persist in
wringing their hands and nattering about the economic consequences of unifica-
tion when a real, free-market liberal-democratic ally would, in a phrase, “just do it”?
In fact, German unification revived an old American habit to overestimate
and simultaneously underestimate—which is to say, generally to misunder-
stand—the situation of the Germans. This issue goes back to the era of Teddy
Roosevelt and Kaiser William II, whose conflicting attitudes about the Monroe
Doctrine and the fate of the Caribbean revealed this phenomenon of misunder-
standing and overestimation of power.43
The syndrome continued through Franklin D. Roosevelt’s assumption, circa
late 1940, that the Germans would soon march on the Amazon Basin as a means
to strike at the United States.44 Similarly, during World War II, the U.S. side over-
estimated the ardor of Nazi Germany’s attempt to secure atomic weapons, and it
overboldly expected Hitler, the Waffen-SS, and the Hitler Youth to fight to the
death until 1948 in the Bavarian Alps. The American project of denazification in
1945–47 also proceeded from a serious misunderstanding of how German soci-
ety had operated in the Third Reich.45 Nothing symbolized such crossed pur-
poses as the simultaneous war-crimes trials against German political and
military figures and hiring by the U.S. Army of German military officers to write
studies on how to fight a war against the Soviet Union (a project that proved a
prelude to the armament of the FRG).46
When unification was at hand in 1989–90, there was impatience with the ten-
tative, circle-and-sniff approach that German lawmakers took to assimilating
the erstwhile East. On the other hand, there arose, at least in certain quarters of
the chattering classes in 1989 and 1990, nightmare suspicions that a unified Ger-
many would revert to the imperialist policy goals of Himmler’s SS Rasse- und
Siedlungshauptamt (SS Race and Settlement Office, home of the SS racial impe-
rialists). In contrast to these fears was the reality of a policy of incremental
change in the Federal Republic of Germany’s force and statecraft, beginning in
the summer of 1990 and accelerating over the decade to come.
Such a process accorded fully with the pattern of German civil-military rela-
tions that took shape at the beginning of the 1950s and has obtained, perhaps,
until quite recently. That is, the formation of U.S. and Atlantic strategy has been
surprisingly open to German interests since 1948;47 its periodic major shifts (for
example, the armament of the FRG, the introduction of tactical nuclear weap-
ons into NATO strategy and force posture, the advent of Flexible Response, the
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diplomacy of unification in 1989–90) subsequently require the laborious for-
mation of consensus in German political parties and other groups.48 This pro-
cess of consensus building usually progresses with less turbulence when
Germany’s external context—especially official American opinion—is clear and
stable. Where, as in the later half of 2002 and into the present, old tensions col-
lide with new uncertainties, the immediate outcome has been less predictable.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY,
AND THE WORLD
One might conclude with the generalization that German-American relations
have gone off the rails in the age of terror, in part (but only in part) because of
the problematic state of politics and society in Germany as it affects external re-
lations. Such a pronouncement does not suggest that all guilt rests with the
Schröder cabinet and the pie-eyed, if not wrongheaded, adherence by some Ger-
man elites to the principles of Egon Bahr, laudable ideas in 1963 (when he was
press spokesman of West Berlin and soon to become a chief architect of Willy
Brandt’s Ostpolitik and a leading figure in SPD politics) that may be dysfunc-
tional four decades later amid a radically changed international context. One
should be grateful that because the reality of a Volk in Waffen (nation at arms)
proved such a disaster in 1914–45, the Germans are dubious about the efficacy
of war. Only an abject disregard for the past allows serious irritation with the
contemporary German reluctance to take up arms in the wider world. Thus, the
Europhobes inside the Beltway who beat their drums of scorn do so for their
own amusement and domestic political profit, not to set sound policy for the
United States.
To be sure, the Schröder government, in the face of a stagnating society and
politics, has given in to the temptation to flirt with nationalist extremes. The
present German government appears to have forgotten the role of common
sense in sound diplomacy, as well as of the long view of statecraft in Central Eu-
rope. A more advised view argues for the simultaneous orientation of the FRG to
a peaceful Western Europe, including a Gaullist France, and also to the United
States and the Atlantic dimension. However, this analysis does not fully explain
the wreckage of U.S.-German relations since 2001.
The United States, particularly in the preemptive campaigns to come in the war
against its terrorist foes, must better perform the trick of evoking gratitude in
statecraft from Europeans while also instructing them in the vitality of U.S. inter-
ests. Since the 1999 NATO campaign against the Serbs in Kosovo, if not long be-
fore, the American school of thought that puts national interests first—and that
touts its refrain of “the mission defines the coalition”—has brought a return to the
bad habits and messy, if not brutal, customs of the Atlantic burden-sharing fights
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of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.49 The difficult diplomacy about collective defense,
national prestige, nuclear and conventional arms, and balance of payments between
London, Washington, and Bonn that no doubt enraged people on both sides in
1963 may have been appropriate in the context of that year, just as Bahr’s idea of
détente may have been, as well. That was then, however. Since 11 September 2001
the postmodern revival of Lyndon Johnson’s burden-sharing headlock of a hapless
Ludwig Erhard has become excessive.
Such unhelpful practices, customary to the secondary, technical level of bilat-
eral relations, must have their counterweight in statecraft that comprehends the
strengths as well as the limitations of military power and that assesses realisti-
cally the respective civil-military potential of each democratic nation. One must
grasp without illusion what a given country can and cannot do in the realm of
defense, in terms not just of force strength and hardware but also political and
social realities. Only thus can one avoid the exaggerations of over and underesti-
mation, as have recently had such acrimonious effect. To be sure, this writer re-
grets that the Germans have not, and will not, increase their defense spending, as
they did in the years 1960–80. But one cannot expect the same performance on
this score from a now unified, but nonetheless self-preoccupied and encum-
bered, Germany as one can from a United States on the march. To embrace a pu-
nitive policy by which Germany, the most populous and important country in
Europe, should be outflanked by Spain and Poland may be an efficacious tactic
in the short term, but it will surely backfire over time. It will become increasingly
clear that something must operate to limit American global power; meanwhile,
what has been the fringe phenomenon of nationalism will intrude into the cen-
ter of domestic German politics.
The present war against terrorism may have implications beyond the obvi-
ous—the collapsed World Trade Center and the toppled statues of Saddam
Hussein. If one is to believe the idea of new Europe versus old Europe, implying
the marginalization of Germany by the United States, the defense bond to Ger-
many will decline. This contingency would mean a diplomatic revolution for
both Germany and the United States, a foreign relations scenario that was always
the subject of intellectual inquiry but never took on the life and depth that it
seems to have in the last year. A United States cut off from Germany and vice
versa, while the former somehow tenuously anchors itself more to the latter’s
neighbors (and victims of the nineteenth and twentieth century), may well rein-
force baleful trends in the evolution in peace and security in Europe. This asser-
tion reflects no criticism of Poles, Danes, or Czechs, or of the Romanians and
Bulgarians, either, who were victims of a different kind. The United States and
the entire project of Western liberal democracy need the newly democratized
states of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the U.S.-German bond
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continues to have a particular significance in this connection. Germany can
reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and they respond in
kind, because of the Atlanticist foundation that has operated for more than a
half-century—such has been the central goal of American policy since 1945. Al-
though it may sound peculiar in 2003 to those ignorant of the history of Europe,
Germany’s peace and security have relied on its bond to America and France si-
multaneously, much in the way that Prussia’s and later Germany’s good fortune
from 1815 until 1888 relied on the bond with czarist Russia. In the latter case, the
northern courts had been a force for stability and order, as well as peace of a
kind—a peace and an international system that, despite its faults, proved far
better than the fragmented European system that arose thereafter and culmi-
nated in world wars.50 The world order anchored by the U.S.-German relation-
ship has integrated Germany into Europe without more bloodshed, brought the
transformation of communist Europe, and visited prosperity—and the political
and demographic stability that go with it—on a part of the world that could eas-
ily have found itself mired in the kind of enduring strife that tore asunder ex-
Yugoslavia and roils Israel today. There is rather more to lose here than Hummel
figurines and wooden nutcrackers in the tourist shops of Garmisch-
Partenkirchen and the sticky French pastries at NATO headquarters in Brussels.
Indeed, the passing of the post-1945 order poses a vast question mark over
the brave new world of Machtpolitik and the vigorous pursuit of U.S. interests by
first strikes and punitive expeditions. Germany will be cut loose, no longer fully
settled in a complete European structure that can hold it. France, Belgium, and
Luxembourg plainly do not constitute the totality of Europe, and the new Eu-
rope of Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, Tallin, Sofia, and Bucharest cannot func-
tion sensibly—or democratically—without its central and western portions.
The danger exists that this new system, which appears to have lurched into exis-
tence through secondary causes, will face an enduring test of grand strategic ef-
fectiveness—that is, to provide a durable and lasting peace that has been the
criterion for the system crafted in the years after 1945.
This question of the grand strategic efficacy of the “coalition of the willing”
within the Euro-Atlantic sphere is the final issue, when one gets past the collec-
tive lunacy represented by boycotting German meat products, McDonald’s,
Coca-Cola. One need only recall that the collapse of the European system in the
1890s began with tariff fights over food and the like, disputes later instru-
mentalized by demagogues and zealots who railed against the limitations and
musty diplomacy of the old world. The results were appalling—two world wars, a
riven Europe, and all the opportunities that these circumstances cost. This insight
is one to bear in mind, even in the blast of war and the rapture of victory.
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GLOBALIZATION AND NATURAL-RESOURCE CONFLICTS
Scott Pegg
High-profile recent conflicts involving lucrative natural resources in suchcountries as Angola and Sierra Leone have drawn increasing attention to
the link between natural resources and violence. While recent strategic, media,
and academic attention has understandably focused on Iraq, the United States
currently imports 15 percent of its crude oil from Africa, a figure that is forecast
to increase to 25 percent by 2015. The Gulf of Guinea is poised to grow in strate-
gic importance for the United States, and senior military and diplomatic offi-
cials are reportedly in advanced discussions with São Tomé e Principe about
establishing a regional U.S. Navy base there.1 This arti-
cle argues that natural resource–related conflicts in
places like West and Central Africa are not well under-
stood. While such conflicts are unlikely to pose sub-
stantive operational risks to U.S. military forces, a
failure to understand the dynamics underlying them
risks exposing U.S. forces to smaller-scale Somalia-
like military problems and, perhaps more importantly,
to serious public relations and reputational risks.
One of the factors that makes natural-resource
conflicts especially noteworthy is the alleged role
played in them by leading private-sector actors. The
sovereign governments of Angola and Sierra Leone
both hired the services of Executive Outcomes, a pri-
vate military company. De Beers has faced mounting
pressure over its purchase of diamonds from these
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war-torn areas. Oil companies in Burma, Colombia, Nigeria, and the Sudan have
been directly linked to state violence against local host communities.
Traditional security studies have generally neglected profit-oriented natural-
resource conflicts. One recent large-scale empirical survey on conflict notes
that nine of the thirteen wars identified in 1998 took place in Africa. Its au-
thors posit that “this might be related to the phenomenon of weak states, to the
increased erosion of boundaries, and to open or clandestine intervention from
neighboring countries.”2 They make no mention of any role that natural re-
sources or private-sector involvement might play in generating these conflicts.
Similarly, this project limits its definition of armed conflicts to conflicts that
result “in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”3 Thus, it lists no armed conflicts for
Nigeria, because the thousands of fatalities suffered in recent years by groups
like the Ijaw and Ogoni in violence surrounding oil extraction in the Niger
Delta are not considered “battle related.” Policy makers and senior members of
Western armed forces might be inadvertently misled by such studies into
thinking that resource-rich West African countries are far more peaceful than
they really are. With a broadening, or loosening, of this “battle related” crite-
rion, the Ogoni from 1993 to 1995 and the Ijaw from 1998 to 2001 would merit
inclusion under this survey’s categories of “intermediate armed conflict” or
even of “war.”4
The cited survey also limits itself to two types of conflict—incompatibility
concerning government and concerning territory. As there is no category for
wars to control natural resources, countries such as Angola and Sierra Leone are
classified as incompatibilities concerning government. This neglect of natural
resources is stunning, given that a recent World Bank study found that “the ex-
tent of primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of
conflict.”5 Three-quarters of sub-Saharan African states still rely on primary
commodities for half or more of their export income.6
Our focus here is on how the global economic incentives surrounding valu-
able natural resources facilitate and influence intrastate conflicts. One leading
scholar has observed that “viewing the international system in terms of unsettled
resource deposits . . . provides a guide to likely conflict zones in the twenty-first
century.”7 Nonetheless, the argument advanced here does not extend to tradi-
tional interstate conflicts (water wars in the Middle East), let alone systemwide
strategic geopolitics (great-power conflicts in the Caspian and South China
Seas). Natural resources are increasingly important determinants of contempo-
rary violence; they will not, however, necessarily produce “a new geography of
conflict, a reconfigured cartography in which resource flows rather than politi-
cal and ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines.”8
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TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF NATURAL-RESOURCE CONFLICT
The diversity of civil wars is widely noted. One theorist observes, “The reasons
for which civil wars are fought, the levels of organization among the various
contesting parties, the degree of involvement by external powers and the politi-
cal outcomes of such contests have all varied widely.”9 Much the same can be said
for the smaller subset of natural-resource conflicts. These conflicts vary widely
along a number of dimensions, including culture, religion, and location (cases
can be found in Africa, Asia, and Latin America); the nature of the resource be-
ing contested (e.g., diamonds in Sierra Leone, hardwood forest products in
Cambodia, oil in Nigeria); and the nature of the participants (degrees and types
of corporate involvement, the presence or absence of organized opposition
groups). We can construct a typology of natural-resource conflicts by focusing
on three different variables: the nature of the resource being contested, the public-
private composition of the resource extractors and the security providers, and
the nature of the instigators and targets of violence.
The nature of the resource being contested and, specifically, how capital-
intensive its extraction is influences the form that natural-resource conflicts
take. As one observer notes, “Economic violence among rebels is more likely
when natural resources can be exploited with minimal technology and without
the need to control the capital or machinery of the state.”10 Thus, rebels are more
likely to be able to fund their operations from easily mined gems than they are to
control more capital-intensive processes, such as oil extraction. Angola was an
interesting example of this phenomenon, in that the late Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA
rebels were concentrated in areas where diamonds could be mined easily with
minimal equipment and sold by the briefcase or small plane load at a time while
the government depended on revenues from the much more capital-intensive
oil industry to fund its war effort. Thus, one is more likely to see a weak state los-
ing control of its territory and calling in private-military assistance, à la Sierra
Leone, when easily mined gems or minerals are at stake. Conversely, situations in
which large corporations find themselves dependent on the protection of state
security forces are more likely when the extraction of lucrative resources (like
oil) requires huge investments.
Obviously, this “easily mined”/“capital-intensive” dichotomy is not absolute.
One cannot, for example, rule out the possibility of large corporations involved
in the extraction of surface mineral deposits or guerilla forces directing their ef-
forts toward capital-intensive industries. By one estimate, Colombian guerillas
attacked pipelines and other oil industry infrastructure 985 times between 1986
and 1996.11 The type of resource involved does, however, suggest the likely na-
ture of the resource extractors and security providers, as well as the instigators
and targets of violence.
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The mixture of public and private involvement in the extraction of resources
and the provision of security can be visualized in a two-by-two matrix (see the
table) where the columns represent the resource extractors and the rows repre-
sent the security providers. Each category can be divided into public and private
participants.
Moving in a clockwise direction from top left, it is the second box (corpora-
tions depending on state security services) and the fourth box (states depending
on private military companies) that have received the most academic attention
to date, albeit in isolation from one another. The purely public activities in
the first box have traditionally been viewed solely in terms of domestic hu-
man rights abuses, while the purely private activities in the third box have
generally been discreet enough to escape attention. Viewing natural-resource
conflicts in terms of such a ma-
trix breaks down the artificial
separation between similar phe-
nomena—that is, the second and
fourth boxes.
The third dimension to con-
sider in constructing a typology
of natural-resource conflicts
concerns the participants, insti-
gators, and targets of violence.
An important distinction here
is between violence that is uni-
directional and violence that is
multidirectional. In this sense, “unidirectional” refers to violence that flows
primarily in one direction—from an instigator to a target. “Multidirectional”
refers to violence that flows back and forth between competing parties. These
categories should be seen as ideal types representing different ends of a contin-
uum, with many points in between. For example, the violence directed against
the Ogoni in Nigeria was unidirectional in the sense that the Ogoni were the re-
cipients of violence (more than two thousand civilians were killed) but were not
instigators of violence (no Shell employees or Nigerian security personnel are
known to have been killed by the Ogoni). The violence in Colombia, on the
other hand, has tended to be multidirectional—comprising, for instance, gov-
ernment violence against rebels, rebel violence against the government, rebel vi-
olence against corporations, and corporate financial support for government
violence against rebels.
The participants also vary. In some countries, like Colombia and Sierra Le-
one, sovereign governments face viable, well-organized competitors. In such
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situations, state officials and private corporations may act both as instigators
and targets of violence. In other cases, such as Ecuador and the Niger Delta, the
competitors that sovereign authorities face are seeking better terms from the ex-
ploitation of natural resources on their land but do so primarily through peace-
ful means. In these cases, indigenous host communities are likely to be the
primary targets of violence.
LINKING RESOURCES AND VIOLENCE
In discussing the dynamics of for-profit violent resource extraction, it is impor-
tant to consider what is and is not new about this process. While there have been
some important changes since the end of the Cold War, there are also definite
historical continuities. The practice seen in Nigeria by which state troops protect
corporate operations goes back at least as far as 1707, when the German state of
Wurttemberg provided troops to the Dutch East India Company.12 The same
company also hired Japanese mercenaries to subdue local opposition to its dom-
inance of the spice trade in what is now Indonesia.13 Describing the rubber
boom in the Belgian Congo, one leading historian observes that “the entire sys-
tem was militarized. Force Publique garrisons were scattered everywhere, often
supplying their firepower to the companies under contract. In addition, each
company had its own militia force.”14 Contemporary cases thus have long histor-
ical antecedents.
The end of the Cold War has, however, brought about changes that account
for the seemingly increased importance of natural resources to both sovereign
authorities and their nonsovereign challengers. In particular, faced with super-
power disengagement and a more liberalized world economy, both sovereign
and nonsovereign leaders have been forced to adopt market-oriented strategies
in order to survive.
In and of themselves, lucrative commodities are not either creative or de-
structive forces. They do, however, seem to encourage particularly poor policy
making on the part of government leaders. The fact that many diverse states that
are richly endowed with resources have produced dismal economic and political
results has variously been described as the “resource curse thesis” and the “para-
dox of plenty.”15 In terms of sovereign states, while the resource curse has a num-
ber of different aspects, we will focus on three here: the internationalization,
centralization, and privatization of the state.16 In the interaction of these three
factors one can find reasons why lucrative natural resources often encourage
state rulers to embrace violence.
The internationalization of a state signifies the increasing dependence of state
leadership, particularly in the absence of Cold War superpower backing, upon
the revenue earned by such fully internationalized commodities as diamonds,
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oil, and hardwood forest products. Such commodities are “fully international-
ized” in the sense that their revenues are derived from the external global econ-
omy and are paid in dollars. The presence of such hard currency rents obviates
the needs for domestic taxation and state building. This internationalization
strategy is appealing, because “the ruler finds that encouraging these various
external actors to align themselves with his political network’s private interests
maximizes the resources available to clients, reinforces his personal capacity
to control resource distribution and hence increases the political authority at
his command.”17
A state becomes centralized “as a mechanism of accumulation and distribu-
tion.”18 In most tropical countries, the state claims exclusive ownership over
valuable natural resources. The monies earned from these commodities are fre-
quently paid directly into the central government’s treasury. Local and regional
authorities tend to have little, if any, claim on these revenue streams. In Nigeria,
for example, the percentage of
revenue allocated to regions of
derivation declined from 50 per-
cent at independence to a low of
1.5 percent in the early 1990s (it is
presently 13 percent). The central-
ized receipt of natural-resource revenue encourages corruption and cronyism.
The state is simultaneously amplified and destabilized as central power increases
but “is typically combined with weak authority and limited administrative and in-
stitutional capacity in the context of intense competition for state resources.”19
Finally, a state is privatized in the sense that rulers increasingly abjure formal
bureaucracies and institutions in favor of their own, personalized networks of
control. The result is the emergence of “strong networks of complicity between
public and private-sector actors” outside formal state institutions.20 The wealth
generated from such networks is then translated into political resources to re-
ward cronies and punish enemies.
Leaders of internationalized, centralized, and privatized resource-rich states
depend upon commercially successful exploitation of natural resources for their
survival. This dependence upon the revenue streams generated by natural re-
sources promotes and encourages violence. The frequent end result of such
vested interest in the efficient and uninterrupted exploitation of profitable re-
sources is that “militaries, paramilitary organizations, and state agencies often
create or exacerbate resource-based conflicts by their participation in protective
activities, their involvement as actors, or their coercive tactics.”21
The ending of Cold War financial support also shifted the calculus of guerilla
movements in a more market-oriented direction. As one observer points out,
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the decline in external support and patronage “has not led guerrilla movements
to conclude that they should stop fighting: it has just made them realize that
their war economies have to change completely.”22 Thus, rather than trying to
woo foreign patrons, opposition groups have increasingly focused on control-
ling remunerative commodities that can be traded globally. Gems and diamonds
are ideal, in that they are easy to extract, can be transported economically, and, at
least after processing, are difficult to identify by region of origin. Successful ex-
amples can be found throughout Africa. Between 1992 and 1998, UNITA ob-
tained an estimated minimum revenue of $3.72 billion from diamond sales.23 In
the early 1990s, Charles Taylor’s “Greater Liberia” earned an estimated eight to
ten million dollars a month from various corporations extracting rubber, tim-
ber, iron ore, gold, and diamonds from territory it controlled.24 Based on their
demonstrated and long-standing abilities to finance themselves, one suspects
that former warlords like Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor make reliable busi-
ness partners.
The shift toward natural resources–based funding for rebel groups has had
two distinct results, both of which lead to increased levels of violence. First, this
shift has encouraged a fragmentation and proliferation in the number of rebel
groups. Control over lucrative natural resources increases local actors’ freedom
of maneuver. During the Cold War, rebels had incentives to remain united—to
assure outside supporters and enjoy the benefits of external funding, which usu-
ally came through a centralized channel. Today, however, financing “is directly
raised at a local level by individuals who have less and less reason to accept the
control of any hierarchy or authority.”25 This change is reinforced by the prolif-
eration in light arms and the resulting buyers’ market for such weapons: “Indi-
viduals and small groups can now easily purchase and wield relatively massive
amounts of power.”26 The second shift concerns changes in the types of rebel
groups. Employing a distinction between “stationary” and “roving” bandits, one
scholar argues that the participants in today’s resource-based conflicts are in-
creasingly likely to be of the roving variety. Whereas stationary bandits depend
on the prosperity of their host communities and thus have reason to establish vi-
able systems of governance, roving bandits “merely extract resources from areas
and move on. They will therefore tend to be extremely predatory and destruc-
tive.”27 This argument is correct about the predatory nature of today’s rebel
groups but wrong, at least in the context of natural-resource conflicts, about
who it is that has to “move on”—it is the local civilian population that is forced
to flee. Thus, the traditional guerilla emphasis on winning popular support has
given way to a more vicious strategy of territorial control through population
displacement.28 The growth in the number of rebel groups and their increasingly
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predatory nature contribute to the escalation of violence surrounding natural-
resource extraction.
While both states and rebel groups have incentives for violence, each ulti-
mately depends upon the availability of willing corporate partners if it is to
transform resources under its control into hard currency. Conflict-ridden tropi-
cal countries would initially appear to be unappealing locations for foreign in-
vestment. Poor enforcement of property rights and inability to guarantee
physical and legal protection of assets effectively bar entry for most service and
manufacturing firms. As one theorist maintains, “the former requires a govern-
ment that can enforce property rights and prosecute infringement on them. The
latter requires political stability that allows foreign business to operate and re-
coup investments.”29 Such concerns do not, however, affect self-sufficient,
self-contained resource-extraction operations to the same degree. These en-
claves do not depend on local firms as suppliers, nor do they require local mar-
kets for their goods. Their basic requirements are just secure working facilities
and access to ports or airports from which their products can be transported to
the global marketplace. The cash flow generated by lucrative resource extraction
means that “firms earning resource rents can afford to pay criminal gangs, pri-
vate militias, or nascent rebel armies for the private enforcement of their prop-
erty rights while still earning a normal profit.”30 Such firms can also, as in the
second quadrant of our table, afford to pay “field allowances” to sovereign mili-
taries and, if necessary, purchase weapons for them.
The ability to cordon off operations from problems in the local economy and
the fact that resource-extraction firms must go where the resources are allow
these companies to bear political risks of a different order of magnitude than
other firms will consider—thus Shell’s decision in November 1995 to announce
a three-to-four-billion-dollar in-
vestment in Nigeria a week after
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other
Ogoni leaders were hanged, and
the continued refusal of compa-
nies like Total and Unocal to disengage from Burma long after other well known
firms, like Levi Strauss, Motorola, and Pepsi, have done so. As one former oil ex-
ecutive puts it, for a resource-extraction firm, “dealing with the regime in place,
regardless of its nature, is comparable to dealing with the owner of a property
which is needed for a project.”31 One might add that the “regime in place” may or
may not be a recognized sovereign government.
The interesting question here is just how much of a role corporations play in
the violence surrounding natural-resource conflicts. As one leading scholar ar-
gues, much of the “resource curse” literature treats criminal gangs and private
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militias as exogenous—that is, the decision of resource firms to employ them
does not influence the strength, prevalence, or behavior of such groups. Yet in
settings where the rule of law is already tenuous, “the presence of resource firms
may help these groups form (or enable preexisting groups to expand) by giving
them lucrative opportunities for extortion. Just as the presence of monopoly
rents tends to foster rent-seeking behavior, the presence of resource rents may
foster the rise of extralegal organizations that seek out ‘protection rents.’”32
While this argument focuses exclusively on “extralegal organizations,” the
second box in our table (private resource extractors, public security providers)
illustrates that this logic applies equally well to sovereign security forces that
take advantage of these “lucrative opportunities for extortion.” Some resource-
extraction firms subcontract their security functions to rebel groups or private
military companies; others utilize sovereign armies. The underlying logic re-
mains the same.
Another way of framing this question is to ask whether corporations actively
play a role in creating, maintaining, or exacerbating violence or whether, as the
firms themselves would have it, they are merely innocent bystanders, complying
with all relevant domestic regulations. In fact, and even beyond the enormous fi-
nancial support they offer governments and rebel movements, the centrality of
corporations in creating and exacerbating security threats to local populations
can be demonstrated in two main ways.
First, corporations have a catalytic effect, tending to bring local populations into
confrontation with military forces. Looking specifically at oil companies, in the
Burmese case it is estimated that the troops stationed where the Yadana natural-
gas pipeline was constructed increased from five battalions in 1990 to more than
fourteen in 1996.33 In the Nigerian case, it was corporate actions, such as pollut-
ing the environment and refusing to pay compensation for such pollution, that
led to community protests in the first place. On numerous occasions, such com-
munity protests have brought security-force abuses, often “right next to
company property or in the immediate aftermath of meetings between company
officials and individual claimants or community representatives.”34 Perhaps the
ultimate expression of this corporations-as-catalysts logic comes from the Su-
dan. The correlation there between planned corporate oil-exploration sites and
subsequent Sudanese military offensives is striking:
Military operations against rebel forces in Western Upper Nile and military opera-
tions designed to secure the oil fields are not distinct from one another. In fact, they
are the same. Oil facilities and infrastructure are de facto military facilities, the oil
fields are the most heavily militarized locations, oil company property and personnel
are viewed as military targets by rebel forces and indigenous rural communities are
considered security threats by forces protecting oil company property.35
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Second, companies can have a direct effect on the security of local host com-
munities. Oil companies have been accused of purchasing weapons for state se-
curity services in Colombia and Nigeria. They have also (in Burma and Nigeria)
transported military troops in
their helicopters and boats and
(in the Sudan) shared airport fa-
cilities with helicopter gunships.
Furthermore, corporations may
make specific requests for military assistance, or not, as they choose. Oil compa-
nies have directly requested assistance from the Nigerian security services in a
number of episodes that have subsequently resulted in the deaths of nonviolent
protestors.36 These companies claim credit for the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes when they ask the military authorities not to intervene forcibly. Yet they
disclaim responsibility for fatalities when they do request intervention, arguing
that they are required to do so by domestic law. Companies are not powerless ac-
tors. They make choices that directly affect the security or insecurity of local
populations.
Unlike state leaders and guerilla groups, however, corporations are arguably
the only leg of this tripod of actors on which in recent years incentives for less vi-
olent behavior have increased. In 1997, following a torrent of bad publicity in
the wake of the Ogoni hangings in 1995, Royal Dutch/Shell became the first en-
ergy company publicly to declare support for the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. The following year, the company explicitly addressed human rights
issues in the first of a series of annual reports on the firm’s financial, social, and
environmental responsibilities.37 Texaco withdrew from operations in Burma in
1997. De Beers has recently announced plans to transform the way it conducts
its business in the wake of mounting public opposition to its purchase of dia-
monds from rebel groups in Angola and Sierra Leone.38
The extent of such changes should not, however, be exaggerated. The British
firm Premier Oil, for example, chose to remain in Burma for more than two
years after the British government took the unprecedented step in April 2000 of
asking it to withdraw from the country.39 TotalFinaElf and Unocal still remain in
Burma today. The Malaysian state oil company Petronas maintains investments
in Angola, Burma, Chad, and war-torn southern Sudan. Even after the bad pub-
licity surrounding Shell’s links to the Nigerian military, Chevron transported
military troops on two separate occasions in 1998 and 1999 that resulted in the
deaths of unarmed civilians.40 When asked at a shareholders meeting in May
1999 whether the company would officially demand that the Nigerian military
not shoot protestors at Chevron facilities, the chairman and chief executive offi-
cer gave a one-word response: “No.”41
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IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND SCHOLARSHIP
Conflicts surrounding the extraction of lucrative natural resources are becom-
ing increasingly prevalent, but there are two particular reasons for caution be-
fore a decision to intervene. First, local rebel and guerilla movements consider
the large revenue streams generated by natural resources worth fighting for.
While such forces may not pose serious operational risks for the U.S. military,
the possibility is very real of daring raids or ambushes meant to produce a few
dozen U.S. casualties, as in Somalia, to undermine civilian support for the inter-
vention. Second, and perhaps more importantly, engagement in such conflicts
potentially opens U.S. forces to serious risks with respect to public relations and
reputation. Activists, nongovernmental organizations, and what some observers
have labeled “transnational advocacy networks” have proven increasingly adept
at networking with local host communities in oil-rich regions like the Niger
Delta and southern Chad and at “telling their story” to the outside world.42 As
local residents in such areas typically live in abject poverty, without access to
piped drinking water or electricity, when billions of dollars of (say) oil wealth
are being taken from their lands, that story is likely to resonate well. It is not dif-
ficult to envision a scenario in which U.S. forces intervening to preserve access to
oil or other vital mineral supplies end up being portrayed, rightly or wrongly, as
the military wing of large transnational corporations or as willing accomplices
of corrupt and repressive regimes like those in Angola or the Democratic Re-
public of Congo. The public relations aspects of natural-resource conflicts will
likely prove far more challenging for U.S. forces than the military, operational,
or strategic aspects.
In terms of general policy, such bold and dramatic suggestions as the recent
proposal to manage global resource stockpiles collaboratively, through the es-
tablishment of new international organizations, seem implausible.43 Instead, the
greatest leverage for improvement lies perhaps in pressuring private-sector ac-
tors to end their complicity in the violent extraction of lucrative natural re-
sources. This strategy is certainly not guaranteed to succeed, but there are clear
cases in which large corporations have changed (or at least acknowledged the
need to change) their behavior. As a group, private-sector actors would seem
more amenable to moral suasion than are either state leaders or guerillas.
There is the danger, however, that larger corporations obliged by public pres-
sure to disengage from volatile regions will simply subcontract that business to
smaller and less scrupulous operators. This was one of Shell’s responses to calls
to pull out of Nigeria: “If we leave,” the company said in effect, “the oil will still
be taken out, but by companies that are less open to responsible dialogue than
we are.” On one hand, this argument should be rejected summarily. As one phi-
losopher comments on oil investment in the Sudan, “Providing strategic
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resources and moral cover to a regime which is committing crimes against hu-
manity . . . is wrong. No one should be involved in it, regardless of what anyone
else does.”44 On the other hand, however offensive and self-serving such a corpo-
rate rationale, there is some truth to it. While companies like Shell and Chevron
may have much to answer for, fly-by-night proxies are not necessarily desirable
alternatives. Indeed, in companies like Petronas and Unocal we may already be
seeing the emergence of a new breed of second-tier transnationals with business
models premised on their comparative advantage in unsavory markets where
more socially responsible companies fear to tread. Still, the conclusion remains
that for those concerned with improving human and environmental conditions in
resource-rich regions, private-sector corporations offer the best prospect for posi-
tive movement of any of the three legs of the violent-resource-extraction triangle.
A number of theoretical implications also emerge. The first is the need to direct
analytical attention toward the economic rationality underlying these conflicts.
Theoretical explanations that focus on ancient hatreds or primordial ethnic dif-
ferences are unlikely to be of much use in explaining the market-oriented behav-
ior of participants in violent, for-profit extraction of natural resources.
While much of the academic international relations literature has focused on
“failed” or “collapsed” states, the dynamics of natural-resource conflicts suggest
a different focus. A more fruitful avenue of inquiry might be the de facto privat-
ization of the state by warlords, state leaders, and their global corporate part-
ners. Very few states actually collapse. Even those that do, like Cambodia,
Lebanon, and Somalia, are propped up juridically by the international society of
sovereign states, which has a compelling interest in their at least nominal preser-
vation. The institution of sovereignty is not in widespread decline and we
should not expect to see large numbers of states collapsing in the coming years:
“The main danger lies less in the disappearance of States than in their takeover
by business interests.”45 Juridical states will continue to survive; the idea and
practice of the nation-state, however, “will become ever more marginal to deals
negotiated between local chiefs and transnationals, an imbalance in bargaining
power if ever there was one.”46
Theories of international relations are often presented in universal terms. In
reality, their relevance may be limited to very specific regions or time periods.47
The insights generated by our focus on natural resource–related conflicts do not
apply globally. Such factors as the simultaneous internationalization, centraliza-
tion, and privatization of the state, and pressure on opposition groups to shift
toward more market-oriented strategies, simply are not present in many in-
stances. Nonetheless, if whatever theories are ultimately developed to explain
the link between violence and resources are not universal, they will be relatively
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broadly applicable across an equatorial belt of resource-rich states in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America.
Moving beyond this preliminary exploration of the conceptual issues sur-
rounding natural resource–related conflicts, one of the first tasks would be to re-
fine the typologies employed here and to see what (if any) generalizations,
however contingent, emerge from them. In other words, is the violence sur-
rounding natural resources higher or lower, or more or less amenable to peace-
ful settlement, when certain types of actors or resources are involved? Are there
contingent generalizations that hold across particular subsets or types of natural
resource–related conflicts?
A goal for further research should be to clarify how broadly or narrowly such
contingent generalizations apply. It is still an open question whether or not
economies based on commodities other than oil, like those of Botswana or
Papua New Guinea, can fruitfully be compared to those of petro-states like Iraq
and Venezuela.48 Can all resource-rich or mineral-exporting states be treated
similarly, or do, for example, diamond states have distinctly different dynamics
than oil states? Recent empirical work suggests that both oil and other non-oil
resources have strong and substantive anti-democratic effects, but clearly more
needs to be done here.49 Similarly, there is a potential selection bias at work to-
ward cases like Angola, Burma, Colombia, and Sierra Leone. The danger here is
that “in examining only cases of conflict, one is likely to find at least partial con-
firmation of whatever one is looking for.”50 To address this problem, further re-
search needs to be conducted into the question of why some resource-rich
countries, like Botswana and Chile, have been able to avoid such conflict.
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Imagine a great metropolis covering hundreds of square miles. Once a vital com-ponent in a national economy, this sprawling urban environment is now a vast
collection of blighted buildings, an immense petri dish of both ancient and new
diseases, a territory where the rule of law has long been replaced by near anarchy
in which the only security available is that which is attained through brute
power.1 Such cities have been routinely imagined in apocalyptic movies and in
certain science-fiction genres, where they are often portrayed as gigantic ver-
sions of T. S. Eliot’s Rat’s Alley.2 Yet this city would still be globally connected. It
would possess at least a modicum of commercial linkages, and some of its in-
habitants would have access to the world’s most modern communication and
computing technologies. It would, in effect, be a feral city.
Admittedly, the very term “feral city” is both provocative and controversial.
Yet this description has been chosen advisedly. The feral city may be a phenome-
non that never takes place, yet its emergence should not be dismissed as impossi-
ble. The phrase also suggests, at least faintly, the nature of what may become one
of the more difficult security challenges of the new century.
Over the past decade or so a great deal of scholarly
attention has been paid to the phenomenon of failing
states.3 Nor has this pursuit been undertaken solely by
the academic community. Government leaders and
military commanders as well as directors of
nongovernmental organizations and intergovern-
mental bodies have attempted to deal with faltering,
failing, and failed states. Involvement by the United
Dr. Norton holds an undergraduate degree from Tulane
University and a Ph.D. in international relations from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Before retir-
ing as a commander in the U.S. Navy he served exten-
sively at sea in cruisers and destroyers and in a variety of
political-military billets ashore. He is now a professor of
national security affairs in the National Security Deci-
sion Making Department of the Naval War College.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 4
101
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2003 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
States in such matters has run the gamut from expressions of concern to cau-
tious humanitarian assistance to full-fledged military intervention. In contrast,
however, there has been a significant lack of concern for the potential emergence
of failed cities. This is somewhat surprising, as the feral city may prove as com-
mon a feature of the global landscape of the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury as the faltering, failing, or failed state was in the last decade of the twentieth.
While it may be premature to suggest that a truly feral city—with the possible
exception of Mogadishu—can be found anywhere on the globe today, indicators
point to a day, not so distant, when such examples will be easily found.
This article first seeks to define a feral city. It then describes such a city’s at-
tributes and suggests why the issue is worth international attention. A possible
methodology to identify cities that have the potential to become feral will then
be presented. Finally, the potential impact of feral cities on the U.S. military, and
the U.S. Navy specifically, will be discussed.
DEFINITION AND ATTRIBUTES
The putative “feral city” is (or would be) a metropolis with a population of more
than a million people in a state the government of which has lost the ability to
maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning
actor in the greater international system.4
In a feral city social services are all but nonexistent, and the vast majority of
the city’s occupants have no access to even the most basic health or security as-
sistance. There is no social safety net. Human security is for the most part a mat-
ter of individual initiative. Yet a feral city does not descend into complete,
random chaos. Some elements, be they criminals, armed resistance groups, clans,
tribes, or neighborhood associations, exert various degrees of control over por-
tions of the city. Intercity, city-state, and even international commercial transac-
tions occur, but corruption, avarice, and violence are their hallmarks. A feral city
experiences massive levels of disease and creates enough pollution to qualify as
an international environmental disaster zone. Most feral cities would suffer
from massive urban hypertrophy, covering vast expanses of land. The city’s
structures range from once-great buildings symbolic of state power to the
meanest shantytowns and slums. Yet even under these conditions, these cities
continue to grow, and the majority of occupants do not voluntarily leave.5
Feral cities would exert an almost magnetic influence on terrorist organiza-
tions. Such megalopolises will provide exceptionally safe havens for armed resis-
tance groups, especially those having cultural affinity with at least one sizable
segment of the city’s population. The efficacy and portability of the most mod-
ern computing and communication systems allow the activities of a worldwide
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terrorist, criminal, or predatory and corrupt commercial network to be coordi-
nated and directed with equipment easily obtained on the open market and
packed into a minivan. The vast size of a feral city, with its buildings, other struc-
tures, and subterranean spaces, would offer nearly perfect protection from over-
head sensors, whether satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles. The city’s
population represents for such entities a ready source of recruits and a built-in
intelligence network. Collecting human intelligence against them in this envi-
ronment is likely to be a daunting task. Should the city contain airport or sea-
port facilities, such an organization would be able to import and export a variety
of items. The feral city environment will actually make it easier for an armed re-
sistance group that does not already have connections with criminal organiza-
tions to make them. The linkage between such groups, once thought to be rather
unlikely, is now so commonplace as to elicit no comment.
WHAT’S NEW?
But is not much of this true of certain troubled urban areas of today and of the
past? It is certainly true that cities have long bred diseases. Criminal gangs have
often held sway over vast stretches of urban landscape and slums; “projects” and
shantytowns have long been part of the cityscape. Nor is urban pollution any-
thing new—London was environmentally toxic in the 1960s. So what is different
about “feral cities”?
The most notable difference is that where the police forces of the state have
sometimes opted not to enforce the rule of law in certain urban localities, in a fe-
ral city these forces will not be able to do so. Should the feral city be of special im-
portance—for example, a major seaport or airport—the state might find it
easier to negotiate power and profit-sharing arrangements with city power cen-
ters to ensure that facilities important to state survival continue to operate. For a
weak state government, the ability of the feral city to resist the police forces of
the state may make such negotiations the only option. In some countries, espe-
cially those facing massive development challenges, even the military would be
unequal to imposing legal order on a feral city. In other, more developed states it
might be possible to use military force to subdue a feral city, but the cost would
be extremely high, and the operation would be more likely to leave behind a field
of rubble than a reclaimed and functioning population center.
Other forms of state control and influence in a feral city would also be weak,
and to an unparalleled degree. In a feral city, the state’s writ does not run. In fact,
state and international authorities would be massively ignorant of the true na-
ture of the power structures, population, and activities within a feral city.
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Yet another difference will be the level and nature of the security threat posed
by a feral city. Traditionally, problems of urban decay and associated issues, such
as crime, have been seen as domestic issues best dealt with by internal security or
police forces. That will no longer be an option.
REASONS FOR CONCERN
Indeed, the majority of threats posed by a feral city would be viewed as both
nontraditional and transnational by most people currently involved with na-
tional security. Chief among the nontraditional threats are the potential for pan-
demics and massive environmental degradation, and the near certainty that
feral cities will serve as major transshipment points for all manner of illicit
commodities.
As has been noted, city-born pandemics are not new. Yet the toxic environ-
ment of a feral city potentially poses uniquely severe threats. A new illness or a
strain of an existing disease could easily breed and mutate without detection in a
feral city. Since feral cities would not be hermetically sealed, it is quite easy to en-
vision a deadly and dangerously virulent epidemic originating from such places.
As of this writing, the SARS outbreak of 2003 seems to offer an example of a city
(Guangdong, China) serving as a pathogen incubator and point of origin of an
intercontinental epidemic.6 In the case of SARS, the existence of the disease was
rapidly identified, the origin was speedily traced, and a medical offensive was
quickly mounted. Had such a disease originated in a feral city, it is likely that this
process would have been much more complicated and taken a great deal more
time. As it is, numerous diseases that had been believed under control have re-
cently mutated into much more drug-resistant and virulent forms.
Globally, large cities are already placing significant environmental stress on
their local and regional environments, and nowhere are these problems more
pronounced than in coastal metropolises. A feral city—with minimal or no san-
itation facilities, a complete absence of environmental controls, and a massive
population—would be in effect a toxic-waste dump, poisoning coastal waters,
watersheds, and river systems throughout their hinterlands.7
Major cities containing ports or airfields are already trying to contend with
black-market activity that ranges from evading legal fees, dues, or taxes to traffick-
ing in illegal and banned materials. Black marketeers in a feral city would have
carte blanche to ship or receive such materials to or from a global audience.8
As serious as these transnational issues are, another threat is potentially far
more dangerous. The anarchic allure of the feral city for criminal and terrorist
groups has already been discussed. The combination of large profits from crimi-
nal activity and the increasing availability of all families of weapons might make
it possible for relatively small groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction. A
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terrorist group in a feral city with access to world markets, especially if it can di-
rectly ship material by air or sea, might launch an all but untraceable attack from
its urban haven.
GOING FERAL
Throughout history, major cities have endured massive challenges without
“going feral.” How could it be determined that a city is at risk of becoming feral?
What indicators might give warning? Is a warning system possible?
The answer is yes. This article offers just such a model, a taxonomy consisting
of twelve sets of measurements, grouped into four main categories.9 In it, mea-
surements representing a healthy city are “green,” those that would suggest cause
for concern are “yellow,” and those that indicate danger, a potentially feral con-
dition, “red.” In the table below, the upper blocks in each category (column) rep-
resent positive or healthy conditions, those at the bottom unhealthy ones.
The first category assesses the ability of the state to govern the city. A city “in
the green” has a healthy, stable government—though not necessarily a demo-
cratically elected one. A democratic city leadership is perhaps the most desir-
able, but some cities governed by authoritarian regimes could be at extremely
low risk of becoming feral. City governments “in the green” would be able to en-
act effective legislation, direct resources, and control events in all parts of the
city at all times.10 A yellow indication would indicate that city government en-
joyed such authority only in portions of the city, producing what might be called
“patchwork” governance, or that it exerted authority only during the day—
“diurnal” governance. State authorities would be unable to govern a “red” city
at all, or would govern in name only.11 An entity within the city claiming to be an
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official representative of the state would simply be another actor competing for
resources and power.
The second category involves the city’s economy. Cities “in the green” would
enjoy a productive mix of foreign investment, service and manufacturing activi-
ties, and a robust tax base. Cities afforded a “yellow” rating would have ceased to
attract substantial foreign investment, be marked by decaying or heavily subsi-
dized industrial facilities, and suffer from ever-growing deficits. Cities “in the
red” would have no governmental tax base. Any industrial activity within their
boundaries would be limited to subsistence-level manufacturing and trade or to
illegal trafficking—in smuggled materials, weapons, drugs, and so on.
The third category is focused on city services. Cities with a “green” rating
would not only have a complete array of essential services but would provide
public education and cultural facilities to their populations. These services
would be available to all sectors without distinction or bias. Cities with a yellow
rating would be lacking in providing education and cultural opportunities but
would be able to maintain minimal levels of public health and sanitation. Trash
pickup, ambulance service, and access to hospitals would all exist. Such a city’s
water supply would pass minimum safety standards. In contrast, cities in the
“red” zone would be unable to supply more than intermittent power and water,
some not even that.
Security is the subject of the fourth category. “Green” cities, while obviously
not crime free, would be well regulated by professional, ethical police forces, able
to respond quickly to a wide spectrum of threats. “Yellow” cities would be
marked by extremely high crime rates, disregard of whole families of “minor
crimes” due to lack of police resources, and criminal elements capable of serious
confrontations. A “yellow” city’s police force would have little regard for indi-
vidual rights or legal constraints. In a “red” city, the police force has failed alto-
gether or has become merely another armed group seeking power and wealth.
Citizens must provide for their own protection, perhaps by hiring independent
security personnel or paying protection to criminal organizations.
A special, overarching consideration is corruption. Cities “in the green” are
relatively corruption free. Scandals are rare enough to be newsworthy, and when
corruption is uncovered, self-policing mechanisms effectively deal with it. Cor-
ruption in cities “in the yellow” would be much worse, extending to every level
of the city administration. In yellow cities, “patchwork” patterns might reflect
which portions of the city were able to buy security and services and which were
not. As for “red”cities, it would be less useful to speak of government corruption
than of criminal and individual opportunism, which would be unconstrained.
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CITY “MOSAICS”
The picture of a city that emerges is a mosaic, and like an artist’s mosaic it can be
expected to contain more than one color. Some healthy cities function with re-
markable degrees of corruption. Others, robust and vital in many ways, suffer
from appalling levels of criminal activity. Even a city with multiple “red” catego-
ries is not necessarily feral—yet. It is the overall pattern and whether that pat-
tern is improving or deteriorating over time that give the overall diagnosis.
It is important to remember a diagnostic tool such as this merely produces a
“snapshot” and is therefore of limited utility unless supported by trend analysis.
“Patchwork” and “diurnal” situations can exist in all the categories; an urban
center with an overall red rating—that is, a feral city—might boast a tiny enclave
where “green” conditions prevail; quite healthy cities experience cycles of de-
cline and improvement. Another caution concerns the categories themselves.
Although useful indicators of a city’s health, the boundaries are not clearly de-
fined but can be expected to blur.
The Healthy City: New York. To some it would seem that New York is an odd exam-
ple of a “green” city. One hears and recalls stories of corruption, police brutality,
crime, pollution, neighborhoods that resemble war zones, and the like. Yet by objec-
tive indicators (and certainly in the opinion of the majority of its citizens) New York
is a healthy city and in no risk of “going feral.” Its police force is well regulated,
well educated, and responsive. The city is a hub of national and international in-
vestment. It generates substantial revenues and has a stable tax base. It provides a
remarkable scope of services, including a wide range of educational and cultural
opportunities. Does this favorable evaluation mean that the rich are not treated
differently from the poor, that services and infrastructure are uniformly well
maintained, or that there are no disparities of economic opportunity or race? Ab-
solutely not. Yet despite such problems New York remains a viable municipality.
The Yellow Zone: Mexico City. This sprawling megalopolis of more than twenty
million continues to increase in size and population every year. It is one of the
largest urban concentrations in the world. As the seat of the Mexican govern-
ment, it receives a great deal of state attention. However, Mexico City is now de-
scribed as an urban nightmare.12
Mexico City’s air is so polluted that it is routinely rated medically as unfit to
breathe. There are square miles of slums, often without sewage or running water.
Law and order is breaking down at an accelerating rate. Serious crime has dou-
bled over the past three to four years; it is estimated that 15.5 million assaults
now occur every year in Mexico City. Car-jacking and taxi-jacking have reached
such epidemic proportions that visitors are now officially warned not to use the
cabs. The Mexico City police department has ninety-one thousand officers—
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more men than the Canadian army—but graft and corruption on the force are
rampant and on the rise. According to Mexican senator Adolfo Zinser, police offi-
cers themselves directly contribute to the city’s crime statistics: “In the morning
they are a policeman. In the afternoon they’re crooks.” The city’s judicial system is
equally corrupt. Not surprisingly, these aspects of life in Mexico City have reduced
the willingness of foreign investors to send money or representatives there.13
Johannesburg: On a Knife Edge. As in many South African cities, police in Johan-
nesburg are waging a desperate war for control of their city, and it is not clear
whether they will win. Though relatively small in size, with only 2.9 million offi-
cial residents, Johannesburg nevertheless experiences more than five thousand
murders a year and at least twice as many rapes. Over the last several years inves-
tors and major industry have fled the city. Many of the major buildings of the Cen-
tral Business District have been abandoned and are now home to squatters. The
South African National Stock Exchange has been removed to Sandton—a safer
northern suburb. Police forces admit they do not control large areas of the city; of-
ficial advisories warn against driving on certain thoroughfares. At night residents
are advised to remain in their homes. Tourism has dried up, and conventions,
once an important source of revenue, are now hosted elsewhere in the country.
The city also suffers from high rates of air pollution, primarily from vehicle
exhaust but also from the use of open fires and coal for cooking and heating. Jo-
hannesburg’s two rivers are also considered unsafe, primarily because of un-
treated human waste and chemicals leaching from piles of mining dross. Mining
has also contaminated much of the soil in the vicinity.
Like those of many states and cities in Africa, Johannesburg’s problems are
exacerbated by the AIDS epidemic. Nationally it is feared the number of infected
persons may reach as high as 20 percent of the population. All sectors of the econ-
omy have been affected adversely by the epidemic, including in Johannesburg.14
Although Mexico City and Johannesburg clearly qualify for “yellow” and “red”
status, respectively, it would be premature to predict that either of these urban
centers will inevitably become feral. Police corruption has been an aspect of
Mexico City life for decades; further, the recent transition from one political
party to two and a downswing in the state economy may be having a temporarily
adverse influence on the city. In the case of Johannesburg, the South African
government has most definitely not given up on attempts to revive what was
once an industrial and economic showplace. In both Mexico and South Africa
there are dedicated men and women who are determined to eliminate corrup-
tion, clean the environment, and better the lives of the people. Yet a note of cau-
tion is appropriate, for in neither example is the trend in a positive direction.
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Further—and it should come as no surprise—massive cities in the develop-
ing world are at far greater risk of becoming feral than those in more developed
states. Not only are support networks in such regions much less robust, but as a
potentially feral city grows, it consumes progressively more resources.15 Efforts
to meet its growing needs often no more than maintain the status quo or, more
often, merely slow the rate of decay of government control and essential services.
All this in turn reduces the resources that can be applied to other portions of the
country, and it may well increase the speed of urban hypertrophy. However, even
such developed states as Brazil face the threat of feral cities. For example, in March
2003 criminal cartels controlled much of Rio de Janeiro. Rio police would not en-
ter these areas, and in effect pursued toward them a policy of containment.16
FERAL CITIES AND THE U.S. MILITARY
Feral cities do not represent merely a sociological or urban-planning issue; they
present unique military challenges. Their very size and densely built-up character
make them natural havens for a variety of hostile nonstate actors, ranging from
small cells of terrorists to large paramilitary forces and militias. History indicates
that should such a group take American hostages, successful rescue is not likely.17
Combat operations in such environments tend to be manpower intensive; limit-
ing noncombatant casualties can be extraordinarily difficult. An enemy more res-
olute than that faced in the 2003 war with Iraq could inflict substantial casualties
on an attacking force. The defense of the Warsaw ghetto in World War II suggests
how effectively a conventional military assault can be resisted in this environ-
ment. Also, in a combat operation in a feral city the number of casualties from
pollutants, toxins, and disease may well be higher than those caused by the enemy.
These environmental risks could also affect ships operating near a feral city.
Its miles-long waterfront may offer as protected and sheltered a setting for
antishipping weapons as any formal coastal defense site. Furthermore, many
port cities that today, with proper security procedures, would be visited for fuel
and other supplies will, if they become feral, no longer be available. This would
hamper diplomatic efforts, reduce the U.S. Navy’s ability to show the flag, and
complicate logistics and supply for forward-deployed forces.
Feral cities, as and if they emerge, will be something new on the international
landscape. Cities have descended into savagery in the past, usually as a result of
war or civil conflict, and armed resistance groups have operated out of urban
centers before. But feral cities, as such, will be a new phenomenon and will pose
security threats on a scale hitherto not encountered.18 It is questionable whether
the tools, resources, and strategies that would be required to deal with these
threats exist at present. But given the indications of the imminent emergence of
feral cities, it is time to begin creating the means.
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DETERRING IRAN, 1968–71
The Royal Navy, Iran, and the Disputed Persian Gulf Islands
Richard Mobley
Between 1968 and 1971, Whitehall assigned the Royal Navy an unusual mis-sion—to defend a series of disputed Persian Gulf islands while the United
Kingdom was selling arms to and conducting naval exercises with Iran, the very
country that threatened to invade them. The ownership of Abu Musa, Greater
Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—three islands astride the western approaches to the
Strait of Hormuz—was as controversial in the late 1960s as it is today.1 The cur-
rent controversy has its roots in complicated historical claims and the way Great
Britain defended, and ultimately negotiated a handoff of, the three islands. To-
day it is possible to gain a far more refined understanding of Britain’s naval and
diplomatic strategy for protecting and then disposing of the contested islands.
Hundreds of formerly secret British military and diplomatic documents have
been declassified and released on the subject since 1999. They are a rich resource
for understanding the controversies associated with British naval planning to
defend the islands and London’s undertakings to its former charges when it fi-
nally withdrew from the Gulf in 1971.
BACKDROP
Tehran and London had long disputed ownership of
Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. For over a
century, Britain had engaged in “indirect rule” of the
Arab states abutting the Gulf. Under treaties signed
with tribal leaders, the United Kingdom would handle
defense and foreign policy but leave domestic affairs
to the emirs themselves. By 1970, the defense policy
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required a commitment of forces to defend such Gulf client states as Bahrain,
Qatar, and the Trucial States. The United Kingdom prepared contingency plans
(such as HELIX, or Reinforced Theatre Plan [Gulf] No. 1) to protect such states
against their neighbors—Iraq, Iran, and each other). The plans required a rela-
tively small presence of British air, naval, and ground forces, which were based
primarily in Bahrain and Sharjah (now one of the emirates of the United Arab
Emirates). The long-standing plans relied on timely alertment, rapid implemen-
tation, and speedy reinforcements from outside the Gulf.2
All such contingency plans became harder to implement in January 1968,
when Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Britain would withdraw
from its defense commitments east of Suez. Its defense obligations and military
presence in the Gulf were to cease by December 1971. The key players on the mil-
itary side, notably the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Commander, British
Forces Gulf, accordingly began planning for a “run-down” of British forces. This
task was particularly challenging because Britain remained obligated to defend
the Gulf client states until the withdrawal was complete, no matter how much the
British overseas force structure had shrunk at any given time—and, as the table
shows, the withdrawal from the Gulf was to occur rapidly.
However, the Royal Navy also relied on a
naval “covering force” from the Far East. As of
September 1971, an attack carrier would be
able to respond to Gulf contingencies within
two weeks. In November 1971, an attack car-
rier was scheduled to be able to respond
within five days; a helicopter assault ship
(LPH) could enter the Gulf within eight days.3
While in the process of withdrawing, the
United Kingdom would also continue to
craft foreign policy on behalf of its clients.
Unfortunately, anticipating the imminent
departure, Iran, ruled by Shah Reza Pahlavi, began immediately more forcefully
asserting its long-standing claim to Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb.
Tehran claimed legal ownership of the islands and declared a desire to ensure
stability of the Gulf (and protect sea lines of communication through the Strait
of Hormuz) by occupying them. In response, the United Kingdom, on behalf of
the emirates of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, asserted that all three islands were
Arab territory. London explicitly backed Sharjah’s claim to Abu Musa and Ras Al
Khaimah’s claim to the Tunbs. With its security obligations scheduled to lapse
by the end of 1971, however, Great Britain attempted to resolve the islands dis-
pute, while fostering the creation of the new United Arab Emirates (UAE).4
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Platform May October
Minesweeper 4 -
Frigate 1 1 (48-hour notice)
LSL 1 1
LCT 1 1
Hunter (fighter) 23 9
Shackleton (patrol) 5 2
PLANNED 1971 DRAWDOWN
Source: CBFG, “Military Action to Counter Arab Guerilla Occupation of Abu
Musa and the Tunb Islands” (Annex B), 30 March 1971 (DEFE 28/576).
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The British were well aware of the conflicting interests involved in the south-
ern Persian Gulf. The Foreign Office repeatedly described the high stakes inher-
ent in the British intermediating position. On one hand were large British arms
sales to Iran, Iranian support for maintaining regional stability via the Central
Treaty Organization, and Tehran’s acquiescence to Bahraini independence and,
in late 1971, the founding of the United Arab Emirates. On the other side of the
ledger was London’s desire to retain influence in the Arab world and foster stabil-
ity in the Persian Gulf even after Britain’s military withdrawal from the region.5
Accordingly, Britain crafted a military strategy designed to straddle the fence.
Commander, British Forces Gulf (CBFG) would monitor Iranian approaches to
the islands and intensify air and naval patrols should the shah seem too interested
in them. Beyond such posturing, the extent to which Britain should go to defend
the islands was controversial. Faced with debates within Whitehall and between
London and its representatives in the field, the United Kingdom crafted a compro-
mise, top secret plan designed to bluff any Iranian invading force away from Abu
Musa (Great Britain considered the Tunbs indefensible)—that is, to deter Iran
without alienating it. A second plan was formulated to retake the islands (and
thereby forestall an Iranian invasion) should they be seized by Arab guerillas.
Britain’s different approach to the three islands was based in part on geogra-
phy. Abu Musa is closer to Arab shores (lying south of a notional median line
that the United Kingdom was arguing could be used to divide the Gulf) and
more salient to Arab clients; the Tunbs were closer to Iran. Abu Musa was larger
than the other two islands, and oil and gas reserves were suspected to lie about
six miles to the southeast. From an Arab perspective, the Tunbs had little to offer.
The Tunbs are seventeen miles southwest of Iran’s Qeshm Island and forty-six
miles northwest of the nearest point on the UAE coastline. Greater Tunb is
roughly 2.5 miles in diameter and had at the time a population of approximately
150 Arabs. Lesser Tunb is eight miles to the southwest; it was barren, waterless, and
uninhabited. Neither had airstrips, jetties, or fuel supplies.6 The shah, however,
had long focused his attention on the Tunbs, and in the late 1960s he began to
press his claim to Abu Musa with equal vigor. Abu Musa is approximately three
square miles, with an estimated eight hundred inhabitants in 1971. Abu Musa suf-
fered from the same lack of militarily useful facilities as did the Tunbs.7
PENSUM
When Prime Minister Wilson announced the end of British treaty commitments
east of the Suez Canal (a position that Edward Heath’s Conservatives would sus-
tain when they assumed power in 1970), the shah became more vocal about Ira-
nian claims to the islands. He argued that only Iran could now ensure safety and
stability in the Gulf, including freedom of shipping through the Strait of
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Hormuz, and that to do so Iranian forces would have to garrison the islands.8
London worried that Iran might seize the islands even before Britain left the
Gulf. In January 1968, the United Kingdom did not even have a contingency
plan to defend the islands and lacked basic knowledge about beaches it might
have to assault. This would change when the Imperial Iranian Navy began oper-
ating close to the Tunbs.9
The first “mini-crisis” started on 12 January
1968, when a photo-reconnaissance Royal Air
Force (RAF) Canberra sighted and photo-
graphed the Iranian frigate Bayandor anchored
approximately one mile east of the Tunbs.
(Commander, British Forces Gulf routinely re-
connoitered the disputed islands and monitored
southern Gulf waters to prevent illegal immigra-
tion and arms smuggling into the Trucial
States.)10 An RAF Shackleton, a propeller-driven
maritime patrol aircraft, quickly corroborated
the sighting. Fearing that Iran would occupy
Tunb, CBFG prepared to deploy elements of the
Trucial Oman Scouts to defend it—if Iranian
troops were not already there. The scouts were
put on four-hour alert. However, when Lon-
don’s emissary to the Trucial States arrived on
the island from Dubai the next day, Bayandor
was gone. Instead of garrisoning any of the islands, CBFG settled for continued
aerial surveillance of the surrounding waters.11
The Royal Air Force’s interest in Iranian shipping near the Tunbs provoked an
Iranian warning. Bayandor had manned and trained its guns on the Shackleton
that overflew it near the Tunbs on 12 January.12 Great Britain and Iran both pro-
tested the incident. The United Kingdom declared that it was “deeply disturbed”
that the Iranian navy had violated the territorial waters of the Tunbs (i.e., those
of Ras Al Khaimah).13 Iran for its part protested repeated “harassing flights” over
an Iranian naval vessel operating in “Iran’s coastal waters.”14 An Iranian diplo-
matic note warned that such surveillance was “unfriendly” and that if the flights
continued the Iranian ship would “take such action as considered necessary in
accordance with international law.”15
A month went by before the next development in this crisis, when British
maritime patrol aircraft flew repeated surveillance passes near the Iranian naval
auxiliary Tahmadou in the southern gulf. Admiral Rasa’i, commander of the Ira-
nian navy, complained to Commander, British Forces Gulf that a large RAF
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aircraft (presumably a Shackleton) had repeatedly overflown Tahmadou as it op-
erated near the Tunbs. He asked for an explanation for the incidents, which
might be “misinterpreted” in Tehran. When debriefed, the Shackleton crew ex-
plained that it had initially approached the vessel about midday on 22 February,
no closer than 440 yards, at an altitude of four hundred feet. Recognizing it to be
a naval auxiliary, the Shackleton stood off. The two subsequent passes had ap-
proached no closer than a mile away. Rasa’i accepted the explanation but asked
that British patrol aircraft stand off at least three miles from Iranian warships
unless they had prior permission to approach closer.16
On the British side, the seeming Iranian threat to the Tunbs sparked an inter-
nal debate about how to defend the islands. A dialogue between Sir Stewart
Crawford, the political resident (the senior diplomatic official in the theater, re-
sponsible for orchestrating British foreign policy in the Gulf), and Frank
Brenchley and M. Weir, in the Foreign Office Eastern Department, framed the
argument. Crawford, with the agreement of CBFG, concluded that the best way
to defend the islands against Iran was by stationing troops on them. He wanted
at least to erect a radio transmitter on Greater Tunb to speed the flow of infor-
mation from this remote island. The Foreign Office Eastern Department coun-
tered that a confrontation might escalate and “seriously endanger our
considerable interests in Iran, commercial (including oil) and military (overfly-
ing).” (The best way for the United Kingdom to support its forces in the Far East
entailed flying through Iranian airspace.)17 The Foreign Office held that garri-
soning the islands would be too provocative. Indeed, the Eastern Department
considered relations with Iran so important that it questioned whether Great
Britain should resort to any kind of military force to protect the islands. If Iran
invaded the islands, Weir’s version of “defense” was merely to lodge a diplomatic
protest in the United Nations and perhaps suspend arms deliveries to Iran: “I
should find it difficult to approve a recommendation to put troops on the is-
lands even if an Iranian move appeared imminent.”18
The political resident, in response, cited Britain’s repeated pronouncements
that it would defend the Trucial States. What would London say if one of the
trucial sheikhs asked for British reassurance as an Iranian threat developed? “Ei-
ther the Minister of State and the Prime Minister meant what they said in stating
that so long as we had the capability we should continue to honour our obliga-
tions, or they did not.”19
A second mini-crisis, however, seems to have forced the United Kingdom to
begin planning to defend the islands militarily. On 29 March 1968, the Foreign
Office received a report (from uncited sources) that Iran might try to seize the
Tunbs over the next two days. Abandoning the Eastern Department’s earlier pas-
sivity, the Foreign Office requested immediate Royal Navy patrols off the
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disputed islands. CBFG consequently ordered two minesweepers to make a day-
light transit past the northern side of Tunb Island on 30 March. Either the as-
sault ship HMS Intrepid or the frigate HMS Tartar, or both, would also steam by
the islands on the thirty-first, while Shackletons reconnoitered the area.
(Ironically, Intrepid had just been conducting assault landings with the Irani-
ans.) None of these units were to do anything other than report back to
Whitehall if Iran invaded the islands. After the transits, the Defence Ministry
warned the theater commander that the “situation . . . is still very delicate and all
provocative action is to be avoided.” Iran never attempted to occupy the islands
during this episode.20
Using the just-ended crisis as a scene-setter, Sir Stewart made his case for a
formal plan to defend the island. He argued that the shah remained a threat to
the islands despite diplomatic warnings and air and naval patrols. The United
Kingdom could defend the islands by preemptively landing troops before the
Iranians could arrive. He reasoned that Iran might attempt to seize the Tunbs
first, given their relative proximity to Iran and perceived strategic importance to
the shah. If Iran took the Tunbs, Crawford believed, CBFG should land on Abu
Musa before the Iranians could arrive there as well.21
Accordingly, in April the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence directed the
preparation of a contingency plan for British troops to occupy Abu Musa should
Iran threaten or occupy the Tunbs. The Foreign Office explained its change of
heart to the defense minister. It admitted that the United Kingdom had previ-
ously ruled out landing on the islands to deter an Iranian assault. Now, however,
it argued, a British failure to take more than diplomatic action would “rally Arab
opinion against us, again with severe damage to our interests, including difficul-
ties over the military withdrawal from the Gulf.”22 However, Whitehall contin-
ued to foreclose the obvious solution of simply stationing a permanent garrison
on the islands, because such a move would provoke Iran. Moreover, a British
garrison would have to be withdrawn when Great Britain left the Gulf, whereas a
garrison manned by Trucial Oman Scouts could simply be overrun once the
United Kingdom departed.
From this debate emerged PENSUM, the United Kingdom’s primary plan to
deter Iran from invading any of the disputed islands; it remained effective from
spring 1969 until the United Kingdom withdrew from the Gulf in December
1971. It called for a military bluff—a show of force in which British units would
be prohibited from actually attacking Iranian invaders. To deter Iran from seiz-
ing the Tunbs, CBFG would merely increase sea and air patrols around them. A
Royal Navy frigate or minesweeper could be on station as well with twenty-four
hours’ notification. The British combatant would advise Iranian ships ap-
proaching to within three miles of the island (and apparently intending to land
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troops) that they were within Ras al Khaimah’s territorial waters. The Royal
Navy would formally protest the landing, but its warship on the scene would not
attempt to prevent it. Neither would British troops land on either island, under
any circumstances.23
As for Abu Musa, CBFG would also increase patrol activity. If the Iranians
seized the Tunbs, two Wessex helicopters could transport a platoon of up to
thirty-two people from Sharjah to Abu Musa—provided the Iranian army had
not already arrived there. (If CBFG belatedly discovered an Iranian military
presence on Abu Musa, the British assault platoon would turn around and heli-
copter back to base.) The remainder of an infantry company (presumably the
platoon’s parent company) could reinforce the platoon. Assuming the British
military got to the island first, the British commander would warn the Iranian
commander that Abu Musa was Arab territory under the protection of the
United Kingdom and that his force was not to land. If the Iranians landed any-
way, the British platoon was to “endeavor to restrict their further movement
from the point of disembarkation without using force.” In no case were British
military units to attack Iranian forces, whether or not they overran Abu Musa,
except in self-defense or to defend the lives of island inhabitants.24
BUDLET/ACCOLL
Great Britain never had to implement PENSUM. However, the Royal Navy soon
found itself in the middle of a battle among three emirates, two international oil
companies, and Iran. This third mini-crisis began in the spring of 1970, when
the rulers of the emirates of Umm al Qaywayn and Ajman permitted the Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation to start exploratory drilling 6.5 miles southeast
of Abu Musa. Unfortunately, unbeknownst to any of the participants, Sharjah
had extended its claimed territorial limit around Abu Musa from three to twelve
miles in September 1969, and it had awarded a drilling concession of its own for
the same area, to the Buttes Oil and Gas Corporation.25
Word of the conflicting drilling leases and territorial claims spread, and Iran
entered the act. The Iranian foreign minister warned that his nation’s warships
would prevent Occidental from drilling in the disputed zone. Nevertheless, the
firm’s drilling operation moved toward Abu Musa late in May 1970. Occidental
initially advised that drilling would not start before 1 June. Meanwhile, RAF
Hunters (fighters) deployed to nearby Sharjah, and Shackletons flying daily sur-
veillance missions searched for Occidental’s derrick barges, survey vessels, and
tugs, as well as for Iranian warships that might be en route to the contested drill-
ing zone. The Royal Navy committed four minesweepers to the operation.26
The United Kingdom was determined to prevent a maritime blowup. To stop
Occidental from drilling, the Foreign Office used diplomatic pressure but also
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requested CBFG to stand by to tow away the drilling platforms and take other ac-
tions to prevent drilling operations. Royal Navy units were to “obstruct” the
drilling platforms if they attempted to work in the disputed areas. Royal Marines
embarked aboard the minesweeper HMS Gavinton to board the barges should
Occidental insist on drilling despite British warnings. The political agent in
Dubai warned Occidental on 31 May that drilling would violate an edict of the
ruler of Umm al Qaywayn. Next day, the Royal Navy warned Occidental that it
was not to begin drilling in the disputed area for at least three months. After two
days of intense diplomacy, Occidental agreed. On 3 June, its drilling barge de-
parted for Khafji, Saudi Arabia.27
Commander, British Forces Gulf considered the outcome favorable. The Brit-
ish ships and aircraft had “exerted a stabilising influence” by demonstrating
London’s intention and ability to prevent drilling operations (and discourage
“precipitate” Iranian naval action). Occidental, however, was less impressed and
initiated legal action against the Royal Navy and other elements of the British
government. The firm claimed that the United Kingdom had illegally hindered
its operation and in the process damaged a drilling rig.28
Eight months later, the shah intensified pressure on London and its client
states. In February 1971 he gave a public interview echoing what he had said pri-
vately—Iran would simply seize the three islands if a diplomatic solution was
not forthcoming. Iranian naval activity buttressed his warnings. Iranian war-
ships thrice violated the territorial limits of the Tunbs that month. In a fourth
instance, an Iranian vessel
put a landing party onto
Greater Tunb Island.29
Over the next month,
London concluded that the
risk of Iranian invasion of
the islands before the final
British departure had grown.
The Chief of Defence Staff
reminded his staff as well as
senior service leaders that the
Joint Intelligence Committee
had recently concluded that
“there [were] substantial reasons” why Iran might invade the islands before the
British withdrawal.30 In particular, he and the Foreign Office worried that Iran’s
increased pressure over the Tunbs might produce an unconventional response
from radical Arab states (such as Iraq) or a state-sponsored guerilla group. The
diplomats specifically feared that to preempt an Iranian invasion, an Arab guerilla
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force of perhaps fifty men landing from dhows might seize one or all of the is-
lands. Iran might respond by invading the islands, potentially while they re-
mained under British protection. The Foreign Office confirmed to the military
that Iran should understand “that our protection of the disputed islands is not
merely nominal, but will be real and effective up to the date of our departure.”31
Whitehall thus wanted to be able to block seizure of the islands by unconven-
tional warfare forces—either Arab or Iranian.
Accordingly, the Defence Ministry in March 1971 directed that the theater
commander prepare a new plan.32 Commander, British Forces Gulf quickly real-
ized that information on landing beaches on the Tunbs was lacking. On the
night of 13 April 1971, the minesweeper Puncheston conducted a clandestine
beach survey.33 With the intelligence the ship collected, CBFG completed a con-
tingency plan known as BUDLET/ACCOLL in May. BUDLET addressed the preven-
tion of a landing of up to fifty guerillas on all three of the islands. If the guerillas
succeeded anyway, British forces were to “evict” them under subplan ACCOLL. In
this event the Royal Navy would blockade the islands and warn the intruders to
surrender or to leave the islands. If the warnings were unheeded, helicopters and
ships would deploy a squadron of the Trucial Oman Scouts to the islands.
Hunter aircraft would provide close air support. Unlike in PENSUM, British
forces were not restricted by ACCOLL from engaging the enemy.34
Interestingly, the Foreign Office felt that the United Kingdom might choose
not to implement the plan even if guerillas invaded the islands. Rather, the For-
eign Office opined hopefully, an Arab guerilla invasion might provide an oppor-
tunity for Iran and the emirates to cooperate in evicting the insurgents.35 It
concluded in a memorandum for the record that “political considerations”
might “militate as strongly against preemption as they do against garrisoning of
the islands.”36
The real purpose of the plan, of course, was to convince the shah that he did
not need to invade the islands while the British were defending them. In May
1971, the ink barely dry on BUDLET/ACCOLL, Sir William Luce of the Foreign
Office flew to Tehran to pursue further negotiations and to reassure the shah
that the United Kingdom now had contingency plans to defend the islands.37
By 15 November, after energetic negotiation by Sir William, Iran and
Sharjah had reached “virtual agreement” on Abu Musa. Iran and Sharjah
would occupy separate parts of the island; there would be a twelve-mile terri-
torial limit around Abu Musa, and the inhabitants could fish in both countries’
zones. Sharjah would designate a company to exploit the oil resources off Abu
Musa; Iran and Sharjah would split the revenues. In a separate agreement, Iran
would provide aid to Sharjah for nine years. A memorandum of understanding
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from Sharjah to the United Kingdom (and agreed to by Iran on 25 November
1971) summarized all this.
Luce foresaw that with the agreement signed with Abu Musa and with Ras al
Kaimah’s refusal to cede the Tunbs to Iran under any circumstances, Iran would
simply station forces on all three islands a day or so before the agreement was an-
nounced—most likely between 30 November and 3 December 1971.38 In fact,
they landed on the thirtieth. Sharjah sent a representative to greet the Iranian
troops. However, the Iranians encountered token resistance when they landed
on the Tunbs, with the result that four Iranians and Arabs were killed.39
“REASONABLE HOPES FOR STABILITY”?
The residual military presence in the Gulf and the flurry of contingency plan-
ning between 1968 and 1971 doubtless afforded some reassurance in Whitehall
as Britain pursued a diplomatic resolution of the islands dispute. However, to
maintain the status quo Great Britain ruled out what it knew to be the most di-
rectly effective means of protecting them—establishing garrisons. PENSUM
could well have backfired; from the tone of his statements, it is hard to believe
that the shah would have backed down once having decided to invade Abu Musa.
The image of a British platoon begging the shah’s troops not to land on Abu
Musa is not an attractive one. Would the posturing envisioned in PENSUM really
have been better than doing nothing?
BUDLET/ACCOLL at least reflected a coherent strategy and a reasonable
matching of means (the residual British force in the Gulf) and ends (removal of
a small guerilla band). The Chiefs of Staff Committee believed the operation
could be completed within a month. Rapid and effective action might have fore-
stalled an Iranian invasion.
At the end of the day, the cabinet viewed the episode as a success story. In De-
cember 1971 Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the foreign minister, told the cabinet that
“there were [now] reasonable hopes for stability in the Gulf area, an outcome for
which our emissary, Sir William Luce, deserved warm congratulations.”40
The conspicuous Royal Navy and Air Force presence had supplemented Brit-
ish diplomacy in deterring Iran. Iran ultimately invaded the islands, but on the
last day of British protectorate; it had not humiliated the United Kingdom by
doing so months earlier, when the islands had been manifestly under British
protection. (Presumably Tehran was concerned to allow responsibility for the
“loss” of the islands to fall on London rather than on the emirates themselves—
which accordingly were not honor bound to seek reprisals or reverse the situation.)
Today, despite the Royal Navy’s efforts in 1971, the status of the islands re-
mains controversial. In 2003 testimony before the International Court of Justice,
the United States accused Iran of using Abu Musa as a base for helicopter and
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Boghammar speedboat attacks against commercial shipping during the “tanker
war” of the 1980s.41 In 1992, the United Arab Emirates accused Iran of violating
understandings reached when Sharjah allowed Iranian forces onto Abu Musa
(Ras Al Khaimah, now part of the UAE, never accepted Iranian occupation of
the Tunbs). Specifically, the UAE protested Iran’s attempts to limit access to Abu
Musa, and Iran evidently became concerned that the UAE might even invade the
islands (with outside assistance). Indeed, when the United States surged forces
into the Gulf in response to renewed Iraqi threats to Kuwait in the fall of 1994,
Iran reportedly increased its defenses on Abu Musa.42 Tehran’s hold on these is-
lands is likely to remain a sensitive point as the United States occasionally
“surges” naval forces into the Gulf, as well as intensifies its rhetoric, in its cam-
paign against the “axis of evil.”
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COMMENTARY
THE ART OF REPERCEIVING SCENARIOS AND THE FUTURE
P. H. Liotta and Timothy E. Somes
“Scenarios give . . . [decision makers] something very precious: the abil-
ity to reperceive reality.”
—PIERRE WACK
In the days when pharaohs ruled Egypt, a temple stood far up the Nile, beyond the
cataracts in Nubia, in what is now the northern desert of the Sudan. Three tributar-
ies joined together in that region to form the Nile, which flowed down one thousand
miles to produce a miraculous event each year, the flooding of its river basin, which
permitted Egyptian farmers to grow crops in the hot, rainless midsummer.
Every spring, the temple priests gathered at the river’s edge to check the color of
the water. If it was clear, the White Nile, which flowed from Lake Victoria through
the Sudanese swamps, would dominate the flow. The flooding would be mild, and
late; farmers would produce a minimum of crops. If the stream appeared dark, the
stronger waters of the Blue Nile, which joined the White Nile at Khartoum, would
prevail. The flood would rise enough to saturate the fields and provide a bountiful
harvest. Finally, if the stream showed dominance by the green-brown waters of the
Atbara, which rushed down from the Ethiopian highlands, then the floods would be
early and catastrophically high. The crops might drown; indeed, Pharaoh might
have to use his grain stores as a reserve.
Each year, the priests sent messengers to inform the king of the color of the water.
They may also have used lights and smoke signals to carry word downstream. Pha-
raoh then knew how prosperous the farmers in his kingdom would be, and how
much he could raise in taxes. Thus, he knew whether he could afford to conquer
more territory. As Pierre Wack . . . would say, the priests of the Sudanese Nile were
the world’s first long-term forecasters. They understood the meaning of predeter-
mined elements and critical uncertainties.1
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What possible connection could this vignette have with the practice of strategic
and future force planning? The answer might be more surprising than you think.
Since our focus in this essay centers on planning for the future and strategic
uncertainties, while not losing sight of the challenges and opportunities that
face us today, we have paid attention most to what the nation needs to both de-
fend and protect its interests in a time of discontinuous change. Yet just like the
priests of ancient Egypt, we also argue that strategies and policy makers need to
understand and recognize the constants, trends, and shifts that will shape and
determine the future security environment. In many ways then, one’s best
“guesstimate”must be informed by an ability to read the “river of change,” just as
the ancient priests were able to “read” the Nile. Thus, to provide reasonable anal-
ysis and information to decision and policy makers, we believe that almost al-
ways we have to let the facts get in the way of our opinion. Therefore, our own
assumptions, prejudgments, and even what we thought was a clear under-
standing of the world must be questioned. It may be a cliché, but it is also an
evident truth that how we view the world subtly but definitely affects how we
act in it. After all, the root from the ancient Greek for “geography” betrays the
idea of a “mental map,” an illustration of the world as we choose to see it. All of
us, whether we admit it or not, come equipped with a “mental map.” However,
if we are to be worth anything at all in making analyses and decisions in an in-
creasingly complex security environment, we must be willing to change that
mental map over time.
This essay thus attempts to integrate some of the ideas of Peter Schwartz,
whose book The Art of the Long View was used at the Naval War College for many
years, along with the ideas of Schwartz’s mentor, Pierre Wack, and others, with
elements and issues of special interest to the student of national security affairs
and future force planning.2
GETTING THE DECISION MAKER TO REPERCEIVE
The challenge for strategic planners is to help decision makers understand what
the future security environment might look like, to affect their perceptions, in
essence, to help them “reperceive.” Wack, who gained some fame as a strategic
planner during the oil crises of the 1970s with his ability to get the senior execu-
tives in Shell Oil to understand what might happen in the energy business, wrote
in the Harvard Business Review some years later:
Scenarios deal with two worlds: the world of facts and the world of perceptions. They
explore the facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of decision makers.
Their purpose is to gather and transform information of strategic significance into
fresh perceptions. This transformation process is not trivial—more often than not it
does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt
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“Aha!” from you  . . . [decision makers] and leads to strategic insights beyond the
mind’s previous reach.3
In short, to think and act effectively in an uncertain world, people need to
learn to reperceive—to question their assumptions and their understanding
about the way the world works. By questioning those assumptions and rethink-
ing the correct way to operate under uncertainty, we often see the world more
clearly than we otherwise would. Wack summarized his goals as a strategic plan-
ner and developer of scenarios by stating:
I have found that getting to that [decision makers’] “Aha!” is the real challenge of
scenario analysis. It does not simply leap at you when you’ve been presented all the
possible alternatives . . . . It happens when your message reaches the microcosms of
decision makers, obliges them to question their assumptions about how their . . . world
works, and leads them to change and reorganize their inner models of reality.4
Secretary of State Colin Powell, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
during the first Bush and the Clinton administrations, often valued such analy-
ses as setting the context for a “strategic conversation” so that real, and often dif-
ficult, decisions could be made about the future.
WHAT SCENARIOS ARE AND WHAT THEY ARE NOT
Scenarios help decision makers select alternative courses of action. Literally, sce-
narios create a “story line”so that analysts and decision makers can understand a
narrative “flow,” from which they can examine and question the constants,
trends, and shifts that are taking place in the security environment. It seems use-
ful to recall that the roots of both words “history” and “story” spring from the
same Greek word historia. Just as the traditional “story” of history helps to ex-
amine and better understand the past, scenarios can help us to examine and
question our choices for the future.
THE PROCESS OF CREATING SCENARIOS: DRIVING FORCES,
PREDETERMINED ELEMENTS AND CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES
As Schwartz puts it, scenarios are a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about al-
ternative environments where future decisions must be played out.5 On the sur-
face, scenarios may look like a set of stories, but they are built on carefully
constructed “plots” that make significant elements stand out by how they differ
within each specific story line. Creating and examining scenarios is a disciplined
way of thinking about the world.
While we emphasize that examining scenarios is a disciplined way of think-
ing, it is not a formal methodology, nor are they predictions, but they can help us
understand the future. It is folly to try to predict the exact outcome of the future.
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The old Arab proverb “He who predicts the future lies even if he tells the truth” is
accurate. However, scenarios provide alternative projections and possibilities for
the future. Creating and understanding scenarios is an art form that can help us
to better recognize plausible outcomes and how to act on and better plan for
them in advance.
For example, in the 1980s, few in the business of assessing the long-term
global security environment forecasted the demise of the Soviet Union. (Those
who did were ridiculed within their organizations.) Instead, most assessments
and research saw the Cold War trends of the previous four decades as continuing
indefinitely. Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and later with the
Soviet Union’s collapse, the U.S. defense establishment found itself in a signifi-
cant force drawdown and witnessed the cancellation of countless billions of dol-
lars of planned purchases. Though many strategic assessments at the beginning
of the twenty-first century focused on American vulnerabilities and the poten-
tial danger of “asymmetric” warfare, these assessments seriously underesti-
mated the damage that dedicated terrorists could inflict on the United States
(“9/11”), and the world.
Finally, the scenarios we are talking about are not the limited threat-based
planning scenarios common in defense planning. Threat-based scenarios, gen-
erally based on assessments of current or postulated threats or enemy capabili-
ties, determine only the amount and types of force needed to defeat an
adversary. (Similarly, capabilities-based planning seeks to avoid the perceived
limits of threat-derived scenarios.)6 In contrast, the scenarios we want to con-
sider should look well beyond current evaluations of threats. If future military
force capabilities are derived from the kind of scenarios we are discussing, they
must encompass the full range of possibilities, with a commensurate weighing
of benefits, costs, and risks. Accomplishing this is a difficult but essential chal-
lenge, if decision makers are to come to any informed, perceptive conclusions
for the future.
In Wack’s words, “Scenarios serve two purposes. The first is protective—
anticipating and understanding risk. The second is entrepreneurial—discover-
ing strategic options of which one was previously unaware.”7 Often, and proba-
bly naturally, decision makers prefer the illusion of certainty to understanding
risk and realities. But the scenario “builder” and analyst should strive to shatter
the decision maker’s confidence in his or her ability to look ahead with certainty
at the future. Scenarios should allow a decision maker to say, “I am prepared for
whatever happens,” because we have thought through complex choices with a
knowledgeable sense of risk and reward.8
Some scenario builders, including Pierre Wack, refuse to give definitions for
the discrete aspects, or elements, of the story line. Their argument to refuse to
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identify or separate specific aspects of the story suggests that it could be danger-
ous, even trivial, to reduce it to its bare bones. Instead of looking only at the skel-
eton, they argue that we should also examine the flesh and blood of the story line
in its entirety. As such, they emphasize the complex interdependence among ele-
ments of a story and de-emphasize focusing on specific definitions.
Others, however, especially Peter Schwartz, suggest that offering definitions
up front can be both helpful and necessary to aid our own perceptions, or
misperceptions, of reality. For Schwartz, the heart of “understanding” the pro-
cess is the identification and exploration of driving forces, predetermined ele-
ments, and critical uncertainties. Yet while literally thousands of former students
at the Naval War College have found these concepts useful, many have also mis-
understood them.
Driving Forces: What We Know We Care About
One such driving force was the rain. It fell upstream on the Nile’s tributaries, and
affected the balance between them. That, in turn, influenced the fate of thousands
of people whom the Pharaoh might conquer that year. There was a second driving
force, as well—the dependence on Nile flooding to grow crops. Had the Egyptians
had irrigation canals and fertilizer, they could have planted crops further out in the
desert. They would not have had to worry about the river flow at all.9
Wack suggests that scenario analysis demands first that decision makers un-
derstand the forces driving their organization, and their future choices. Power
and insight come from understanding the forces behind the outcome in any sce-
nario.10 Schwartz insists that if one fails to recognize the driving forces, there is
no way to begin thinking through a scenario.11 These elements of the scenario
hone one’s initial judgment and helps one to decide which factors are important.
Driving forces are the elements that move the plot of a scenario and directly
influence the story’s outcome.12 If we return to the vignette at the beginning of
this essay, we can better understand what the Egyptian priests were doing, by ex-
amining how they recognized the forces driving the movement of the Nile River.
In essence, the specific color of the water’s stream made it possible to guess the ef-
fect on the floods downstream. If each tributary that flowed into the Nile were the
same color, the priests would not have been able to project future outcomes with
as much certainty. So identifying and assessing driving forces is both a starting
point and an objective of the scenario method. Without an initial understanding
of driving forces, there is no way to begin thinking through a scenario.
In the same way, a senior defense leader needs to appreciate and attempt to
comprehend the huge complexities of the global security environment, the state
of the economy, technological advances in military systems, the movement of oil
and dependence on resources, and potential adversaries’ capabilities, to name
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just a few. The key is to decide in each scenario which driving forces are
significant.
As a teaching methodology, we present various frameworks in seminars at the
Naval War College that are intended to help students look for driving forces for
future national security related scenarios.13 Also, according to Schwartz, and
others, there are several categories one should look for to discover driving forces
that can make a difference in the story line: society, technology, economics, poli-
tics, environment, and the military and defense infrastructures.14 Schwartz,
Wack, and many other long-range planners claim that it is helpful to work as a
team in developing meaningful scenarios. Individuals see things differently; a
member of a team will identify factors as key driving forces that will not be obvi-
ous to others. Often, this “leap or surprise”—the unexpected insight—can lead
to further insights and discoveries.
Predetermined Elements and Critical Uncertainties:
Understanding Their Differences
Put yourself now in the position of a priest on the river, watching the water turn
brown and green. To warn Pharaoh of a devastating flood required supreme confi-
dence. Being wrong was breaking a religious sacrament and would also, no doubt,
have meant losing one’s life. Priests had that confidence, however, because the fate
of the floods that year was predetermined. Nothing could change its impact on the
crops, even though the impact would not be felt for months later. The priests may or
may not have known why the color of the water affected the power of the flood. They
may or may not have been aware of the driving force—the rainfall pattern which
caused one river, or another, to dominate. But they knew the predetermined ele-
ments of flooding as well as they knew anything.15
Scenarios structure the future into both predetermined and uncertain ele-
ments. Any good scenario “reading” explores and seeks to comprehend these el-
ements. Often, events that are “already in the pipeline,” such as demographic
shifts or energy dependency, bring consequences that have yet to unfold, and
these consequences may have immense impact.
Schwartz provides one example to illustrate the shortcomings of conven-
tional forecasting and trend analysis:
[Consider] the U.S. birthrate. In the early 1970s it hovered around 3 million births
per year; forecasters at the U.S. Census Bureau projected that this “trend” would
continue forever. Schools, which had been rushed into construction during the baby
boom of the fifties and early sixties, were now closed down and sold. Policymakers
did not consider that the birthrate might rise again suddenly. But a scenario might
have considered the likelihood that original baby boom children, reaching their late
thirties, would suddenly have children of their own. In 1979, the U.S. birthrate began
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to rise . . . in 1990 [it was] almost back to the 4 million of the fifties. Demographers
also failed to anticipate that immigration would accelerate. To keep up with demand,
the state of California (which had been closing schools in the late 1970s) . . . [had to]
build a classroom every day for the next seven years.16
Assessing and developing the two fundamentals—predetermined elements
and critical uncertainties—when building a scenario may be among the more
valuable aspects of this process, or at least on what strategic planners spend
much of their time. Yet experience tells us that many of our war college students,
initially introduced to this art of scenario “reading,” find of particular value the
process of deciding what are predetermined elements, as opposed to critical un-
certainties. When we examine geostrategic regions, for example, we may strive
to recognize which elements of each region are predetermined, such as geogra-
phy, and which may be critical but uncertain identities, such as how the prede-
termined “importance” of geography can be made less important, or even
irrelevant, by the uncertainty and influence of technology.
It is characteristic of the U.S. military that it spends considerable time refin-
ing definitions of anything it feels is important. Yet the very nature of scenario
building suggests that there is no clear distinction between the building blocks
of driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties. These sep-
arate elements of the scenario are not set in concrete; they can shift and change
over time and space.
Let’s consider another example: the fact that this technology is having an im-
pact on the military is clear, yet many of the specific implications it will have on
the future of war remain unclear. Good, sound strategy should therefore adapt,
and seek to operate, at the nexus of the predetermined elements of accelerating
technology and the critical uncertainty of the pace of innovation. Thus, the
“predetermined” intersection between technological innovation and how, and
to what degree, it may contribute to the transformation of the American mili-
tary and its way of conducting war remain a critical uncertainty.
Predetermined Elements: What We Know We Know
In the arena of national security affairs, it remains imperative to identify key
predetermined elements. As recent events in the security environment empha-
size, the United States, partially because of its immense power and influence,
will remain politically engaged in many regions of the world. This recognition,
in turn, continues to lead to the involvement of various elements of the U.S. mil-
itary in many places in the world on a regular, and in some cases, continuous ba-
sis. Although there have been some who advocate a significant reduction to the
overseas commitment of U.S. forces, the events of 11 September 2001 again con-
firm that their presence there will likely continue. The U.S. military can accept as
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a predetermined element that global engagement in some form, by the United
States, will continue in the foreseeable future, placing on it demands that will be
commensurate (if not greater) with those of the 1990s.
Certainly, in developing any realistic scenario of value, other predetermined
elements would include the realities of demographics, key geographic parame-
ters including distances in certain theaters of operations, climatic challenges,
and such other “nontraditional” aspects as the identity and form of governance
within societies and the rising significance of environmental, human, and even
“social” security. Schwartz offers some ways to look at these various aspects:
• Slow-changing phenomena. These include population growth, building a
physical infrastructure, and resource development.
• Constrained situations. For example, Japan must maintain a positive trade
balance because its aging population, spread out on four main islands, does
not possess the resources to feed, clothe, warm, or transport itself.
• In the pipeline. Today we know almost exactly how large the teenage
population in the United States will be in the near future. They are “in the
pipeline” already. The only uncertainty is immigration and how it will affect
these overall figures.
• Inevitable collisions. During the 1980s deficit, the American public
refused to provide the government with higher taxes just as they also
refused to give up any public benefits. Once the federal “gridlock” began,
there was no way out.17 (Again in 2000, when the United States thought it
had eliminated the federal deficit, it resurfaced just two years later. Thus
the competition for limited budget resources, and the inevitable conflicts
and collisions that will occur, may well be intractable, predetermined
elements of a national security scenario.)
There is also the possibility that the United States fears predetermined ele-
ments because it prefers to deny them. Schwartz illustrates this point by examin-
ing the reality of traffic gridlock that took place in large cities in the United
States in the mid-1990s. He calculated that if the number of people of driving
age were multiplied by the average number of cars per person in the United
States, the increased road mileage generated, planned highway construction,
and the length of time it takes to build highways (several years, at least), the con-
clusion would be that gridlock could not be avoided and is thus a predetermined
element. Subsequent events proved him correct.
Similar examples are widely available in the area of defense planning. The
continued lack of adequate Navy ships to meet national commitments might be
one case in point. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that American
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national leadership, with its continued emphasis on global engagement, will at-
tempt to maintain a level of naval presence in the oceans roughly on par with
that of the past decade. However, because of an insufficient number of ships, the
U.S. Navy is unable to meet this requirement. The war on terrorism has exacer-
bated the demand for more ships. Since ships take years to design, fund, and
build, a predetermined element in many maritime oriented scenarios is the lack
of adequate ships for many years.
Similar practical realities exist whenever military systems will take years to
build and field, whether the area of concern be space systems, missile defense
systems, major aircraft programs, or other comparable projects.
Critical Uncertainties: What We Thought We Knew but Didn’t—
or, the Demons Who Come in the Night
For five-thousand years, the waters of the Nile rose and fell predictably. The dy-
nasty of the pharaohs declined; other governments emerged and they too declined,
but the means for predicting floods remained basically the same. Then in the early
1960s, the Aswan High Dam was built. It was a remarkable feat of engineering,
five-hundred miles downstream from where the fierce Atbara joined the Nile.
Now if priests had still kept vigil at their temple (or government clerks a monitor-
ing station at the same locale upstream), they would have lost their ability to fore-
tell. Whether the water was blue, white, or green-brown, the result would be the
same: the flow would reach the Aswan Dam and stop. The fate of the flood plains
below is now in human hands.
One could perhaps, based on knowledge of Egyptian politics, make an educated
guess about the flooding level. It would now depend on two competing driving
forces: the farmers’ same need for water, and a new need by Egyptian consumers for
electricity from the dam. Regulating the dam was a political act, subject to pressure
from both sides. The flooding as a result became an “uncertainty.” If you wanted to
know how much money the Egyptian government could raise in taxes from farmers
this year, you could not simply tell from the color of the water. You had to find out
what the people in the dam’s control tower would do.18
Critical uncertainties come from predetermined elements. You often find
these uncertainties by questioning your assumptions about what you thought
was certain, or “predetermined.” Not meaning to sound too abstract, we like to
think of these critical uncertainties as being “things you thought you knew but
didn’t know at all.” Examples would include: the assumption that the United
States will continue as the sole economic, military, and political superpower in
the foreseeable future; that overseas presence will always determine future force
structure for the military; and that defense budgets will be available to fund ade-
quately the “transformation” of the military. In addition, while we argued earlier
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that the events of 11 September again confirm that the presence of U.S. forces
overseas will likely continue, there are circumstances and conditions in which
this might not be true. Finally, while many believed and argued that the United
States was increasingly vulnerable and likely to suffer some form of asymmetric
attack prior to 11 September, no one sufficiently anticipated the horribly precise
orchestration and execution of those attacks.
Examples of critical uncertainty from history include some important reali-
ties that have had a deep and lasting impact, such as: until 1989 it seemed that
the Cold War was going to continue as it had for almost five decades and that the
Soviet Union was not going to go away any time soon; during World War II, Ad-
miral Raymond Spruance, while at Midway, knew the Japanese fleet was headed
toward Hawaii and that his challenge was to find it and strike it before the Japa-
nese found him; equally, the German leadership knew the Allies planned to land
on the coast of Europe, but not when or where.
In every scenario, regardless if it focuses on history, culture, economics, poli-
tics, or military force, there are critical uncertainties that must be assessed and
reckoned with. Moreover, after recognizing the uncertainties, one should also
begin to consider options and strategies for dealing with them.
THE ART OF REPERCEIVING
The relationship between driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical
uncertainties is complex, but important to understand, as we learn to “read the
flow” of what is occurring in useful scenarios. As Schwartz points out, “I some-
times think of the relationship between predetermined elements and critical un-
certainties as a choreographed dance. You cannot experience the dance just by
knowing the sequence of steps. Each dancer will interpret them differently, and
add his or her unpredictable decisions.”19 In terms of national security and de-
fense, one cannot anticipate the nature of a war merely by looking at the military
orders of battle, even if you know your plans and those of the enemy. In the same
fashion, by developing scenarios oriented to a more distant future, the interrela-
tionship between that which is predetermined and that which is uncertain may
be equally open to interpretation and changing factors. Pierre Wack offers sev-
eral thoughts with respect to the use of scenarios as tools:
I have found that scenarios can effectively organize a variety of seemingly unrelated
economic, technological, competitive, political, and societal information and translate
it into a framework for judgment—in a way that no model could do. . . . Decision sce-
narios describe different worlds, not just different outcomes in the same world. . . . You
can test the value of scenarios by asking two questions: (1) What do they leave out? In
five to ten years . . . [decision makers] must not be able to say that the scenarios did not
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
134
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss4/1
warn of important events that subsequently happened. (2) Do they lead to action? If
scenarios do not push managers to do something other than that indicated by past ex-
perience, they are nothing more than interesting speculations.20
We are experiencing a world of dynamic change where even the most
mind-numbing, dramatic events do not impress us for long. Yet any good strate-
gist and planner must be able to help the nation’s leaders see more clearly the dif-
ferent futures that may occur. To operate in an uncertain world, we need to
reperceive—to question our assumptions about how the world works, so that we
see the world more clearly. The purpose of this is to help us make better deci-
sions about the future.
Perhaps one way to think about this is to obvert George Santayana’s famous
saying about learning from history by changing our perception of things that are
yet to come, by suggesting that “those who do not learn from the future are des-
tined to make mistakes in it.” To be able to understand that future, we have to
have a “mental map” flexible enough to consider plausible alternatives and pos-
sibilities we might not otherwise consider.
In the end, we can be certain of one thing: the future is not likely to be boring.
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THOMAS B. BUELL SAILOR AND SCHOLAR
Donald Chisholm
“Command at sea is the ultimate goal of ambitious naval line officers, but only a
chosen few obtain it. An officer proves worthy of command by performing well
as a subordinate officer aboard a variety of ships in a variety of duties.” These
words, written by Tom Buell in his renowned biography of Admiral Raymond
Spruance, apply to his own naval career as well.
A graduate of the Naval Academy class of 1958, Buell began his commis-
sioned life as first lieutenant aboard USS Hamner (DD 718), a World War II
Gearing-class destroyer. He then detached for duty with the commissioning
crew of USS Ernest J. King (DLG 10) and afterward went on to attend the weap-
ons curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, which he put to good use as
weapons officer aboard USS Brooke (DEG 1/FFG 1). After a stint at Norfolk Na-
val Shipyard, Buell served as executive officer in USS John King (DDG 3). He
later wrote that a ship’s first crew “became her brains, her blood, and her spirit,
for through them the ship was transformed from an inert mass of dirty, rusty
steel into a living personality.”
Buell attended the Naval War College, where he was a 1971 honor graduate of
the College of Naval Command and Staff, and then served as a member of the
Naval War College’s faculty before reporting as commanding officer to USS
Joseph Hewes (DE/FF/FFT 1078). The Hewes initially proved to be an engineer-
ing challenge, with an attendant string of inspections and surveys, but it was
made sufficiently reliable to undertake a six-month Indian Ocean deployment
on independent steaming; showing the flag culminated with the first U.S. Navy
operational transit of the Suez Canal after it reopened in 1975. From there Buell
was assigned to his twilight tour, teaching military history at the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point.
Buell liked to go to sea. He was, in the great tradition of those in command, a
fine ship handler, although like C. S. Forester’s
Hornblower, he fell prey to seasickness. He ran a
friendly, though not informal, wardroom. Buell liked
a quiet, businesslike bridge. Those occasions when his
temper was on the rise were presaged by the pulsing of
a vein in his forehead, providing ample warning to the
offending officer or sailor. Officers who proved them-
selves professionally competent were rewarded with
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increasing levels of trust and responsibility. For example, his combat informa-
tion center officer and operations officer had the conn through most of the Suez
transit. Buell understood and venerated naval tradition. Independent steaming
while in command of USS Hewes afforded him ample opportunities to engage in
diplomacy after a fashion more akin to that of the nineteenth century than the
twentieth—and he was good at it.
However, command of a warship at sea was not the peak of Buell’s profes-
sional contributions to the Navy. Early in his career he had shown a flair for writ-
ing, publishing his first article, “To Build a Better Ship—on Time,” about his
experience aboard USS Brooke, in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, which
also published his second article while he was serving in Norfolk. Both were
good efforts, the sort one expects from a junior officer—well defined on techni-
cal or procedural problems but arousing no particular controversy—and were
tolerated by Navy seniors.
While at Annapolis, Buell became aware of Admiral Raymond Spruance and
his accomplishments. Researching a paper for the Naval Postgraduate School led
him to an afternoon’s conversation with the admiral at his Carmel, California,
home, which was such a “profoundly moving experience” for young Buell that
when at the Naval War College he produced a monograph on Admiral Spruance.
It was the genesis for his subsequent biography, The Quiet Warrior (Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1974), researched and written in only fifteen months. Based on exten-
sive primary sources, it is eminently readable and evocative of person and place,
clearly informed by Buell’s own professional experience with the admiral. It
went into print just as Buell assumed command of USS Hewes. The Quiet War-
rior serves as the model for a biography of a military leader and has been widely
recognized as such. All four military services have placed the book on their pro-
fessional reading lists. The Naval Institute Press reissued it in 1987 for its Classics
of Naval Literature series; the Naval Order of the United States bestowed on
Buell its Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distinguished Contri-
bution to Naval Literature; and the Navy League awarded Buell its Alfred Thayer
Mahan Award for Literary Achievement. However, the most telling evidence of
its enduring value is that it is still in print three decades later.
Buell went on to write two more books: Master of Sea Power: A Biography of
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Naval Institute Press, 1980, reissued in 1995 for the
Classics of Naval Literature series), written while he was at West Point; and the
iconoclastic appraisal of the Civil War Union and Confederate combat leader-
ship The Warrior Generals: Combat Leadership in the Civil War (Crown, 1997),
now coming into its own as one of the best historical works on the Civil War.
Buell’s last published work was the fine monograph Naval Leadership in Korea:
The First Six Months, written for the Naval Historical Center. At the time of this
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writing, there are in press two co-edited volumes that are to appear in the West
Point History series on World War II. When Buell died he was at work on a sea
warrior trilogy, using three pivotal naval battles—Lake Erie, Hampton Roads,
and Guadalcanal—to address the issue of how naval leaders have responded to
the stress of battle. Running throughout each of his works is the fundamental
question of what makes a good, effective military leader, to which he provides
significant and useful answers.
Buell was in great demand as a public speaker and as a panelist at conferences,
where he showed that he was not only knowledgeable but also had the rare abil-
ity to distill complex subjects to their essential components, communicating
them effectively to both professional and general audiences. Moreover, he could
usually be counted on to offer a perspective of people and events that caused his
audiences to look at a subject in a new way.
Individuals capable of and skilled at both action and reflection are rare in any
profession. The Navy has not always rewarded reflection. An 1855 statement by
Senator Stephen Mallory in reference to oceanographer Matthew Maury still has
currency: “We think of the seaman as a mariner of the deep to whom we entrust
the honor of our flag, to carry it abroad on the high seas; we never think of him
as a philosopher.” Yet as John Dewey pointed out, it is the reconstruction of ex-
perience that creates the practical knowledge necessary for effective future ac-
tion. Buell acted and reflected, and did both well, to his credit and to the benefit
of the Navy.
Did Buell’s books change the way officers think? No definitive answer is pos-
sible for this sort of question. However, that his books are still in print and
widely read suggests that value is yet found in them regarding some of the cardi-
nal virtues of effective naval officers. They are well written, lively biographies
that deliver lessons in a palatable form.
Commander Thomas B. Buell, USN (Retired), commander of destroyers and
author, slipped his cable on 26 June 2002.
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
A MARITIME TRAFFIC-TRACKING SYSTEM CORNERSTONE OF MARITIME
HOMELAND DEFENSE
Guy Thomas
Among the many lessons “9/11” has taught is the one that the United States is a
vulnerable nation. This is especially true on its sea frontiers. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt understood this; he made a point of it during his first “fireside chat”
after Germany invaded Poland, plunging Europe into war in September 1939,
twenty-seven months before the U.S. Navy was attacked at Pearl Harbor. Ameri-
can security was, he said, “bound up with the security of the Western Hemi-
sphere and the seas adjacent thereto.” It still is. “We seek to keep war from our
firesides by keeping war from coming to the Americas.” Today, we are engaged in
a different war, one that has already come “to our fire-
sides.” To help prevent its return Americans must
again attend to the security of the seas and their ports.
This is doubly true for, despite the emergence of the
information age and the decline of the U.S. merchant
marine, the United States is still a maritime nation;
the security of its harbors and seaports is still of first
importance to the well-being of this country. Ameri-
cans are very dependent on maritime trade, as was re-
cently demonstrated by the significant economic
damage done by the short dock strike on the West
Coast. It is easy to envision that the economic cost and
social impact of simultaneous terrorist attacks on two
or more American ports would be huge.
The nation is attempting to grapple with this prob-
lem, which is ultimately one of global scope. One part
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of that problem—but a step that is both critical and manageable in the short
term—is to maintain the security of its ports. The United States needs to track
and identify every ship, along with its cargo, crew, and passengers, well before
any of those vessels and what they carry enter any of the country’s ports or pass
near anything of value to the United States. This article proposes a system that
would provide that tracking capability, as well as a means to meet any related
emergency with an appropriate response. This proposal—the result of months
of war games, conferences, and working groups dealing with the maritime as-
pects of homeland security—is intended to be a strawman, a thought starter, a
means of generating informed debate on how and why the United States might
build a maritime counterpart to the flight-following systems of the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).1
Not everyone supports this idea. Some believe it is too difficult, or not worth-
while, or both. Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, is not one of
these; he has twice called for the creation of a “maritime NORAD.”He first urged
its creation on 26 March 2002 during a conference on homeland security issues
sponsored by the Coast Guard and the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis at
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Parts of his speech resemble an early version of the
white paper this article is drawn from, written by the author and forwarded to
the Navy Staff in November 2001. Other powerful members of the U.S. govern-
ment also spoke, but it was Admiral Clark’s words that the press highlighted. The
CNO’s second call for a maritime tracking system came on 15 August 2002, at
the Naval-Industry R&D Partnership Conference in Washington, D.C. This time
the press missed it:
In conducting homeland defense, forward deployed naval forces will network with
other assets of the Navy and the Coast Guard, as well as the intelligence agencies to
identify, track and intercept threats long before they threaten this nation.
I said it before and I’ll say it again today: I’m convinced we need a NORAD for mari-
time forces. The effect of these operations will extend the security of the United
States far seaward, taking advantage of the time and space purchased by forward de-
ployed assets to protect the United States from impending threats.
What, some ask, does the admiral mean by “forward deployed assets”? If he
means units deployed overseas, the problem is significantly more difficult than
if he means units under way (in fleet operating areas, for example) a few hun-
dred miles off the U.S. coasts. A maritime NORAD-like system could be built
from existing technology to solve the “detect, ID, track and interdict as appro-
priate in the coastal-belt” problem. That belt could extend from fifty to a thou-
sand miles offshore, or some other similar area, to provide sufficient time for
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early detection, analysis, and determination of the threat potential or the proba-
bility of involvement in illegal activity of vessels en route to the United States. A
maritime traffic tracking system as outlined below would require almost no ad-
ditional tactical assets and would make the ones that are there substantially
more effective. The overseas, far-forward problem is a closely related, but sepa-
rate, issue. Its multinational political dimension alone makes it substantially
more difficult. However, it is not significantly more difficult technically, once we
get foreign ships in foreign waters to install the proposed transponders, which, it
must be admitted, would indeed be a very tough sell. The proposed system
would, most assuredly, assist in the forward-deployed situation, but, in any case,
the problem of security at home needs to be solved first. It may be possible to ex-
pand overseas the tracking capabilities required once they are in place in U.S.
coastal waters and economic exclusion zones, but it would be nearly impossible
to do the reverse—to establish the required tracking capabilities in foreign seas
and then extend them back to the coast of the United States. To attack the over-
seas environment before the near-home coastal problem would result in a huge
waste of time and national resources, both manpower and money, and would
leave our ports still vulnerable.
THE PROBLEM
The United States has 185 deepwater ports. Every day over two hundred com-
mercial vessels and twenty-one thousand containers arrive at eighteen of these
deepwater ports. The container-carrying ships are largely concentrated in less
than a dozen ports that have the proper handling equipment, but most ports can
accept a few containers. Additionally, approximately five thousand vessels of all
types, pleasure boats, fishermen, tugs with or without tows, oilfield-support ves-
sels, and research ships are active every day in the vast area from fifty to a thou-
sand nautical miles offshore. All of these vessels are large enough to carry
significant cargoes. They sail to and from not only the 185 ports mentioned but
also an even larger number of smaller moorings and anchorages. Some of these
vessels, which are of all sizes and types, are involved in illegal activities, such as
drug and immigrant smuggling, illegal fishing, or environmental pollution.
The concern since “9/11” is that there may be other vessels with even more
sinister objectives. This concern is heightened by the fact that tens of
ocean-crossing-capable commercial vessels disappear every year. Some sink be-
cause of weather or unseaworthiness. Others probably “disappear” for insurance
purposes. More than a few are attacked by pirates. Additionally, older but ser-
viceable ships of considerable size can be purchased in many places for less than
the terrorists probably spent to execute the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon. Any of these vessels could carry enough explosives to destroy
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or substantially damage a port’s infrastructure, including bridges, chemical and
petroleum plants, processing, handling and storage facilities, and such
high-value vessels (and thus high-payoff targets) as aircraft carriers and liquid
natural gas carriers. Indeed, the easiest way to put a weapon of mass destruction
into large urban areas such as New York, Los Angeles, or the Hampton Roads area
of Virginia is to send it by ship. A relatively small explosion onboard a small ship
with a deck cargo of even a few smallish bags of anthrax or some other evil sub-
stance in a major city port might only kill a few thousand or even just a few hun-
dred people, but the terror it would cause would be devastating to our economy, if
not our national psyche. The threat to our ports is especially true now that the air-
port and container security has been significantly enhanced worldwide.2
These facts make it apparent that the United States needs a better means than
it now has of identifying and tracking all vessels, as well as their cargoes, crew,
and passengers, as they approach the coasts of the United States or its territories.
The country does not now have a system that will give full “situational aware-
ness” of the surface of the seas surrounding it. It needs to create one now. We
need to know the name and ownership, position, course, speed, and intended
port of call of every vessel; the identity of everyone onboard; and a description
of its cargo or function—just as is required for all aircraft, private and commer-
cial alike. In other words, what is needed is a requirement for a “float plan” (the
maritime equivalent of an aviation flight plan) and a means of positively identi-
fying each vessel well before it nears our coasts (e.g., the maritime equivalent of
an “identification friend or foe,” or IFF, system). Moreover, the float plan and the
maritime IFF system must be linked together. Such an infrastructure might be a
“North American Maritime Defense Command.” Various proposals are under
investigation by the governments of the United States and Canada via a Bi-
National Maritime Awareness and Warning Working Group based at NORAD.
Others have suggested changing NORAD to the “North American Defense
Command” (with the same acronym), with air, land, and sea components.
HOW CAN THIS BE DONE?
Once we have a workable long-range maritime IFF, we can use several existing
technologies to gather, process, analyze, and fuse data from all useful sources so
those who must daily make decisions can reliably make the right ones in a timely
manner and take appropriate action. As already noted, the proposal centers on
a maritime analog of the FAA and NORAD, as well as the U.S. Customs flight-
following systems and the development of a long-range maritime IFF. This is the
critical initial step in building a maritime equivalent of NORAD. Though it does
not address adequately the very difficult problems of tracking the cargo and the
people onboard, this increment will provide an “information backbone” with
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which data on the contents of a vessel—its cargo, crew, and passengers—can be
melded, as it absolutely must be. Though this article focuses primarily on a mar-
itime IFF system and the needed information backbone, it also addresses the
other issues, i.e., the gathering, processing, analyzing, fusion, and provision of
data, to provide a context and to outline issues to be considered for an
end-to-end “system of systems.”
The tracking of ships bound for the United States is a task for the U.S. Navy,
U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs Service. Whereas ship tracking is now un-
dertaken only by exception, when extraordinary circumstances warrant, this
article proposes that it be done on a routine basis. Indeed, given today’s technol-
ogy, its comparative low cost and substantial capabilities, it would not be exces-
sively expensive to put a transceiver or transponder on every ship and track it (as
will be discussed below). However, even if a transponder could be placed, at a
reasonable unit price, in every container bound for the United States, the aggre-
gate cost could well prove prohibitive. But the payoffs of even just vessel tracking
for the struggle against terrorist threats (as well as drug and illegal-immigrant
smugglers and polluters) could be substantial, far outweighing its cost.
Surveillance under the proposed system would be focused on the belt from
fifty to a thousand miles offshore, or some other similar zone. (Vessels on voy-
ages originating and terminating within U.S. waters would be of interest only if
they ventured more than fifty miles offshore.) Vessels in that belt would be for-
bidden to approach U.S. shores closer than twelve nautical miles (the interna-
tional recognized limit of territorial waters) without having switched on and
operated a maritime IFF system for at least the previous ninety-six hours. A ship
departing a foreign port less than ninety-six hours from the coastal waters of the
United States would have to have the system operating as it gets under way.
Also, all vessels bound for U.S. waters would be required to file a float plan
(with the information detailed in the sidebar) and have a registration receipt
from the U.S. Coast Guard before reaching a point ninety-six hours (about a
thousand miles, at ten knots) out. Those who did not comply would risk being
stopped, searched, and denied entry to U.S. ports for a minimum of two days.
The float plan could be forwarded via e-mail or any other record-producing
communications system. Most shipping companies already do something simi-
lar to this internally to keep track of assets and maintain business flow. This is an
expansion of the field of vessels for the Advanced Notification of Arrival
(ANOA) now required by the Coast Guard for large vessels entering our ports. It
is in any case a good idea from a safety view, as a float plan tells someone ashore
where a vessel is headed and when it expects to get there; if the vessel does not ar-
rive on schedule, a search can be initiated. (In two recent cases, men sailing alone
spent more than three months adrift in disabled boats because no one knew to
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look for them.) Many smaller ships operating offshore already have communi-
cations devices that support e-mail; those that do not could use a marina’s
e-mail before departure. It would, in any case, be the operators’ responsibility to
make the necessary reports and to obtain the necessary documents. Given the
widespread availability of communications systems, however, this requirement
should not be arduous. The cost of the transponders and the minimum monthly
fee for U.S. citizens could be funded with an income tax credit. In that most of
the proposed transponders would also have at least e-mail capability, additional
usage of the system would be the vessel operators’ responsibility, like exceeding a
monthly allocation of cell-phone minutes.
These reporting requirements are consistent with international practice re-
garding freedom of navigation on the high seas. Indeed, the U.S. Coast Guard al-
ready has a ninety-six-hour Advanced Notification of Arrival requirement in
effect, dictating that large commercial vessels broadcast their intentions well be-
fore they cross the thousand-mile line. Once within a thousand miles the pro-
posed maritime IFF system would update a vessel’s position at specified
intervals as it closed the coast. The fifty-nautical-mile inner boundary elimi-
nates from surveillance the vast majority of pleasure and fishing boats and other
coastal commercial vessels that normally do not routinely venture far offshore.
The boundaries, both far and near, could be easily adjusted as needs and experi-
ence dictate.
Those areas that abut neighboring countries’ borders will need special atten-
tion, including the establishment of radar identification zones. The areas in-
clude where the coasts of Texas and California meet Mexico; where Washington
State and Maine meet the Canadian coast; the Strait of Florida, which abuts the
territorial waters of Cuba; and the vicinity of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. Radar surveillance in these high-interest, potential high-threat areas
would greatly facilitate the positive identification of all maritime traffic, espe-
cially if very-long-range (110 nautical miles–plus) high-frequency surface-wave
(HFSW) radar is employed. Indeed, means are already at hand in most of those
places to provide the close surveillance required. The one thing they are lacking is
the means to identify positively the many tracks they now have. This proposal solves
that problem for the tracking of all law-abiding citizens. The others would become
much more conspicuous. Where adequate radar surveillance is not now available, a
few well-placed aerostats, like those used in counterdrug operations, would provide
sufficient coverage. However, experience indicates that radar tracking is not
enough—satellite communications transponders onboard ships, serving an IFF
function, are key to solving the ship-traffic management system.
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SHIP AND CONTAINER TRACKING
Monitoring the contents and tracking the location of containers are at the heart
of shipping security. Many people believe containers, whether arriving by land
or sea, represent the greatest potential for security breaches and entry of contra-
band. The tracking of containers bound for the United States is an important re-
sponsibility of the U.S. Customs Service. The U.S. Border Patrol, Drug
Enforcement Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, plus other law en-
forcement agencies, support Customs in this effort. The people-vetting and
tracking problem is even more difficult, and these agencies also assist the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) in vetting and tracking the people ar-
riving in the United States via all modes of transportation, including ships. (For
some of the currently available technologies, see the appendix, available online
at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/autumn/rd1-a03.htm.)
Potential solutions to these two problems will not be addressed here other
than to note that the float plan, systems, databases, and procedures developed to
track ships would assist the INS in its people-tracking efforts and the U.S. Cus-
toms Service in its cargo-tracking mission as well. In fact, the system proposed
here would have much wider applications than port security, or even
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DRAFT NOTICE TO MARINERS
Be advised: All vessels intending to enter or transit the territorial waters of the
United States or its protectorates (Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Samoa)
must file the Advanced Notification of Arrival (ANOA), as required by pertinent
U.S. Coast Guard regulations, or a float plan as described below with the U.S.
Coast Guard, prior to arriving within one thousand nautical miles of the coast of
the United States or its protectorates. If the point of departure is within [to be
specified] nautical miles, the float plan must be filed a minimum of twenty-four
hours prior to leaving the foreign port. The float plan will include:
1. The names and nationalities of all persons onboard
2. List of all Maritime Mobile Service Identifiers (MMSIs) to be used on the voyage
3. Description of any and all cargo
4. Point of last departure
5. Destination
6. Estimated time of arrival
7. Estimated time and location of arrival at a point fifty nautical miles from the
coast of the United States or its protectorates.
Additionally, all vessels must also have one of the following systems on and
transmitting its identification (MMSI) and location. It must be reporting the ves-
sel’s position and MMSI not less than once an hour when in international waters
within [to be specified] nautical miles from the United States or its protectorates.
When in international waters within [to be specified] hundred miles of the United
States or its protectorates and planning on entering U.S. territorial waters the ves-
sel must broadcast its identification and position four times an hour. Vessels not
complying with this directive will be subject to interception and detention for a
minimum of twenty-four hours at the limits of U.S. territorial waters.
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counterterrorism generally. As a start, it would also greatly assist in the war on
drugs, help curb illegal immigration, assist in fisheries protection, and support
antipollution operations.
Most of the civilian agencies named above already have at least limited mari-
time surveillance capabilities to cope with such problems. As an example, the
Customs Service has an excellent facility at March Air Reserve Base, near River-
side, California—the Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center
(AMICC). It is primarily focused on countering air smugglers and tracks all air-
craft crossing any border in North America. The coverage of the remote radars
(displayed at AMICC via live video feeds) extends far across North America and
well into South America. AMICC currently makes only a minimal effort against
marine smugglers, due to manpower and equipment limitations, but Customs
would like to see that capability expanded. The agency clearly understands what
needs to be done and, given the resources, is ready to do it or to help whatever
other organization gets the job.
At any one moment there are about five thousand aircraft airborne either
over the United States or in its immediate vicinity. The Customs Service’s system
for coordinating multiple reporting entities and the tools it has developed for its
air surveillance task are especially instructive. In the course of a day, seven to
eleven AMICC watch standers routinely select an average of 2,900 tracks (out of
tens of thousands) for special, detailed examination. To assist in that examina-
tion AMICC has developed an excellent set of software tools that allow surveil-
lance system operators to access databases that contain the current flight plan
data and the flight tracks of all flights of the aircraft under special scrutiny in the
past two years, as well as data on anyone of special interest who has been associ-
ated with that particular aircraft. Interestingly enough, the Coast Guard has
much of this same data on over six hundred thousand vessels of U.S. registry in
its Maritime Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database. It
also has many of the same types of interfaces to a host of other organizations,
such as commercial insurance databases and international police organizations
as does the AMICC. The AMICC is also a major participant in the Domestic
Events Network (linking the Federal Aviation Administration, NORAD, law en-
forcement agencies, and air traffic control facilities). AMICC’s experience
should prove very valuable in developing a maritime counterpart. If the mari-
time surveillance organization is not collocated at the AMICC, it would need to
have a close interface with AMICC and be a major participant on the Domestic
Events Network. The maritime tracking center would need to be linked to the
MISLE database, which would need in turn to be interfaced to the Global Com-
mand and Control System, which is now under consideration, in order to ap-
proximate what is now in operation at the AMICC.
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MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS
Fundamentally, the maritime homeland security/defense mission involves a detect-
assess-act cycle. These cycles can be approached in several ways. The most
famous model is the “OODA loop,” which consists of the elements observe, ori-
ent, decide, and act. Another widely employed model is the “sensor to shooter”
paradigm. A third, more recent breakdown of this cycle is the “find, fix, track,
target, engage, assess” model. Though each of these models is useful, none fully
describes what actually happens in a systems sense. Let us use a slightly different
model to describe a vessel-tracking system and its interfaces with a decision-
making apparatus so as to produce a system able to take timely action against
potentially hostile vessels and to apprehend others engaged in illegal activities.
This model, called “Warfare in the Fourth Dimension,” was developed more
than twenty years ago to describe and analyze the importance of time for deci-
sions in combat.3 It was first used to equate the battle for control of the electro-
magnetic spectrum with the battle for time, the fourth dimension in physics.
The model’s components are the sensors (S), the processors (P), the fusion sys-
tem (F), the decision maker (DM), and the action taker (AT), as well as the com-
munications links that tie each of those components together. The paradigm closely
mirrors what actually happens in all forms of combat, be it an infantryman fighting
in very close combat or a ballistic-missile-defense action on the edge of space.
Sensors detect phenomena given off by potential targets and forward data to
processors, which feed information to the fusion system. The fusion system pro-
vides knowledge to the decision maker. He, in turn, takes all other factors of the
environment, including rules of engagement, force status, strategic situation,
political alignments, and so on, into account and develops as clear a tactical pic-
ture as possible and (ideally) the wisdom applied to it. On this basis the decision
maker issues orders to the action taker. The sensors detect the results, or lack
thereof, and the cycle starts all over again. A shorthand of the model’s operation
is S-P-F-D-A.
In close ground combat, eyes and ears (and hands and noses, if the conflict is
very close indeed) are the primary sensors. The processors, fusion system, deci-
sion maker, and action taker are all represented within soldiers, and the commu-
nications systems are the synapses in their brains. At the other extreme, on the
edge of space, the sensors might be infrared or electronic intelligence satellites,
linked to their processing centers on the ground by high-capacity data links that
are in turn linked to the fusion system via military satellite communications or
fiber-optic cable. The fusion systems might, or might not, be collocated with
the decision maker. Most likely the decision maker would be linked to action
takers via a separate military satellite communication system. Battle damage
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assessment uses exactly the same systems, tasked to look for confirming phe-
nomena, after which the S-P-F-D-A process starts all over again.
The requirements for an enhanced tracking system are being widely dis-
cussed within the Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs. The basic requirement for
overall situation awareness is “maritime domain awareness,” analogous to the
airspace awareness afforded by the FAA’s, NORAD’s, and Customs’s flight-
following systems. Numerous war games and conferences indicate that various
existing systems could be modified to provide the basic building blocks for a sys-
tem to provide the necessary awareness; this would be the first step in building a
North American Maritime Defense Command. Stepping through each of the
segments of the S-P-F-D-A model, let us examine how this could be done.
Sense
The first step in this chain is to select specific phenomena that can be detected by
sensors and processed by the rest of the cycle in a timely manner. This is the
heart of the proposal. Beyond the traditional sensors, such as radars, signals in-
telligence, and acoustic devices, there already exists a set of cooperative report-
ing systems, communications satellite–based identity and position reporting
systems—the InMarSat, ARGOS, and OrbComm, communications satellite sys-
tems with midocean coverage—each of which could be adapted for use as a pri-
mary sensor for maritime domain awareness. GlobalStar and Iridium
communications satellite systems, the only two other systems with similar cov-
erage, are also developing similar transceiving or transponding systems. Yet
other companies, Comtech Mobile DataComm and Boatrac as examples, have
developed transceiver-based unit-tracking systems that could possibly partici-
pate in the envisioned system. Other satellite communications–associated com-
panies and systems probably would also be able to provide basic components of
a maritime IFF system.
These systems would need a common vessel-identification scheme, and one
is readily available. Several of them already use the Maritime Mobile Service
Identifier (MMSI), assigned by the International Telecommunications Union.
Discussions with developers of most of the other systems indicate that their sys-
tems could be relatively easily modified to broadcast an MMSI as well.
If the envisioned MTTS transponder system is the maritime equivalent of the
aircraft system’s IFF, the MMSI is the specific entity’s identification (“squawk”)
code. It would become an “electronic license plate.” Aviation IFF was originally
interrogated solely by military radar systems, but now it is the primary elec-
tronic means of identification of radar tracks for both civilian and military uses.
Radar is the vital part of the IFF system, interrogating unit-based transponders
and reading responses. However, a ship-tracking system such as would be
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required for a maritime defense command would need to track ships well out
beyond land-based radar ranges; communications satellite transceivers and
transponders would serve in its place. Of the five communications satellite sys-
tems that either now or would soon be able to meet the reporting requirements
over a broad ocean area, InMarSat and OrbComm appear able to provide timely
position reporting with oceanic coverage. As of early 2003, two other satellite
communications systems, GlobalStar and Iridium, were on the threshold of the
needed capability. The fifth system, ARGOS, has an oceanic communicating and
reporting capability but has significant built-in time-lateness. Additionally,
once a firm market and a known requirement exist, other satellite companies
may well decide to provide the required services, either by adapting existing sat-
ellite systems or by including oceanic capability in new ones. (Brief descriptions
of the MMSI and the several satellite tracking systems suitable for maritime use
are in the online appendix.)
Process
The signals containing the unit’s identification and location would be broadcast
via a transceiver or transponder onboard every ship desiring to enter the coastal
waters of the United States. The signal would be received by one of several com-
munications satellite systems, depending on which transceiver/transponder
was installed. Overall course and speed would be calculated at the terrestrial
tracking station.
Eventually, the effort could include the Automatic Identification System
(AIS)—an excellent, high-fidelity collision-avoidance and traffic management
system now coming into use (see the online appendix)—if its transponders were
placed in orbit, as has been suggested, or a method were found to route the AIS
signal through one of the existing communication satellite systems. The advan-
tages to global shipping control would be significant. However, no satellites now
in orbit can receive or process the AIS signal, and it is unclear when, or even if,
AIS transponders themselves will be put in space. Manned or unmanned aircraft
and aerostats could also be equipped to monitor AIS and used in a surveillance/
patrol role, but a space-based approach might well be significantly less expensive.
Earth stations receiving the downlink transmitted by whatever satellite system
would forward the generated ship-position data to both the National Maritime
Intelligence Center and Coast Guard regional reporting centers of some type.
The functions of regional reporting centers could be served by the two Mari-
time Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs), one on each coast, recently created by
the Coast Guard with assistance from the Office of Naval Intelligence. Also, the
Defense Information Systems Agency is experimenting with a concept it calls
“Area Security Operations Command and Control” (ASOC), by which a
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communications and software suite would link many of the organizations in-
volved in homeland security. The MIFC will be linked to Joint Harbor Opera-
tions Centers (JHOCs), which will use the ASOC to link to military and other
government agencies—for instance, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the
Drug Enforcement Agency, the Border Patrol—in its area of responsibility. It
would be responsible for tracking all vessels in its area, assisting in assessing all
contacts and deciding whether a response is required, and orchestrating any tac-
tical response required. It would be assisted by NMIC’s civilian merchant ship
section, which is the organization responsible for performing long-term trend
analysis as well as maintaining a daily maritime intelligence watch worldwide.
Fuse
All-source intelligence fusion would primarily take place at the NMIC, but the
MIFCs and battle watch organizations maintained at numbered fleet headquar-
ters would assist. Coordination would be over SIPRNET (the U.S. government
secure Internet), but because much of the data is not classified, the World Wide
Web could also be used. Data from national collection means, including signals
intelligence and acoustic systems, over-the-horizon radars such as the ROTHR*
and HFSW systems, sighting reports by Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs vessels
and aircraft, human intelligence, and acoustic sensors would be melded with the
transponder-supplied positions to determine the presence of nonreporting ves-
sels or tracks displaying abnormal behavior or with suspicious histories.
This is not an insurmountable task. As mentioned above, the Customs Ser-
vice’s Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center investigates an average
of 2,900 anomalous tracks daily. Careful analysis and prompt information ex-
change with other governmental agencies and with private entities clears the
vast majority of unusual tracks, but almost every day the AMICC initiates inter-
cepts by Customs aircraft. Similarly, in a maritime defense system, Coast Guard
or Navy assets, either air or surface, could be dispatched to interdict, interrogate,
and determine the status and intentions of the few entities judged sufficiently
suspicious by the regional reporting center—vessels not reporting or reporting
in anomalous ways (such as using the MMSI of a ship known to have been re-
cently in another part of the world). The patrol units would be linked via UHF
satellite communications to the MIFC, which in turn could access the vessel’s
“master file” (probably at the National Maritime Intelligence Center). The mas-
ter file would contain everything known about the vessel and its owners, includ-
ing type, the current float plan and all previous ones, associated MMSIs, history
of ownership, and cargoes and crews, plus any special notes that have been ap-
pended in the past, such as association with suspicious entities or activities.
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The patrol unit, which could, in many cases, also determine a vessel’s Mari-
time Mobile Service Identifier via a standard marine VHF radio equipped for
Digital Selective Calling, would query the vessel database using the MMSI, much
as a highway patrol officer runs a license plate check. A query to a Department of
Motor Vehicles database can tell a patrol officer if a suspicious car should be
pulled over; an MMSI check would provide the same benefit to maritime forces.
Establishing the MMSI as an IFF-equivalent, an electronic license plate, would
be of substantial benefit to Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs patrol units. Of
course, complications arise when a Navy unit has to check out a suspicious en-
tity and “pull it over”; the Posse Comitatus Act of 1877 constrains the Navy’s ac-
tions in such a situation. That whole issue is under review, however, and in any
case legal means can be found to halt a suspicious ship on the high seas. The USA
Patriot Act of 2002 at least allows military platforms to collect intelligence on ci-
vilian entities in the manner described here.
Establishing the MMSI as electronic license plates and developing the means
to track them would be important steps and would fill a substantial void in the
nation’s maritime defenses. Getting all units approaching the coast of the United
States and its territories to broadcast their MMSIs and position is a different
matter, one that would require cooperation. However, the U.S. government can
require all vessels desiring to enter U.S. ports to commence broadcasting their
MMSIs, within either a specified distance of the coast or time of entering port.
Vessels complying would enjoy the greater safety that accrues from track follow-
ing. Any ship not filing a float plan or broadcasting its identifier and location
(which should be immediately obvious to patrolling units) would be subject to
interception, inspection, and the likelihood of significant delays in entering
port, if indeed they were allowed to enter port at all. Thus the incentive to com-
ply would be substantial. Delay costs all vessel owners, especially shippers,
money—more money than acquiring communicating systems (that their ships
should already have anyway, for safety, as discussed below) would cost them.
The processing system outlined above is an expansion of capabilities already
in place at the Joint Inter Agency Task Force facilities on both the east and west
coasts of the United States and at the AMICC. Fortunately, software tools in use
at the AMICC and at other government agencies such as the National Security
Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office have shown that the manning
requirements for a full maritime watch can be quite small. New-generation dis-
play and decision technology—such as the Anti-Air Defense Commander
(AADC) system developed at Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Labo-
ratory, with easily understood symbology and embedded reasoning and data
manipulation capabilities, now being deployed on Navy command ships and
cruisers—could be used to help the regional reporting center gain and maintain
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situational awareness. The reporting center’s display and decision system would
be the focus of the data fusion efforts, such as “smart agents” (see the online
appendix), software that would sort the huge amount of data flowing in. The en-
visioned system could also manage communications links into and out of the
several reporting and analysis centers.
Decide
A correct decision requires a sufficient quality and quantity of information
and enough time to fuse that information so as to develop knowledge and
thence wisdom. Timeliness dictates that decision makers be able to know when
they have the information—from all sources and addressing all aspects of the
problem at hand, such as status of own forces, rules of engagement, and the po-
litical, strategic, operational, and tactical situations—needed to develop wis-
dom and issue the appropriate orders. This is by no means a trivial task;
indeed, integrating vast amounts of data from heterogeneous sources is daunt-
ing for the human mind; fortunately, however, several software tools are now
available to help the decision maker.
One of these is the Architecture for Distributed Information Access
(ADINA) tool developed at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory—an agent-based architecture for seamless access to and aggrega-
tion of heterogeneous information sources. Maritime defense regional report-
ing centers would use smart-agent tools like ADINA (and Control of
Agent-Based Systems, or CoABS, grids, described in the online appendix) both
to fuse the data, including the crucial MMSI reports, and to formulate decisions
and courses of action, all in close coordination with the U.S. military command
structure in the appropriate area.
Act
Once the decision is made to interdict a specific vessel, an on-scene commander
would be designated; rules of engagement need to be in place and clearly spell
out which federal agencies would take the lead in anticipated cases. Forces, pos-
sibly including surface and air elements of the Coast Guard, Navy, or Air Force,
would be assigned to take appropriate action. Rapid response would be crucial
in some situations; for that reason interdiction forces should include such regu-
lar and reserve assets as Air Force A-10s and Navy P-3s, equipped and trained for
antishipping attack. Their weapons should include optically guided missiles
such as Penguin and Hellfire, to allow disabling fire to be focused on the bridges
and rudders of rogue ships attempting to enter port with clearly hostile inten-
tions. In extremis, such as the need to stop a ship known or strongly suspected of
carrying weapons of mass destruction, larger weapons, such as Maverick or Har-
poon, must be readily available to sink it. If more time is available and forces are
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in position, surface units could effect the interdiction. Helicopter insertion of
special operations forces or specially trained units is also a possibility.
Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs vessels and aircraft routinely operating off
U.S. shores would not only report all surface vessels in their areas but act as “first
responders.” Their reports would be fed into vessel master files and automati-
cally matched with the pertinent float plan. Nonreporting or suspicious vessels
would be marked for follow-up.
Because other systems, such as InMarSat-C, AIS, and DSC (described in the
online appendix), broadcast position and identification information, it would
be beneficial if maritime patrol forces could monitor them. Any vessel in a patrol
unit’s vicinity broadcasting on these internationally mandated systems could be
quickly and accurately identified, by MMSI. Indeed, all units of the U.S. govern-
ment assigned to surveillance and interdiction roles should also be equipped to
monitor them, if not fully participate.
WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED?
Putting this proposal into practice would require prenotification of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO) but not necessarily its approval. The initial
implementation of this system would require the wide promulgation of a notice to
mariners directing all vessels out to a thousand nautical miles off a U.S. coast and
desiring to enter American territorial waters to broadcast their identification and
location at set intervals over one of the approved systems. It would further direct
every vessel to broadcast its location as soon as within ninety-six hours of arrival
in an American port or whichever happens first. A vessel departing a port less than
ninety-six hours out would operate the system as soon as it is under way.
One final word on available technology. The International Maritime Organi-
zation already requires units above three hundred gross tons to carry
InMarSat-C, as part of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System and in
accordance with the Safety of Life at Sea Convention. InMarSat-C has a built-in
ship-polling capability that meets the requirements for a maritime IFF system.
The proposed system would provide that capability, all the way down to the
smallest vessel capable of open-ocean navigation. These vessels will also be re-
quired to have the more expensive and more sophisticated Automatic Identifica-
tion System by 2004. The purposes of this proposal could be met by either
system; in any case, AIS, once it is capable of being monitored from beyond line
of sight, may well become the specified system. However, AIS is significantly
more expensive than the transponders of the low-earth orbiting satellite com-
munications systems. Those other satellite communications reporting systems
that would be suitable include OrbComm, GlobalStar, and Iridium. In any case,
installation could be encouraged via a tax credit for American vessel owners. For
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foreign owners the cost of entering U.S. waters will indeed increase, but not by
an unbearable amount. Operational tests would be needed on each of these sys-
tems to ensure they are sufficiently timely and compatible with a national re-
porting standard. The task is clearly feasible from a technology viewpoint.
A two-tiered tracking system could be quickly emplaced, in which a com-
bined automatic identification and satellite transceiver system sends tracking
output via the AMICC or other tracking center to national and regional intelli-
gence centers for further analysis and threat/law violation/encroachment deter-
mination, in much the same way as a Federal Aviation Agency regional center tracks
aircraft. Regulations would be needed requiring all oceangoing vessels to install
satellite communications reporting systems and operate them within a certain
distance from the United States if the vessels intend to enter its territorial waters.
It would be very much to the benefit of U.S. security, maritime and otherwise,
if the system and legal requirements outlined above were enacted immediately.
This proposal is intended as a point of departure for building the maritime por-
tion of the homeland security mission capabilities package. It names specific
systems, but if more capable systems become available or a more beneficial
alignment of existing systems can be made, so much the better. One way or the
other, let’s get on with it. We are at war, and this is a known vulnerability.
N O T E S
1. Drafts of this article have been circulated
since November 2001 to stimulate focused,
informed debate and information exchange.
That information exchange has resulted in
several major revisions of this article. How-
ever, more informed discussion, war games,
both technically focused and policy focused,
and operational experiments are needed until
the concept and procedures outlined here are
fully implemented. One disclaimer is appro-
priate: though this article identifies specific
systems to provide points of departure for
further investigation, it is not intended to
champion any specific system or systems. If
there are better, more useful systems available
either now or in the near future, then those
should be used.
2. For a detailed study of the piracy problem see
John S. Burnett, Dangerous Waters: Modern
Piracy and Terror on the High Seas (New
York: E. P. Dutton, 2002).
3. The model was developed by the author, as a
research fellow at the Naval War College, in
Newport, Rhode Island.
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A NEW ORDER, NEW POWERS
Werner Weidenfeld
The war with Iraq has been a turning point in history that will bring massive
changes to America’s relations with the rest of the world and relations within
Europe. Future historians will characterize the time period between the attack
on the World Trade Center and the Iraqi war as the beginning of a new era in the
history of the world. They will see the end of the East-West conflict as the incu-
bation period for the full consequences that were not reducible to one concept
by its contemporaries. Unsurprisingly, the political response worldwide has
been erratic and confused, reflected in the intellectual commentary. The war ex-
posed a lack of orientation. Where it was once fashionable to speak of a para-
digm change, one now soberly acknowledges paradigm atrophy.
The demands of our era are too high; too much must be resolved in too many
places, and too many previously legitimate assumptions appear to have become
irrelevant. Almost everything that seemed to lend world politics the image of a
reasonably reliable order is no longer valid. The Iraqi war presents seven conse-
quences for the future of international politics.
In the beginning there was terror. This is not to say that everything is a conse-
quence of terrorism, but the attacks of 11 September released forces, triggered
traumas, and made us all look into the abyss of serious dangers previously off in
the distance where they were more or less ignored.
The end of the Cold War and the dissipation of communist ideology and its
goal of world domination left smoldering conflicts in the background. Phenom-
ena such as religious fundamentalism, the explosion of ethnic tensions, and
heated nationalism, which has been contained for so long within the grip of bipo-
larity, were then suddenly set free, surprising the world community with this new
aggressiveness, from the Balkans to the Caucasus, Af-
ghanistan to Pakistan, Iraq to Indonesia and Malaysia.
The second consequence is that terrorism has un-
dermined the premise of our security. The basic prin-
ciple against terrorism has always been deterrence. An
enemy state was to be deterred from attacking with
the threat of a counterattack resulting in destruction
or at least defeat. Every actor’s move was based on the
rationally calculated risk of a counterattack. This en-
sured peace in the Cold War world for decades.
Professor Dr. Werner Weidenfeld is currently a member
of the executive board, Bertelsmann Foundation,
Guetersloh; director of the Center for Applied Policy Re-
search (CAP) Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich;
and professor for political science at Geschwister-
School-Institut, University of Munich. From 1975 to
1995, he was professor of political science at Johannes
Gutenberg University, Mainz. He was associate profes-
sor at the Sorbonne, Paris, and from 1987 to 1999 the
coordinator of the German government for German-
American cooperation.
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However, the global professional network of terrorism does not act according to
this principle. Its calculations are not based upon this traditional sense of risk, as
divine promises are made.
Terrorism is no longer the classic foreign enemy. It lies both within and be-
yond the borders of the country under attack. Terrorist networks boast a high
level of professional training and are well equipped with high-tech capabilities,
which are often linked to a transcendence-oriented conviction to bring a new
cultural horizon to designated nations. Terrorism has nested itself in many
countries, effectively rescinding the traditional distinction between domestic
and foreign security. Western societies, particularly the United States, have
therefore replaced deterrence with the active search for protection.
In recent years alone, some ninety thousand terrorists worldwide have been
trained. The nightmare of 11 September was, against the backdrop of this infor-
mation, just the beginning of the beginning. Western civilization is facing
threats to its very existence.
America’s ability to survive terrorism is the third consequence. Rendered vul-
nerable for the first time on its own territory, on 11 September the United States
was struck at the very heart of its existence. Practically defenseless against attack,
the American self-conception made war against terrorism necessary to protect
the survival of the nation. That is why the war with Iraq should not be seen as a
singular event. It is only one stone, with many more needed to complete the large
mosaic of security and stability. First, there was Afghanistan, then Iraq, and oth-
ers will follow—Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Korea; wherever the
roots of threats are found, America will seek to protect its national existence.
Should organizations such as the United Nations or NATO wish to be of help,
Washington will welcome them; however, should the solidarity of international
organizations not bear support for it, Washington will manage it alone. The
same goes for international law. When useful, the United States will follow it, but
when not, one can go without appealing to its legitimacy. The vital interest of se-
curing America’s existence has priority above all else.
The fourth consequence is that the United States and Europe’s respective ba-
sic perceptions of risks and threats to their national security are drifting further
apart. This huge divide could lead, at some point, to a rupture in transatlantic
culture. To be sure, the common roots of an enlightened society, principles of
freedom and reason have not simply withered. A close transatlantic economic
relationship and social interconnection continue to be important, but they are
strained more and more by dissent over the use of military force by the United
States. America guaranteed its European allies sanctuary, which soothed the Eu-
ropean soul wounded by two world wars. However, when two societies respond
so differently to the key challenges to their basic security, the partnership erodes,
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and it is only a question of time before the relationship collapses. The end of the
old Atlantic community is at hand.
As for its perception of the rest of the world, the fifth consequence is that the
only remaining superpower is prepared to fully realize its hegemonic status. A
natural reflex to this has been its attempt to build temporary coalitions that
relativize and curb its domination. Only this can explain the current curious al-
liance between France, Germany, Russia, and China. Within it, each partner has
its own interests:
• France sees the chance to bring itself back into the circle of world powers. It
is realistic enough to recognize that its strength alone is not enough. France
needs partners, even if that means working with an estranged Germany,
which can only be considered a junior partner in world political affairs at best.
• Germany senses the need to avert the danger of a German Sonderweg. For
historical reasons, Germany requires the anchor of friendly relations
more so than other nations. After having estranged itself from old
partners, in particular the United States, Germany must forge new
alliances. Working together with France, Russia, and China, it can
combine the current moods and attitudes of multilateralism, pacifism,
and anti-Americanism to its advantage at the voting booth.
• Russia is trapped in ambivalent behavior. On the one hand, wounded by
the loss of its superpower status, Russia seeks to benefit from a close
relationship with the United States. On the other hand, too close a
relationship with Washington threatens to destroy what remains of Russia’s
weight in world political affairs. Russia’s claims of solidarity with America
were a welcome diversion from domestic attention to Chechnya. However,
when core elements of national pride and world political interests are at
stake, Moscow knows how to define and claim its own position.
• China is the only power that in the midterm could meet the United States
eye to eye. However, it needs a prudent policy that will keep its neighbors
from becoming ticking time bombs through U.S. actions. The aggravation of the
Indian-Pakistan conflict is one such example. This applies as well to a policy
toward North Korea, which could force Japan to become a nuclear power.
Considered together, all four partners share the interest of deflating the
world’s only superpower’s magnetism, albeit for different reasons. America’s he-
gemony is to be tamed through the alliance of a counter power.
The sixth consequence is America’s response to this change in the constella-
tion with a cooperation strategy à la carte. It seeks out specific countries, attract-
ing them with the alluring promises of business and prestige, even at the risk of
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damaging such international organizations as NATO, the European Union, and
the United Nations. Regarding the EU, the classic strategy of “divide and con-
quer” has been employed, the symbolic highlight thereof being the letter of soli-
darity with the United States, signed by eight European states. This piece of
paper became a document of the division of Europe. America will honor this
document at best with wistful nostalgia, as its basic interests lie elsewhere in the
main sources of energy supplies. These markets of the future lie beyond Europe.
The most relevant and potentially dangerous nations with respect to ques-
tions of security are in Asia and the Middle East. The political arm of Islamic
fundamentalism is based on the Arabian Peninsula. The threat of nuclear arms
was an issue in the Indian-Pakistan conflict. It is an issue in Iran, in the Middle
East generally, and in North Korea. The time when America needed to protect its
primary interests in Europe is gone.
The final consequence is how deeply America’s behavior and the war with
Iraq have divided Europe. It would be naïve to assume that the historical suc-
cesses of European integration will continue. The process of European integra-
tion can also fail. The war with Iraq has given rise to basic existential questions,
to which European states have reacted with recourse according to their diverse
national dispositions. Europe has no common perception of war and peace—
each nation’s own historical trauma is too different to permit such a shared ba-
sis. Europeans consistently pursue individual national courses alongside their
respective relationship to the United States, which explains why Eastern and
Central European states are giving in to the magnetism of America’s market and
power. It also explains why British prime minister Tony Blair and Spain’s José
María Aznar compensate for their limited influence in continental Europe by
positioning themselves at the shoulders of the United States and its political and
economic prowess.
In the long-term, most importantly, trust among Europeans is being torn
asunder. That letter signed by eight countries was an act prepared and carried
out in the style of old-time secret diplomacy. Who should trust whom? Should
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder still trust Azner? Should President Jacques
Chirac continue to have faith in Blair? Should France and Germany stand to-
gether against Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in European politics?
The virus of distrust threatens to corrode Europe internally.
Considered together, these points illustrate why it is so difficult to understand
clearly and interpret our present situation. There are power conglomerates of a
dimension heretofore unknown, societies have become more vulnerable than
ever, and the previous world order has become an anarchy of conflicts. The great
dramas of human history are apparently still to be written. The reliability of our
peaceful experience is a thing of the past.
1 5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
160





Kinnard, Douglas. Eisenhower: Soldier-Statesman of the Amer-
ican Century. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002. 112pp.
$19.95
Wicker, Tom. Dwight D. Eisenhower. New York: Times Books,
2002. 158pp. $20
Holland, Matthew F. Eisenhower between the Wars: The
Making of a General Statesman. Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
2001. 248pp. $64.95
I have written you a long letter because I do not have time to write you
a short one.
—Blaise Paschal
Anyone who has ever written professionally, whether a novel or an interoffice
memo, quickly acknowledges the accuracy of Paschal’s statement. If this is the
test of a good writer, it is even more pertinent when the subject is someone larger
than life. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s extraordinary achievements have filled vol-
umes, some more adequate than others. Historians of
great note have written hundreds of pages about brief
segments of his eventful life. Now, three authors have
attempted in comparatively slim volumes to define
the essential experiences and achievements of one of
the twentieth century’s most notable figures.
Of the three books reviewed, Kinnard achieves this
task to a greater degree than the other authors. This
should come as no surprise to those familiar with
Kinnard’s work. A true soldier-scholar, Kinnard has
Colonel Jay M. Parker, U.S. Army, is professor of inter-
national affairs and director of International Relations
and International Security Studies at the U.S. Military
Academy. Commissioned as an infantry officer, he
served in a variety of command and staff positions prior
to joining the senior faculty at West Point. He earned
his Ph.D. from Columbia University and is a 1994
graduate of Naval Command and Staff College of the
Naval War College. At the time of writing, Colonel
Parker was a visiting research fellow at Princeton Uni-
versity’s Center of International Studies.
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often achieved the near impossible task of being present for significant moments
in history and later proving capable of writing about them with objectivity and
careful scholarship. Originally a protégé of General Maxwell Taylor, he went on
in his post-Army career to carve a distinct niche in the scholarship on defense
politics and national security. His earlier writings on the politics of defense pol-
icy in the Eisenhower years still rank among the seminal works on this subject.
His classic The War Managers (Avery, 1985) is an invaluable addition to the
civil-military literature of the Vietnam era. In Kinnard’s latest study of Eisen-
hower (part of a Brassey’s series on great military leaders), he best addresses
Eisenhower’s military leadership, with particular attention to his role as su-
preme allied commander in the Second World War. While he is clear in his praise
for Eisenhower’s diplomatic skill and his consistently keen grasp of the bigger
strategic picture, Kinnard does not shrink from presenting criticism of Eisen-
hower’s early failures, particularly in the North Africa campaign. A more thor-
ough discussion of these events and the personalities that shaped them can
certainly be found in larger volumes (most notably Carlo D’Estes’s excellent
biography Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life [Henry Holt, 2002]). However, for so thin
a volume, Kinnard’s book covers these topics extremely well.
Less satisfying, however, is his discussion of Eisenhower’s road from Abilene
to five stars. All the high points are there—the difficult childhood, the serendipi-
tous opportunity to attend West Point, the long years of service in a small and
resource-poor peacetime Army, and the important role played by his mentors
Fox Connor and George Marshall. Yet among Eisenhower biographers there are
two schools of thought on his early military career. One highlights an almost in-
evitable march through a succession of key jobs and successful mastery of im-
portant opportunities that culminated in his unchallenged appointment with
destiny. The other presents a grim parade of brutal staff jobs for often ungrateful
bosses (among them Douglas MacArthur) and the series of lucky breaks in what
might have been considered the twilight of a mediocre career that led George
Marshall to select Eisenhower for command in Europe. Kinnard seems to fall in
with the former school of thought.
The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between, and it is difficult to play out
important nuances in so short a book. The story of Eisenhower as presented
here, however, might have been better served by balancing the great achieve-
ments with the hard knocks. For example, who would imagine that a junior offi-
cer could survive a court-martial and go on to five-star rank? What career officer
would not benefit from the knowledge that an assignment that superbly ori-
ented Eisenhower to his future battlefields (service on the American Battle Mon-
uments Commission) was an assignment Eisenhower neither sought nor
welcomed?
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Kinnard addresses important facets of Eisenhower’s presidency that served
him well: his unique military experiences in diplomacy, the economics of na-
tional security, and the domestic politics of defense. In so doing, however,
Kinnard is less critical than he might have been of what are generally acknowl-
edged to be the two most significant shortcomings of Eisenhower’s presi-
dency—his failure to challenge Senator Joe McCarthy and his reluctance to
intervene on behalf of public school integration in Little Rock, Arkansas. These
failures are made all the more puzzling by instances earlier in Eisenhower’s ca-
reer when he successfully challenged bullies similar to McCarthy when others
would not, and when he personally took the high road on civil rights in a racially
segregated Army. Again, a short volume does not allow for a full examination of
all questions, but Kinnard at least could have raised these issues in his otherwise
excellent book.
In Tom Wicker’s short biography (part of a series of short studies of Ameri-
can presidents edited by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.) we see a different emphasis on
Eisenhower’s life and career, one far more critical and far less balanced than the
picture presented by Kinnard. This is surprising, given Wicker’s well deserved
reputation as a political journalist whose carefully crafted writings often meet
the standards of the finest scholarly works. His classic JFK and LBJ (revised and
updated Elephant paperback, 1991) remains one of the finest studies of presi-
dential exercise of legislative power. This work is even more impressive when one
considers that it was a far more flattering picture of Johnson than of Kennedy,
though it was written at a time when Kennedy was celebrated and revered as a
martyr and Johnson was viewed as a tragically flawed and failed president. How-
ever, such balance and insight are not as prevalent in this book.
At 158 pages, Wicker’s book is somewhat longer than Kinnard’s, and as one
would hope, given Wicker’s expertise, it places far greater emphasis on Eisen-
hower’s political career than on his time in the military. But Wicker disappoints
on several levels. First, he does not adequately discuss how Eisenhower’s uncon-
ventional military career more logically prepared him for the White House than
for battlefield command. He seems to embrace the view that Eisenhower came
from a rigid, authoritarian, hierarchical profession that did not understand or
value the kinds of political nuance necessary to be president. Virtually every
authoritative biography of Eisenhower—whether lengthy or short, celebratory
or critical—has effectively laid this myth to rest. Wicker, however, seems
unconvinced.
In addressing Eisenhower’s successes and failures as a president, Wicker finds
many of the latter and a grudging few of the former. Like Kinnard, he addresses
the president’s relationship with Joseph McCarthy and the use of federal troops
to enforce the court order at Little Rock. But where Kinnard may be too
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forgiving, Wicker is too uncompromising. The emotions surrounding the do-
mestic politics of the Cold War (its roots grounded in the Red Scares of the
1920s and ’30s, with the added overlay of the nuclear age) should not be under-
estimated. Likewise, the task of applying federal force to issues that the Civil War
should have decided but that Reconstruction failed to resolve was a monumental
challenge that continues to haunt presidents. If Eisenhower did not adequately
meet these two demands on his watch, it certainly was not because he was a sim-
ple man unable to grasp an obvious solution. In the end, Wicker’s book, which
could have been an excellent political bookend to Kinnard’s military critique,
falls short.
In the third short volume, Matthew Holland studies Eisenhower’s prepara-
tion for leadership, with a particular emphasis on the role played by his military
experiences. A retired army officer turned academic, Holland does not have the
kind of impressive track record that recommends Kinnard or Wicker. However,
there are telling signs of a newer scholar, two of particular note. One is his
strongly enthusiastic admiration for his subject. Scholars—despite what they
may say—do not approach a subject with total dispassion, and historians and
political scientists normally choose those disciplines more from deeply held be-
liefs than idle curiosity. Holland is to be admired for at least putting his biases up
front; however, while true scholars may start with a research question that be-
trays their particular perspective, they then carefully gather data and, if they are
doing their job, let the chips fall where they may. There are countless examples of
authors who started a book with a fixed opinion about the outcome, only to be
surprised by the eventual conclusion. In this particular instance Holland could
have let the facts speak for themselves.
Having said this, the book has much to commend it. Holland weaves together
primary archival material and important secondary sources, sometimes provid-
ing an important expansion on the works of other writers and, on occasion, cor-
rectly contradicting them. While his stated topic is the years before Eisenhower
came to power, he links Eisenhower’s background to his later actions, giving us a
fuller picture of the man as opposed to the myth. There are critiques of style that
can be made. For example, rather than tracing Eisenhower’s biography in
chronological fashion, Holland chooses to address key points by topic, such as
Eisenhower’s political experience or his personal relationships with mentors
and peers. While Holland uses this technique to provide rich, specific, and im-
portant details (some of which do not appear in many other comprehensive
works), it can be distracting to readers. When Holland covers different topics
from the same era in back-to-back chapters, the reader sometimes is inclined to
ask, “Didn’t I read this already?”
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In sum, Paschal was right: the short text is an author’s most difficult chal-
lenge. None of these works should be a substitute for more comprehensive
books available on the life of Dwight Eisenhower. Yet all three books demon-
strate to a greater or lesser degree that it is possible to provide a solid, valuable
introduction to the topic for the serious scholar and an adequate, self-contained
work for the casual reader.
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A LONG-OVERDUE SERVICE
David E. Graham
Borch, Frederic L., Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers
in Military Operations from Vietnam to Haiti. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2001. 413pp. $40
In the foreword, retired general Gordon R. Sullivan, a former chief of staff of the
Army, notes, “Commanders and staff officers should read this book to see how
the Army lawyer’s role has evolved. Judge advocates should read it because it of-
fers a shortcut to knowledge that ordinarily is gained only through experience.
Those interested in the Army’s history should read it because it provides details
published in no other source.” To this list should be added all who deal with,
teach, or are simply interested in the legal aspects of U.S. national security
matters.
Military attorneys—judge advocates of all the armed forces—have become
increasingly active participants in both operational planning and implementa-
tion. In clear and concise narrative, Borch offers the reader a comprehensive ex-
planation of why and how this has occurred. Through his systematic discussion of
the evolution of “operational law” (OPLAW) and his use of dozens of vignettes
gleaned from over a hundred personal interviews, Borch offers an accurate pic-
ture of both the nature of OPLAW and the work of the OP lawyers. In doing so,
he performs an important and long-overdue service to the national security
community and the general public, who are still largely unfamiliar with this crit-
ically important aspect of military legal practice. This “educational” aspect of
the book is also of particular contemporary relevance.
Recently, the question has been posed by some, both in and out of the govern-
ment, whether the enhanced role that judge advocates now play in the opera-
tional arena has made war fighting excessively
legalistic, thus impeding the successful conduct of op-
erations. While the answer is probably best left to
commanders, Borch—through his extensive exami-
nation of the manner in which OP lawyers identify
and advise on legal issues affecting military activities
conducted across the operational spectrum—does
much to dispel any notion that judge advocates un-
duly place obstacles in the path of mission success. It is
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now a certainty that the manner in which a U.S. military operation is conducted
invariably will be subjected to intense media coverage (and second guessing);
that any deployment of U.S. forces abroad will be highly politicized, both within
the United States and internationally; and that, accordingly, all such operations
necessarily have become legally intensive. Both commanders and their judge ad-
vocate advisors understand fully the environment in which they must operate
and succeed. Also understood is the undisputed fact that “judge advocates ad-
vise; commanders decide.”
An Army judge advocate and an accomplished author of several books, as
well as of numerous articles dealing with both criminal and international law
subjects, Colonel Borch has made the task of reviewing Judge Advocates in Com-
bat an easy one. In a well structured preface, he informs the reader of what his
book is, and is not, about. It is a narrative history of the participation of Army
lawyers in a broad range of military operations—from 1959, the beginning of
Army judge advocate deployments to Vietnam, to 1996, when Army attorneys
returned from a United Nations operation in Haiti. As noted, the book’s princi-
pal theme is the process through which Army judge advocates have, during this
period, effected a transcension from their peacetime “garrison” mission, provid-
ing legal services only in the traditional areas of military justice, claims, legal as-
sistance, and administrative law, to their current practice—a military legal
discipline that encompasses all U.S. foreign and international law specifically af-
fecting the conduct of military operations.
Borch addresses this theme in a very personal manner by detailing, through
the use of meticulous research and personal interviews, the actions of individual
judge advocates in both major and minor operations, at home and abroad.
There are individual chapters on Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf,
Somalia, and Haiti, while the final chapter deals with judge advocate participa-
tion in eleven operations other than war. The author asks: “Who was there?
What did they do? How did they enhance the commanders’ ability to accomplish
the assigned mission?” Borch answers these questions by focusing on the activi-
ties of numerous judge advocates over a thirty-year period. With the help of well
crafted maps and photos from many of the operations examined, Borch de-
scribes the manner in which Army lawyers have dealt with increasingly complex
legal issues in jungles and deserts around the world. Of particular importance to
our understanding, he has organized these issues under the individual military
legal discipline encompassed by this body of law.
When advising the reader what this book is not about, Borch emphasizes that
it is neither a history of the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps nor a history
of wartime legal issues. This reviewer agrees with this assessment. Borch also
gives notice that the book should not be viewed as a collection of legal lessons
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learned. This, however, is only partially correct. While certainly not a compre-
hensive collection of such lessons discerned over the course of the thirty-plus
years dealt with, Judge Advocates in Combat is, nevertheless, an exceptionally
valuable resource for those whose work requires them to draw upon how legal
issues commonly recurring in an operational environment have been dealt with
by U.S. forces in the field. Indeed, this reviewer is personally aware of several oc-
casions when legal offices within the Department of Defense have already
turned to this book for information and guidance.
Colonel Borch has produced a work of enduring value. Absent his efforts, the
stories and accomplishments of countless Army judge advocates would not have
become an integral part of the history of the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s
Corps. Just as importantly, however, he has chronicled the genesis and evolution
of operational law within that corps—a legal discipline that has now become the
doctrinal bedrock for judge advocates advising commanders on the wide range
of legal issues that arise in operational environments around the world. This is a
book that should be on the shelves of all who are practitioners or students of U.S.
national security law.
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BOOK REVIEWS
THE ARABS AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
Pollack, Kenneth M. The Threatening Storm: The United States and Iraq—The Crisis, the Strategy, and the
Prospects after Saddam. New York: Random House, 2002. 528pp. $25.95
Pollack, Kenneth M. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press,
2002. 698pp. $49.95
The U.S. engagement in the Middle
East has dramatically escalated due to
the recent war in Iraq. These two books
provide valuable historical background
as well as cogent national security pol-
icy analysis that commands attention
from military and other national secu-
rity leaders.
Kenneth Pollack, a highly regarded
Middle East analyst, is a senior fellow
for Foreign Policy Studies at the
Brookings Institution and director of
research for the institution’s Saban
Center for Middle East Policy. Pollack
is a member of the Council on Foreign
Relations (sponsor of both books), a
former CIA analyst, and a former Na-
tional Security Council staff member.
He has been a frequent commentator
on the television news and a regular
contributor to newspaper op-ed pages,
and he has been published in such
prominent journals as Foreign Affairs
and International Security. Pollack has
considerable expertise in Middle East-
ern affairs and skillfully brings it to
bear. Both books are well written
and easily accessible to a general
audience, and they provide strong
analysis. The Threatening Storm also
contains several soundly supported
policy recommendations.
The books came out in autumn 2002,
contributing constructively to the de-
bate leading up to the recent war with
Iraq. Superficially, it might appear that
The Threatening Storm is outdated, given
the fulfillment of Pollack’s recommen-
dation for war. Similarly, the immediate
operational value of Arabs at War may
also seem overtaken by events. However,
even though their value was greater prior
to the war, discounting their continuing
value would be a mistake.
The Threatening Storm is an important
policy examination that also incorpo-
rates a good, concise overview of Iraq
and its earlier relationship with the
United States. The book’s centerpiece is
Pollack’s comprehensive and compel-
ling case for war against Saddam-led
Iraq as the best of available policy alter-
natives. However, he provides more
than just an argument for war.
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Confident the United States would
quickly win a war with Iraq at an ac-
ceptable cost, Pollack emphasizes that
winning the war would not be enough
and therefore provides an outline for
American diplomatic, economic,
informational, and military efforts to
support successful postconflict recon-
struction. The war has been won with
fewer forces than Pollack and many
others would have preferred, but the
number of forces sufficient to win the
war might not be enough to secure the
peace. Hence, Pollack’s postconflict
analysis found in chapter 12 (“Re-
building Iraq”) remains useful. Addi-
tionally, in chapter 10 Pollack provides
an interesting look into American mili-
tary operations, particularly regarding
airpower in the first Gulf War, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan.
Arabs at War is an excellent work of
military history. Pollack discusses the
military performance of six Arab coun-
tries—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, and Syria—from 1948 to 1991.
Although the record is heavily weighted
with episodes from the Arab-Israeli
wars, there are numerous other con-
flicts that support the analysis of Arab
military effectiveness.
Pollack’s definition of military effec-
tiveness “refers to the ability of soldiers
and officers to perform on the battle-
field, to accomplish military missions,
and to execute the strategies devised by
their political-military leaders. If strat-
egy is the military means by which po-
litical ends are pursued, military
effectiveness refers to the skills that are
employed.” Pollack explores nine possi-
ble explanations for a remarkable rec-
ord of Arab military ineffectiveness
since World War II: cowardice, lack of
morale, training, unit cohesion,
generalship, tactical leadership, infor-
mation management, technical skills
and weapons handling, and logistics
and maintenance. He concludes that
“four areas of military effectiveness
stand out as consistent and crippling
problems for Arab forces: poor tactical
leadership, poor information manage-
ment, poor weapons handling, and
poor maintenance.” Secondary prob-
lems such as poor generalship, training,
and morale were recurring but not con-
stant. Even when Arabs did well in
these secondary areas, there was little
increased effectiveness. Pollack observes
that cowardice, weak unit cohesion, and
bad logistics have not been significant
problems for Arab militaries—Arab
units and individual soldiers generally
have fought hard, but not well.
The book concentrates primarily on
Arab armies in conventional war, par-
ticularly ground warfare. Although use
of air forces is addressed in many of the
conflicts, their limited role and their
frequent early failure and exit leave lit-
tle to discuss. Pollack’s assessment of
Arab air force performance largely rein-
forces his general point about the limi-
tations of Arab personnel in handling
modern weaponry. Use of naval forces
(limited when they exist at all) is incon-
sequential for the conflict chosen. With
the exception of a brief treatment of
Libyan-U.S. skirmishes from 1981 to
1989, naval operations play no signifi-
cant role in Pollack’s analysis.
Arabs at War more accurately could be
titled “Six Arab States at Conventional
War.” Although Pollack is on solid
ground asserting that these six states
comprise the lion’s share of conven-
tional Arab military experience since
World War II, there is little about Arab
military effectiveness in unconventional
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war, which places an important limit on
the current value of Pollack’s analysis.
What it leaves out is the numerous ir-
regular forces of the Arab world, who
have proven troublesome to foes and
who are often more effective in achiev-
ing political aims. However, a hint of
such analysis shows itself in Pollack’s
description of Arab conventional mili-
tary forces as they faced unconventional
foes—such as Jordan against the PLO
during the “Black September” fighting;
Syria against the PLO and Lebanese
guerillas; Iraq in numerous clashes with
Kurds; and Libya against various forces
in Chad. Additional examples of un-
conventional Arab military actions in
Algeria, Afghanistan, Morocco, Leba-
non, and Palestine-Israel might profit-
ably be considered to form a more
comprehensive view of Arab military
effectiveness.
This work has a Rashomon-like feel that
results from reading about military ac-
tions one state at a time, even though
several belligerents participated in the
same wars, sometimes even fighting
each other. Pollack’s approach main-
tains a discrete analysis of national mili-
tary efforts but creates a disjointed
presentation of some events. Readers
who are familiar with these conflicts
from other sources will have an easier
time keeping events in context. The
book’s focus is on the effective use of
instruments of war, particularly ground
forces, and provides readers with little
about the interplay of policy and strat-
egy. Coalition dynamics also do not fig-
ure prominently in Pollack’s discussion,
although there are hints that in Arab
military collaboration the coalition
whole was often worth less than the
sum of the parts.
Arabs at War and The Threatening Storm
are excellent works of history and analy-
sis. Arabs at War is a valuable work of
military history for military profession-
als and historians. The Threatening
Storm, its main argument now dated,
still serves as a useful history of U.S.-Iraq
relations leading up to the war and re-
mains a valuable guide to the challenges
of postwar reconstruction.
RICHARD LACQUEMENT
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
Chasdi, Richard J. Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of
Middle East Terrorism, 1994–1999. Lanham, Md.:
Lexington, 2002. 507pp. $80
This is a book only a statistician could
love. This reviewer is not a statistician.
Chasdi, a visiting assistant professor of
international relations at the College of
Wooster, presents a quantitative analysis
of the terrorist phenomena in four re-
gions of the Middle East: Algeria, Egypt,
Turkey, and Palestine and Israel. Pur-
portedly Chasdi attempts to examine the
antecedent events and conditions in the
four subject nation-states with an eye to-
ward understanding why terrorism oc-
curs at the systems or operational level
as well as at the state and subnational-
actor levels. He hopes that in doing so he
will give counterterrorism planners and
policy makers data to help them better
craft counterterrorism policy in the
future. If this sounds complex, it is.
Chasdi’s complicated quantitative analy-
sis coupled with his turgid and at times
unfathomable prose makes the effort
even more difficult.
Tapestry of Terror is the second of a pro-
jected trilogy studying the root causes of
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Middle Eastern terrorism. In his first
volume, Serenade of Suffering, Chasdi
examines terrorism in the context of
the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian-
Arab conflict. He throws a wider net in
his second work by examining condi-
tions in countries as diverse as Turkey
and Algeria, as well as the more widely
studied Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyp-
tian varieties of terrorism. Because
comparatively less has been written
about terrorism in Algeria and Turkey,
these two sections are uniquely interest-
ing. In the section relating to Algeria,
Chasdi devotes considerable time to the
Islamic Salvation Front, the Armed Is-
lamic Group (GIA), and some relatively
obscure splinter groups of the GIA. Un-
fortunately, Chasdi’s examination of
them falls short. Much of his analysis
does not really address the basic ques-
tions of who these groups are or what
constitutes their ideologies, their politi-
cal, social, and religious goals, and how
they differ from each other. Rather,
Chasdi devotes most of his effort to
studying the current state of the schol-
arship on different Algerian terrorist
movements. This approach, historio-
graphical in practice, is unhelpful,
because it presumes that the reader is
familiar with the differing views of the
various scholars he is discussing. Last
time I looked, not too many policy
makers were steeped in the nuance of
Algerian terrorist historiography.
The section devoted to the study of
Turkish terror covers such well known
groups as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party
and some not so familiar organizations,
like the Greater Eastern Islamic Raiders
and the Anatolian Federal Islamic State.
While the information presented on
these obscure organizations is interest-
ing and frankly better presented than in
the Algerian case, Chasdi once again
falls victim to his fascination with the
internecine disputes and discussions
among scholars. Many times the more
immediate questions of who and what
these organizations represent are simply
not presented in sufficient detail.
Another problem plaguing this book is
Chasdi’s basic quantitative approach to
the issue of identifying the root causes
of terrorism and then using data to pre-
dict terrorist incidents. While using
quantitative methods to study terrorism
has been vetted and is useful in certain
instances, Chasdi’s devotion to the
methodology almost approaches the re-
ligious. With the text littered with such
terms as “Pearson chi square values”
and “Yates continuity corrections,”
Chasdi is for not the casual reader but
one who is well versed in statistical re-
search analysis methods. This, of
course, harkens back to the original
purpose of the book, to assist policy
makers in understanding the causality
behind Middle Eastern terrorism. Un-
fortunately, Chasdi has crafted a work
so complex and arcane that one must
question the real utility of his work to
those who shape policy. While the ef-
forts of his scholarship are impressive,
one cannot help wondering if the only
real audience for Chasdi’s Tapestry of
Terror is Chasdi himself.
JACK THOMAS TOMARCHIO
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
1 6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
172
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss4/1
Lennon, Alexander T. J., ed. What Does the World
Want from America?: International Perspectives on
U.S. Foreign Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2002. 209pp. $22.95
This volume is a collection of sixteen
articles originally published in the
Washington Quarterly in 2001 and 2002.
It is part of the Washington Quarterly
reader series, in which domestic and in-
ternational perspectives are applied to a
topic. Twelve of the articles were solic-
ited from academics around the world.
The editor of this book, Alexander T. J.
Lennon, is the editor in chief of the
Washington Quarterly. He offers no
explanation of how the twelve were
chosen, other than to say that each
author is “preeminent” and has spent
some time in the United States. The au-
thors were asked to describe their ideal-
ized vision of U.S. foreign and national
security policy in the future, emphasiz-
ing the role they would like the United
States to play in their particular regions.
The remaining four articles are the re-
actions of American scholars to those
collective visions.
The Washington Quarterly typically
runs accessible, jargon-free, main-
stream articles, and those in this collec-
tion are no exception. They are well
written and get to the point quickly.
It is a useful exercise for Americans to
learn the views of non-American ex-
perts on foreign policy. Predictably,
many of these academics from other
countries emphasize that the United
States could do more to understand
(and sympathize with) the perspectives
and cultures of other countries. Other-
wise, the foreign authors tend toward a
sanguine view of America as the world’s
only true superpower. This could reflect
the timing of the articles and their geo-
graphic locations.
It is important to note that all twelve
articles were published before “9/11”
and the war on terrorism. If writing to-
day, perhaps their opinions would be
different.
The four articles by American scholars
were written after “9/11” and when the
war with Iraq was inevitable. Their
analyses are both more current and out
of alignment with the others. For un-
derstandable reasons, they reach be-
yond the range of their colleagues by
paying considerable attention to post–
11 September priorities and the fears
that accompany them. Having said this,
however, they do agree that the United
States should be alert to the potential
downside of power and compensate by
being more politically and culturally
sensitive. The Americans also advocate
a balance between multilateralism and
unilateralism, conceding that drawing
this balance is more of an art than a sci-
ence. Their articles imply that on this
point the Americans arrived at their
conclusion independently of the views
of their foreign counterparts. They ap-
pear to be swayed more by the practical
aspects of the war on terror and the risk
of imperial overreach than by the open-
ing twelve articles.
Christopher Layne suggests that the
United States avoid overreaching by
“shifting” the burden of maintaining
stability to others on the assumption
that in some regions U.S. interests are
less intense than those of other major
powers. He argues, for example, that Ja-
pan, China, and India have greater in-
terests in Persian Gulf oil than does the
United States and should therefore be
responsible for stability in the region.
The other American authors, however,
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tend more toward sharing the burden
with international organizations and
other countries rather than totally
relinquishing responsibility.
One theme addressed by the Ameri-
cans is anti-Americanism in the Arab
world, the cultural divide between the
Arabs and the West. Unfortunately,
none of the authors who wrote on the
Middle East is an Arab. One is an
Iranian, who observes that today the
average Iranian has (or perhaps did in
the summer of 2001) a “far more posi-
tive” view of the United States than the
average Arab, and the other is an Israeli.
They appear to be unusual choices to
represent the region at this juncture
in time.
Readers who hoped to learn more
about Arab views of American foreign
policy should look elsewhere.
JAMES MISKEL
Naval War College
Lindberg, Michael, and Daniel Todd. Brown-,
Green- and Blue-Water Fleets: The Influence of Ge-
ography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001. 242pp. $64.95
Given the subject, this book appropri-
ately covers a lot of territory. It is more
than a treatise on geography; Lindberg
and Todd have managed to incorporate
fairly substantial discussions on naval
strategy, tactics, history, force structure,
and ship construction. The central
theme is that historical concepts of
“distance” remain central to modern
naval operations, leading to the hypoth-
esis that “the navies with the longest
reach—those with the greatest geo-
graphical power-projection capability—
are in possession of not just the most
sophisticated fleets but the most
elaborate infrastructures to boot.” In
developing that idea, the authors pro-
vide a useful compendium of intellec-
tual rigor to support the strategic
prescriptions not only of the U.S.
Navy’s Forward . . . from the Sea but
also of navies of all sizes, worldwide.
The authors progress from an introduc-
tion to the concept of time-distance as
related to the maritime environment,
comparing land versus sea warfare, to
exploring historical case studies of naval
warfare on the high seas, the littorals,
and riverine warfare, before concluding
with some thoughts on the influence of
geography on navies. The theoretical
background chapter is a generally solid
overview of the works of Alfred Thayer
Mahan and Julian Corbett, but it also
discusses the often-overlooked Sir
Halford Mackinder. The historical ex-
amples comprise several such obvious
scenarios as Gallipoli and Okinawa, as
well as many lesser-known ones—for
example, the Russo-Japanese War and
the Falklands campaign. Riverine war-
fare was especially interesting, with the
arrival of the review copy in time to read
the section on the Mesopotamia cam-
paign of the First World War just in ad-
vance of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Although necessarily slight, these case
studies are far from shallow, drawing out
the larger themes in often-novel ways.
In and of themselves, with a few excep-
tions, the authors’ observations and
discussions are hardly profound.
However, the judicious combination
and interplay of geography, history, and
strategy lead to many quite compelling
derivations. Prospective readers be
warned, however: This is a dense book
with tightly spaced pages and is defi-
nitely not for the novice. There is a
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presumed familiarity with much of the
subject matter that makes this work a
more appropriate developmental read
for the interested professional—for
whom it is a must.
If there is a weakness to the book, it is
that the terms “brown-,” “green-,” and
“blue-water” are not properly associ-
ated with their respective naval equiva-
lents of “inland waterways,” “coastal
defense,” and “power-projection”
fleets until the last quarter of the book,
and even then the distinguishing fea-
tures are not defined but implied. To
complicate matters, there is the earlier
fleeting introduction of an additional
“marginal seas” naval warfare environ-
ment that is never again mentioned.
The distinctions are important, espe-
cially when the authors conclude that
the physical configuration of these vari-
ous environments—their geography—
will continue to present challenges
to navies and naval operations. Opti-
mistically, they also conclude that far
from rendering navies obsolete in the
modern battle space, technological
improvements and force structure
developments derived from a sound
understanding of geographical con-
siderations will ensure their contin-
ued relevance.
A greater disappointment for a book on
geography is the selection of maps.
They are barely adequate even for the
basic overview they are intended to
provide—a number of important place
names mentioned cannot be found.
More to the point, especially consider-
ing the key factor of “distance,” the
choice of the common Mercator projec-
tion, with all its inherent north-south
distortions, is unfortunate. In many
cases the scale is not given, and in the
littorals the bottom depth contours are
not identified. Conic projections could
have illustrated many points far more
effectively.
That said, this book deserves to be read
by naval professionals. Its conclusion
that geography will continue to have
much the same influence it always has
had on navies would be startling only if
it were otherwise. However, in arriving
at that conclusion, Lindberg and Todd
provide many useful reminders that na-
vies do not exist just to impact one an-
other but are part of a larger spatial
context of global dimensions.
RICHARD H. GIMBLETT
Research Fellow, Dalhousie University
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Karatnycky, Adrian, A. Motyl, and A. Schnetzer,
eds. Nations in Transit 2001–2002: Civil Society,
Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe
and the Newly Independent States. Somerset, N.J.:
Transaction, 2002. 445pp. $39.95
Nations in Transit 2001–2002 is a com-
prehensive fact book that examines the
trends of liberalization in East Central
Europe and the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union. The
editors claim the book is unique, as the
“only . . . comparative study of post-
Communist political and economic
transition in Central and Eastern
Europe and Eurasia.” This sixth edition
covers the period from November 2000
through December 2001; however, the
reader will frequently find information
from the 1990s.
The book covers twenty-seven nations,
attempting to assess each by its level of
democratization, rule of law, and eco-
nomic liberalization. Each of these
broad categories contains elements that
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provide a structure for the analysis of
each nation; this analysis is conducted by
one principal author, who in many cases
is a native of the country in question.
The political process element in the
democratization category has an expla-
nation of the major political parties,
their leadership, political agendas, and
majorities in the government. Democ-
ratization also discusses civil society,
focusing primarily on the functioning
of nongovernmental organizations.
Independent media are also covered,
containing information on names, affil-
iation, content, and audience. This ele-
ment also includes data on Internet
accessibility. The final elements in the
democratization category are gover-
nance and public administration. These
cover the executive-branch workings of
the nation, including information on
political parties, national and sub-
national governments, and elections.
The rule-of-law category has two ele-
ments. The first is a constitutional, leg-
islative, and judicial framework that
details constitutional and judicial is-
sues, to include the court system and
human rights. The second is corrup-
tion, addressing both the amount of
corruption and initiatives to correct
this problem. Economic liberalization
and social indicators are the last cate-
gory, which includes economic issues,
both domestic and international, tax re-
form, and employment issues.
The book does have one potential flaw.
The authors and editors have included
a rating system grading each element on
a scale of one to seven, with one being
the maximum score. The grades of each
element are averaged and recorded to
two decimal places to obtain a rating
for the category. The movement of each
nation along the scales is then tracked,
and nations are compared with one an-
other. In the description of this rating
methodology, the reader may believe
that there is a scientific basis for this
scheme. In carefully reading the text,
however, one finds that this basis is not
fully explained. In fact, lacking any spe-
cific information, the conclusion one
reaches is that this scale is subjective in
nature, which detracts from the editors’
claim of a comparative assessment of
these nations. If there is no true objec-
tive measure, providing an example of a
nation that rates a one in a particular
element might mean more. That way,
the reader has some basis to understand
more clearly what a rating of 4.25 in,
for example, independent media means.
Overall, this single weakness does not
diminish the worth of Nations in Tran-
sit 2001–2002. The great value of this
book is that it provides extensive
knowledge and current, as well as his-
torical, data on a variety of political,
social, and economic issues in East
Central Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Even with all this data, the text
is easy to read. This is accomplished
with the incorporation of information
from the 1990s, which provides a criti-
cal strength of this work; the reader
need not be an expert on East Central
Europe or the newly independent states
to use it.
PATRICK LUEB
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
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Grimsley, Mark, and Clifford J. Rogers, eds. Civil-
ians in the Path of War. Lincoln: Univ. of Ne-
braska Press, 2002. 280pp. $50
This edited volume of essays provides an
important set of historical case studies
about noncombatant victims of war.
From ancient Greece to the French Rev-
olution, to strategic bombings of urban
centers in World War II and the Gulf
War, these articles address not the ethi-
cal or moral dimensions of war but
rather the military calculus in planning
violence against enemies that could also
endanger or kill civilians. This collection
gives historical perspective to the con-
cept of collateral damage.
In their introduction the editors state,
“This book is about occasions in which
soldiers and governments have deliber-
ately attacked the helpless.” The au-
thors provide specific, highly detailed
examples, removed from the lens of
morality and judgement, of the “whys”
of strategic interventions. It is difficult,
however, not to document the uncer-
tainty that accompanies military deci-
sion making, as author Conrad Crane
describes in his article, “Contrary to
Our National Ideals.” In spite of the
important strategic use of American
airpower to exact a toll on cities during
World War II, he explains how Ameri-
can public opinion shifted against such
ruthless bombings. The concept of
“surgical strikes” by airpower was a
concept conceived in part to assuage
public opinion that rejected the indis-
criminate use of force to destroy
noncombatants.
Nine essays, originally commissioned as
part of a 1993 conference on military
history, reveal a central ambivalence by
the authors about the impact of
military imposed violence on civilians.
These historical cases try to balance
what generals depict as a military neces-
sity for bombings or invasions against
the realities of on-the-ground condi-
tions, which reveal large numbers of ci-
vilians getting in harm’s way. What is
frequently developed in the name of
military necessity is often immoral in
practice. Certainly, this is the conclu-
sion of Holger Herwig in his “The Im-
morality of Expediency,” which takes
on German military planning and the
exclusion of civilians from such dis-
cussions on the eve of World War I.
Williamson Murray’s “Not Enough
Collateral Damage: Moral Ambiguities
in the Gulf War,” extols the use of
American airpower to seek “surgical
strikes” to minimize the loss of life on
the ground but also points out that
such an approach does not always pro-
duce decisive military victory. He recalls
that even in Vietnam, with General
Curtis LeMay’s “bomb them back into
the Stone Age” approach, such bombing
did not persuade the North Vietnamese
not to pursue their military course.
While all the essays provide a strong
historical overview of how noncombat-
ants have fared in the course of warfare,
it is difficult to understand how such a
published volume could omit impor-
tant lessons from the post–Cold War,
given the gap of nine years between the
commissioning of papers and publica-
tions. There is no essay about the geno-
cide in Rwanda, where research shows
that a military force positioned in early
April 1994 could have averted tremen-
dous loss of life. Moreover, in such in-
trastate conflicts as Chechnya, where
the Russian military has turned on not
only rebel guerilla groups but also the
civilian population, the nature of these
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new wars has also changed the rules about
who is a combatant. Even more recent
is the case of Kosovo, where Serbian
military commanders deliberately tar-
geted civilians as a means of staving off
NATO air strikes. It has been precisely
the importance of noncombatants as
victims in the post–Cold War era that
has been the central feature of internal
conflicts and has distinguished these re-
cent intrastate wars. Yet no essay in this
volume brings the historical cases up to
the present.
This anthology is useful for historians
looking backward for examples or pre-
cedents. However, the book will not
work for everyday classroom teaching
without supplementation, because the
case studies omit some of the more
current examples, as mentioned above.
Finally, the editors should have added a
final essay about the Geneva Conven-
tions and other public humanitarian
law. The rules of modern warfare and
the centrality of protecting civilians
cannot be divorced from the planning
of any intervention. As the United
States enters a new era of strategic doc-
trine and preemption, it is especially
important that writing about war in-
clude not only the details of decision
making but also the implications that
such acts have on civilians who might
be caught in the middle.
JOHANNA MENDELSON FORMAN
Senior Program Officer
Peace, Security, Human Rights
United Nations Foundation
Friedman, Norman. The Fifty Year War: Conflict
and Strategy in the Cold War. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2000. 597pp. $39.95
Winkler, David F. Cold War at Sea: High-Seas
Confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2000. 263pp. $45
Although the Cold War ended more
than a decade ago, its impact continues
to haunt the international community
to this day. These two excellent works
from the Naval Institute Press will
greatly enhance our understanding of
this uncertain period.
Norman Friedman’s Fifty Year War is
a broad look at the conflict between
East and West. Friedman contends
that the Cold War actually began in
Spain in 1937, “when Stalin tried to hi-
jack the ongoing civil war.” This divide
between the Soviet Union and the
West would not come to an end until
1991. Friedman poses several ques-
tions: “Should or did the West under-
stand events in the Soviet Union? Did
the West in fact defeat the Soviet Union,
or did the Soviet Union defeat itself?
Was the Cold War, then, about com-
munism versus capitalism or was it
about old-fashioned Russian imperial-
ism, cloaked in a largely irrelevant
ideology?”
Friedman contends that the Cold War
was in fact a “real war” fought in slow
motion. It was also a war lost by the
Soviet Union for sociopolitical, eco-
nomic, and ideological reasons. In the
end, Friedman sees Mikhail Gorbachev
as responsible for its collapse, because
he “never understood that his state was
built on terror, not on any kind of pop-
ular support.”
While making these arguments,
Friedman also includes some very scary
Cold War near misses, including a 1960
mistake by the new U.S. radar at Thule
that interpreted the moon as a Soviet
missile attack. Also intriguing is
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Friedman’s critical analysis of President
John Kennedy’s Cold War leadership.
With The Fifty Year War Friedman
presents a new, provocative survey of the
Cold War from a joint force perspective
while keeping both sides of the Iron
Curtain in mind. He again demonstrates
why he is considered a leading commen-
tator on international security issues.
Unlike Friedman in his broad landscape
of Cold War history, David Winkler
paints a much smaller aspect of the Cold
War canvas. This is a fine work that de-
tails the long road to mutual respect,
safety, and communication on the high
seas between the U.S. and Soviet navies.
Utilizing previously classified official
documents, other archival material, and
personal interviews with senior partici-
pants from both sides, Winkler traces
the history of confrontations between
U.S. and Soviet naval forces—confron-
tations that often proved fatal. Even-
tually, these Cold War incidents
demanded a solution lest the next such
occurrence escalate into outright war.
The solution was found in 1972, in the
historic pact, known as the Incidents at
Sea Agreement (INCSEA).
INCSEA provided a direct navy-to-navy
channel of communication that would
help to limit and avoid future occur-
rences. How necessary was INCSEA?
Winkler’s first chapter, “Playing with
the Bear,” clearly reveals how “hot” the
Cold War actually was, unbeknownst to
many at the time. During the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations alone,
over one hundred Soviet and U.S. air-
men were killed in air-to-air contacts.
Throughout 1971–72, studies and nego-
tiations took place that led to the sign-
ing of the INCSEA agreement by then
Secretary of the Navy John Warner and
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov of the Soviet
navy. Winkler skillfully illustrates how
the successful negotiations were rooted
in mutual respect and professionalism.
This mutual understanding and respect,
along with the signing of INCSEA,
would do much to end naval harassment
between the Cold War superpowers.
As Winkler points out, INCSEA truly
“is one of the positive legacies of the
Cold War.” One should note that al-
though Cold War at Sea represents
first-class scholarship, the Cold War
specialist is more likely to enjoy it than
the armchair sailor. Nevertheless, with
its superb chronology of Cold War na-
val incidents and excellent notes, this
work will make a welcome addition to
any serious Cold War library.
ANDREW G. WILSON
The George Washington University
Vyborny, Lee, and Don Davis. Dark Waters: An
Insider’s Account of the NR-1, the Cold War’s Un-
dercover Nuclear Sub. New York: New American
Library, 2003. 243pp. $24.95
Although ultimately worthwhile and
entertaining, Dark Waters suffers from
the strange paradox of inadequately de-
scribing underwater events that ought to
be gripping while simultaneously por-
traying mundane and ordinary events
in a marvelously compelling manner.
Lee Vyborny was a new-construction
plank-owner and member of the first
commissioning crew of the U.S. Navy’s
small nuclear-powered submarine NR-1.
Don Davis has written or coauthored
eleven books.
Overall, the book well rewards its read-
ers, but unevenly. An example of its
bumpiness comes early in the prologue
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when the authors state that in World
War II “about half the U.S. submarines
and the men who served in them were
lost,” which, of course, is untrue. Al-
though fifty-two U.S. submarines and
over 3,500 of their heroic crewmembers
were lost, this number represents a fifth
(not half) of the submarines the United
States sent to sea during that war.
Further problems arise when the book
briefly describes the path that took
Vyborny from being an ordinary high
school graduate to becoming a
crewmember of NR-1—the Navy’s
smallest and most mysterious nuclear-
powered submarine. The authors cer-
tainly do not devote excessive space to
this part of the tale, but their telling of
Vyborny’s early story is just a bit too
self-conscious and self-effacing, lacking
the easy confidence and pride that char-
acterizes much of the rest of the book.
Another criticism arises from an early
passage in which Vyborny relates a 1964
deployment he made as a junior en-
listed sailor on the nuclear-powered
submarine USS Sargo to the Sea of Ja-
pan. Intended, one presumes, to rival
the swashbuckling tales told in Sontag
and Drew’s Blind Man’s Bluff, the story
of the grounding, jam-dive casualty,
and operational exploits of the USS
Sargo simply are not conveyed in a
manner compelling or even believable
to those with their own submarine ex-
perience. One reads them wondering if
they are true. For instance, the authors
state that Sargo passed ten feet directly
underneath a newly launched Echo II
Soviet submarine to “determine if she was
powered by standard diesel engines, or a
nuclear reactor.” It is curious to think
the U.S. Navy would use this method to
ascertain the mode of propulsion of a
ship class that had already been in ser-
vice for at least two years.
But these criticisms pale in comparison to
Vyborny’s success in relating how he and
eleven other immensely dedicated men
who made up the first NR-1 crew worked
in the physically demanding environment
of the Electric Boat shipyard to oversee
the construction of the small submarine.
This is the section in which the book truly
shines, as readers get a rare firsthand
glimpse of how a crew, believing with jus-
tified conviction that they are elite, come
together to become shipmates and expert
operators of a complex, expensive, amaz-
ing machine. Vyborny and Davis’s work
is again excellent when it tells some of the
Admiral Hyman Rickover anecdotes that
Vyborny witnessed during Rickover’s
reign over all the Navy’s nuclear-
powered vessels. The authors balance per-
fectly Rickover’s bizarre idiosyncrasies
against his awesome effectiveness and
offset the fear he engendered against the
respect he earned, neutralizing his rou-
tinely acidic abrasiveness with his child-
like wonder at the sights of the deep
visible from NR-1’s small windows. Also
masterful is the authors’ depiction of the
routine when operating NR-1, the sacri-
fices inherent in living for weeks in a
small enclosed space, eating preprocessed
food for days on end, standing miserable
surface watches, and all the other mun-
dane aspects of extended life underwater in
close proximity to a nuclear reactor. These
portions of the book are indeed well told
and will resonate with those who have
gone to sea.
As good as their depictions of the ordi-
nary are, Vyborny and David convey
the dangers of NR-1’s unusual and ex-
ceptional missions and experiences in a
less forceful and riveting manner. Per-
haps readers have become overexposed
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to and jaded by these kinds of exploits,
or perhaps Dark Waters pulled some of
NR-1’s punches due to classification
considerations. Regardless, the action
sections, though worth reading, are not
up to the high standards of the rest of
the book. Still, Vyborny’s insider ac-
count of how NR-1’s first crews built
and operated their ship fully pays back
the reader’s investment. Dark Waters
should be on every submariner’s book-
shelf, even if it tells its extraordinary
tale a bit unevenly.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY
Naval War College
Bateman, Robert L. No Gun Ri: A Military History
of the Korean War Incident. Mechanicsburg, Pen-
na.: Stackpole, 2002. 288pp. $22.95
On 11 January 2001, Secretary of De-
fense William Cohen announced that in
June 1950, U.S. soldiers “killed or in-
jured an unconfirmed number of Ko-
rean refugees . . . in the vicinity of No
Gun Ri.” This announcement preceded
the release of an investigation convened
in response to an Associated Press arti-
cle that documented the massacre of
hundreds of Korean civilians by U.S.
soldiers under orders. The article even-
tually earned a Pulitzer Prize for the As-
sociated Press and thrust the story to
front-page news.
For nearly fifty years, the No Gun Ri in-
cident languished in the backwaters of
military history. Despite understand-
able Korean interest, few American re-
searchers delved into this difficult
period until early 1999, when AP corre-
spondents Charles Hanley and Martha
Mendoza uncovered a “smoking gun,”
a confessed U.S. Army massacre
participant, and broke the story to a
readership anxious to hear about U.S.
wartime atrocities.
The truth is not so simple, however.
According to Bateman, the AP was
working with inconsistent or incorrect
information and knew their version
was questionable before the article was
published. Concurrent with the
Army’s investigation into the incident,
Bateman (an experienced infantry offi-
cer himself) examined what transpired
at No Gun Ri and tried to resolve the
discrepancies between what he knew
of 7th Cavalry history, the soldiers
who were there, and the details of the
AP story. From his investigation and
his subsequent writings, Bateman has
captured important aspects of the mili-
tary reality of that time, the frustrations
associated with presenting unimpeach-
able history about a fifty-year-old
event, and the dangers of a free press
run amok.
Bateman’s treatise is divided into two
major sections: first, a soldier’s review
of the tactical situation at the end of
July 1950 and the military record of the
events at No Gun Ri; and second, a less
relevant examination of the Associated
Press’s publication of the original story.
The military analysis is generally solid
and clearly backed by an infantry sol-
dier’s appreciation for the life-and-
death challenges that faced young men
of the 7th Cavalry in the early days of
the war. Bateman relies on U.S. primary
sources, extensive interviews, and re-
connaissance photographs to debunk
many “facts” reported by the AP and a
group of former Korean refugees who
are now parties to a four-hundred-
million-dollar lawsuit against the U.S.
government. Unfortunately, Bateman
also draws a number of conclusions
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(e.g., that communist sympathizers
fired at U.S. soldiers from inside a group
of civilian refugees) that are supported
only by circumstantial evidence. Inter-
estingly, he chose not to refer to Korean
primary sources, citing translation chal-
lenges and tainted testimony, and used
only sources available on this side of
the Pacific.
In the second half of the book, Bateman
takes issue with the investigative work
at the Associated Press and discusses at
length his inability to convince the AP
of the inconsistencies in its story. While
interesting in a voyeuristic sort of
way, Bateman’s harsh spotlight on the
AP does little to further explain what
happened at No Gun Ri. Americans,
unfortunately, have become inured to
journalistic excesses and biased report-
ing. Not much is added to the story by
belaboring the point. Also, Bateman’s
additional cursory discussions of the
current sad state of military-media af-
fairs are out of place in a work of seri-
ous military history.
Woven throughout both the AP story
and Bateman’s book is the strange case
of Ed Daily—the “smoking gun.” Pur-
portedly an Army officer who was pres-
ent at No Gun Ri, Daily told his story to
Handy and Mendoza and became an in-
stant media sensation. After the story
was published, Daily was interviewed
by Tom Brokaw, made appearances at
veterans’ gatherings, and had his pic-
ture flashed around the world. He was a
fraud. Daily had never been an Army
officer. He made his living by fabricat-
ing an honorable military career. In
February 2002, Daily was fined four
hundred thousand dollars by a federal
court for fraudulent combat-related
medical claims, and he admitted publicly
for the first time that he had never been at
No Gun Ri.
Ed Daily’s deception and Bateman’s
conflicting evidence seriously under-
mine the credibility of the AP story but
do not alter one fundamental fact—in
the midst of a chaotic tactical withdrawal
at the beginning of the Korean conflict,
an unspecified number of civilians were
fired upon and wounded or killed by
U.S. soldiers near a railroad overpass at
No Gun Ri. Any serious student of gen-
eral military history, or Korean military
history in particular, will not be sur-
prised to learn that an incident like this
occurred. The exact number of casualties
is subject to debate but is likely far less
than reported by the AP.
In the final analysis, there are four ver-
sions of the story: those of the Korean
litigants, the Associated Press, the U.S.
Army, and Bob Bateman. It is unlikely
that we will ever know which of them is
correct. Time, fog, fading memories,
inadequate Army record keeping, and
inflated egos have combined to make
this event difficult to understand with
confidence and clarity. Yet the event,
however it occurred, reaffirms how
challenging it is to lead troops in the
field under fire, and it underscores the
difficult task of combat identification
during times of extraordinary stress.
STEPHEN F. DAVIS, JR.
Commander, U.S. Navy
Federal Executive Fellow
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, D.C.
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Mills, Randy K., and Roxanne Mills. Unexpected
Journey: A Marine Corps Reserve Company in the
Korean War. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2000. 271pp. $32.95
For authors unschooled in Marine
Corps history and newly self-taught in
the history of the Korean War, Randy
and Roxanne Mills do an acceptable job
in following the Reserve Marines of
Company C, 16th Infantry Battalion, to
Korea and back, from 1950 to 1951. The
strength of their homage to their neighbor-
veterans of southwestern Indiana is their
sympathetic, sensitive reconstruction of
personal combat experiences in Korea
and the general trauma of sudden war-
time service. Its weakness is their han-
dling of contextual and organizational
issues. The authors sometimes seem as
mystified as their veterans did when they
went off to war in 1950.
When Company C formed in 1947, its
officers and noncommissioned officers
were World War II veterans without
troops. They recruited obvious candi-
dates such as Boy Scouts, high school
athletes, younger brothers of Marines,
and adventurous farm boys. The Millses
capture the bucolic, Currier and Ives
character of 1950 Indiana (I was there
as a teenager visiting my grandparents);
the recruits might well have been the
Indiana volunteers of 1861. The authors
do not press the point, but the rein-
statement of the draft in 1948 proved a
mighty weapon for recruiters—join the
U.S. Marine Corps and escape the
Army. It was an empty threat, however,
although the recruits didn’t know it;
virtually no one was drafted into the
shrinking Army between 1948 and
1950. It appears that the excitement of
field training, company athletics, and a
little spending money sufficed as a lure,
and the requirements were minimal:
drill usually on Monday nights and two
weeks annual training duty (“summer
camp”). There was no initial active duty
training requirement, no boot camp.
Company C, not aggressively officered,
coasted through its limited training
from 1948 through 1950.
No doubt there was tension between
regular Army and reservists at the troop
level, as the Millses note, but the Ma-
rine Corps wanted fresh reservists with
no prior experience for its twenty-one
infantry battalions, nineteen other
combat and combat support battalions,
and a mix of independent companies.
The1950 drill-pay reservists numbered
almost forty thousand units, a small
percentage of the nearly 129,000 Ma-
rine reservists, but the best source of
unbloodied infantry replacements for a
short-handed active duty force. The
authors are vague on mobilization
demographics, providing a roster of
eight officers and 202 enlisted men at
the station of initial assignment, Camp
Pendleton but no statistics on delays
and physical disqualifications.
The Millses are unclear about how
Company C fared in its readiness triage
at Camp Pendleton as the company dis-
integrated in three days into a pool of
replacements. Reservists and half the
drill-pay reserves were judged combat
ready by virtue of prior active duty
(more than ninety days) or two years of
Marine training that included at least
one summer camp and no less than
thirty-six drills (with two camps). An-
other 30 percent were judged combat
ready after two to four weeks of inten-
sive field training and weapons instruc-
tion. Twenty percent went to boot
camp and became “real” Marines the
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old-fashioned way. The problem with
the deployable 65 percent was their
rank (too much) and lack of thorough
weapons training. Other problems were
little more than irritations born by all
Marines, which was interpreted as prej-
udice by the reservists.
After the readiness triage, the book be-
comes a mishmash of personal Korean
War experiences—especially combat in
the frozen crucible of the Chosin Reser-
voir campaign—and operational his-
tory. The authors recount the personal
experiences well but bungle the general
history in several details (none fatal)—
for example, Major Courtney Whitney
was not FECOM G-2.
Their Indiana Marines have tales to tell,
but the stories will not move non-
deployable readers. They are neverthe-
less the true ordeals of real people.
There is good coverage of the veterans
of Company C that includes forty-three
interviews, several with wives. However,
apart from the interviews, the Millses
use predictable secondary sources,
sometimes without much real under-
standing. (This reviewer served twenty-
seven years in the U.S. Marine Corps
Reserve, nine as a commander and staff
officer in two infantry battalions, com-
manding 3d Battalion, 25th Marines,
from 1980 to 1981.)
On balance, Unexpected Journey gives
the 1950 Marine Corps reserve mobili-
zation a human face and an emotional
dimension. As a tribute to Company C,
this book succeeds and deserves inclu-
sion in the personal literature on the
Korean War.
ALLAN R. MILLETT
The Ohio State University
Beach, Edward L., Sr., with Edward L. Beach, Jr.
From Annapolis to Scapa Flow: The Autobiography
of Edward L. Beach, Sr. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2003. 344pp. $34.95
This charming and insightful memoir
is among the most vivid and enjoyable
portraits of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth–century Navy ever writ-
ten. Originally drafted in the 1930s fol-
lowing Captain Beach’s retirement, it is
the story of the fascinating career of an
officer who began at sea by learning to
handle sail as a midshipman in 1888
and ended by commanding a seventeen-
thousand-ton steel battleship at Scapa
Flow during the Great War. Full of
equal parts delightful sea stories, har-
rowing maritime adventures, and
thoughtful diplomatic insights, this is
indeed a sailor’s story. The volume was
edited with loving care by the author’s
son, the late Captain Edward L. Beach,
Jr., who was known for his famous
work Run Silent, Run Deep (Naval Insti-
tute Press, Classics of Naval Literature
series) and a dozen other histories and
novels. Beach the younger inserts many
wry and sometimes poignant asides that
help to set in context his father’s story.
And what a story! Beginning in the late
1880s, Beach senior served alongside
Civil War veterans as he learned his
trade in wooden sailing ships. He saw
firsthand the naval renaissance of the
late nineteenth century, powered by the
intellectual energy of Alfred Thayer
Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, and the po-
litical dynamics of Theodore Roosevelt.
Beach began his commissioned ser-
vice as an engineer and served as such
until the merger of the engineering
and line communities (amidst much
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controversy) in 1897. He met and in-
teracted with every significant naval fig-
ure of his time; among the most cele-
brated were a future commandant of
the Marine Corps, John A. Lejeune, his
Annapolis roommate, and a young as-
sistant secretary of the Navy, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt.
Beach’s career included command of a
repair ship, cruisers, and the battleship
USS New York, which served as the flag-
ship of the American Battle Squadron
of the British Grand Fleet during World
War I. Beach also commanded two ma-
jor shore installations—the torpedo
production facility at Newport, Rhode
Island, and the Naval Shipyard at Mare
Island, California. There are two epi-
sodes in his thirty-eight-year career that
are particularly worth noting—the battle
of Manila Bay, in which Beach served as
engineer below decks in the cruiser USS
Baltimore, and the destruction of the
cruiser USS Memphis in the harbor of
Santo Domingo in 1916 while under his
command. (This story is brilliantly told
in his son’s gripping classic, The Wreck
of the Memphis, in the Naval Institute
Press, Classics of Naval Literature series.)
What is most striking about this superb
memoir are the similarities to our own
time. Even as the United States debates
the transformation of its military today
into an information-based force, the
parallels are obvious in Beach’s writing
at the turn of the twentieth century:
“The whole Navy of this period was
enthusiastically interested in the fast-
developing technology of warships and
the sea. We developed smokeless pow-
der from Russia, ‘built up’ guns from
France and England, rapid fire and ma-
chine guns of our own invention, hard-
ened armor plant, higher grade steel,
the automobile torpedo, and the
submarine. There were many other in-
ventions and developments of naval en-
gines and weapons, all of which we
worked on eagerly.” Similarly, today,
we are actively seeking to develop en-
tirely new concepts of operating war-
ships at sea, and many of the challenges
are the same.
Likewise, the political tenor of Beach’s
time was similar to that which the
United States faces today—a chaotic
world with frequent requirements to
apply naval power at the edges of the
developed world. Beach was repeat-
edly thrust into diplomatic and military
exchanges and, as many U.S. Navy cap-
tains do today, found himself develop-
ing U.S. policy at a great distance from
Washington, D.C.
After retiring from the Navy in 1922,
Captain Beach settled into an academic
life, teaching history at Stanford Uni-
versity, entering complete retirement in
the early 1940s. He described this in
typical nautical terms, “And so I have
finished my story. Lately, I have come
under the domination of a most des-
potic admiral [his wife], who always
makes me wear an overcoat when I go
out for a walk, and even insists on my
wearing a cap in the house, so I won’t
catch cold in my bald head. Our two
sons are respectively in the Navy and
Army, and so is our daughter, who has
become a ‘Navy Wave,’ thereby ranking
about even with her two older Lieuten-
ant brothers. The only people left to
obey my orders are a collie dog, who
takes walks with me every day and
thinks I’m wonderful; and a ridiculous
cat, who is very insubordinate.”
Beach lived to see the tragedy of Pearl
Harbor but maintained faith in his
Navy’s ultimate victory until his death
in 1943.
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There is a comfortable fit to the feeling
and tone of this autobiography. The ca-
maraderie of the wardroom, the con-
stant moving back and forth from sea
to shore, the hard work and great re-
wards of command at sea, and the
friendly naval gossip are so recognizable
that he could be talking about the Navy
of today. Indeed, the real charm of this
book is in its candid yet loving portrait
of one of the truly abiding institutions of
the U.S. Navy. Captain Edward L. Beach,
Sr., with the nicest of assists from his ac-
complished officer-author son, has given
us not only his own story but a warm in-
sider’s view of our beloved Navy as well.
This is a volume that deserves a spot in
any serious Navy library.
JAMES STAVRIDIS
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group 12
Crawford, Michael J., et al., ed. The Naval War of
1812: A Documentary History. Vol. 3. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Naval Historical Center (GPO), 2002.
874pp. $70
During the War of 1812, the United
States attempted to invade Canada
three times in separate campaigns and
failed on each occasion. Inept leader-
ship, militia and service differences, and
lost tactical opportunities marred trans-
lation of strategic aims into a workable
operational plan. Vastly outnumbered
by American troops on the land frontier
along the Great Lakes and the St. Law-
rence River, the British and Canadians
remained on the defensive until events
in Europe released regular reinforce-
ments and ships of the Royal Navy. In
1814, Great Britain applied seapower
against the United States and took
the offensive. The resulting stalemate
eventually brought the two adversaries
to the peace table to sign the Treaty of
Ghent, whereby British North Amer-
ica’s territorial integrity was preserved
for the later confederation of Canada
into a nation. This documentary col-
lection, the third volume of a pro-
jected series of four to be published by
the Naval Historical Center on the na-
val side of the war, concentrates on the
Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and
Pacific theaters from 1814 to 1815.
The selection of documents, like the
two preceding volumes, deals com-
prehensively with events and persons
behind the main battles and cam-
paigns on both sides, as well as with
such matters as recruitment, logistics,
shipbuilding, and social relations
from a wider perspective.
Almost half the book is devoted to the
British blockade of the Chesapeake Bay
and American defense against the
mounting amphibious incursions of
General Robert Ross and Admiral
Alexander Cochrane into the American
heartland. Once the resolve of General
William Winder and his sundry troops
crumbled at the battle of Bladensburg,
Washington was left wide open. The
occupying British burned the White
House and other public buildings (al-
legedly in retaliation for burning the
provincial legislature at York [present-
day Toronto] by American sailors in
April the previous year). The docu-
ments highlight the flexibility accorded
the British to choose when and where
to attack from the sea, as well as the sig-
nificant naval contribution in stiffening
American defenses.
The British likewise demonstrated the
possibilities of concerted military and
naval action on the internal waters of
Lake Huron, Lake Ontario, and Lake
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Champlain, the high point being Com-
modore Sir James Yeo’s amphibious raid
on the American transfer point at Os-
wego, and the low point definitely being
General George Prevost’s retreat from
Plattsburg. On the opposing side, Com-
modore Isaac Chauncey’s support of
American armies on the Niagara frontier
took second place to a growing ship-
building race between the American and
British naval commanders. The Ameri-
can land campaign was irretrievably im-
paired, the hoped-for decisive battle to
determine naval ascendancy on Lake
Ontario never materialized before peace
came, and the republic’s finances were
left in tatters. The documents are care-
fully chosen to show the consequences
of confused operational-level decision
making and of the failure to pursue
joint operations in an effective manner.
If Chauncey inclined toward caution
on the Great Lakes, Captain David
Porter’s decision to abandon a success-
ful commerce-destruction cruise in fa-
vor of seeking out superior British
naval forces in decisive combat off the
Chilean coast was rash and impulsive.
American hopes for challenging the
British in the Pacific ended with the
frigate Essex’s submission to British
firepower. In spite of the defeat, Porter
returned home to a hero’s welcome,
while the officers and sailors whom he
left behind faced numerous hardships
and another year in British captivity.
Inclusion of this small episode in the
collection presents a reminder that per-
sonal considerations of fame and glory
are no replacement for sound strategy.
Porter spent the rest of his life trying to
justify his actions.
The collection makes accessible many
primary documents used in classical
works by Alfred T. Mahan and Theodore
Roosevelt, as well as recent monographs
by Anthony Pitch, Robert Malcomson,
and Barry Gough. For anyone who has
struggled to decipher handwriting in
the originals, availability of typed and
organized documents is a major benefit.
Introductory essays to the chapters and
subchapters are informative and bal-
anced, while extensive footnotes give
more details on people and sources.
The index, perhaps the book’s most
valuable feature, allows readers to iden-
tify specific matters of interest within
the documents quickly and efficiently.
The end of each chapter shows the loca-
tion and source from which individual
documents were drawn, with microfilm
numbers provided for Washington-area
repositories, but no corresponding mi-
crofilm numbers appear for Record
Group 8 in Ottawa. This discrepancy,
though minor, detracts from the book’s
usefulness in tracking down originals
for the sake of comparison, accuracy,
and provenance.
This documentary collection, of which
the first volume was published in 1978,
will become a standard reference source
in most libraries and undoubtedly stim-
ulate awareness and scholarship about
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for Global War, 1934–1940, by Henry G.
Gole. Naval Institute Press, 2003. 224pp.
$34.95
Thomas Macdonough: Master of Com-
mand in the Early U.S. Navy, by David
C. Skaggs. Naval Institute Press, 2003.
257pp. $36.95
Powder and Propellants: Energetic
Materials at Indian Head, Maryland,
1890–2001, by Rodney Carlisle. Univ.
of North Texas Press, 2d ed., 2002.
322pp.
John McIntosh Kell of the Raider Ala-
bama, by Norman C. Delaney. Univ. of
Alabama Press, 2003. 270pp. $19.95
Bombers over Berlin, by Alan W. Cooper.
Stackpole, 2003. 320pp. $19.95
Out of the Italian Night: Wellington
Bomber Operations, 1944–45, by
Maurice G. Lihou. Stackpole, 2000.
196pp. $16.95
USS Constellation: From Frigate to
Sloop of War, by Geoffrey M. Footner.
Naval Institute Press, 2003. 367pp.
A Diminished President: FDR in 1944,
by Matthew B. Wills. Ivy House, 2003.
191pp. $22.95
Campfires of Freedom: The Camp Life of
Black Soldiers during the Civil War, by
Keith P. Wilson. Kent State Univ. Press,
2002. 336pp. $39
Geopolitics of the World System, by Saul
Bernard Cohen. Rowman & Littlefield,
2002. 434pp. $44.95
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The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli
Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship, by A.
Jay Cristol. Brassey’s, 2002. 294pp.
$27.50
In the Wake of Terror: Medicine and
Morality in a Time of Crisis, edited by
Jonathan D. Moreno. MIT Press, 2003.
229pp. $24.95
First Commandant of the Coast Guard:
Commodore Ellsworth P. Bertholf, by C.
Douglas Kroll. Naval Institute Press,
2002. 160pp.
The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical
and Biological Warfare Program, by
Helen Purkitt and Stephen Burgess. Air
War College, 2001. 118pp.
Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s:
Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests, by
Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr. Praeger, 2002.
224pp.
Nixon, Ford and the Abandonment of
South Vietnam, by J. Edward Lee and
H. C. Haynsworth. McFarland, 2000.
215pp. $35
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the War in Vietnam, 1969–1970, by
Willard J. Webb. Office of Joint History,
2002. 380pp.
Admirals in the Age of Nelson, by Lee
Bienkowski. Naval Institute Press, 2003.
294pp. $36.95
Hitler Attacks Pearl Harbor: Why the
United States Declared War on Germany,
by Richard F. Hill. Lynne Rienner,
2003. 225pp. $49.95
1 8 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
190




A new title in our Newport Papers series is available in print and online—The
Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military
Affairs, by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, of the Naval War
College faculty. Little attention has been paid, the authors find, to the views of
military officers on the prospect of dramatic service transformation. The au-
thors argue that these views are important for a number of compelling reasons.
What is the level of enthusiasm among officers for transformation? How com-
pelling do they perceive the need for transformation to be? How extensive a
change do they believe necessary? How confident are they in the ability of the
U.S. military to carry out transformation? To obtain copies of this Newport
Paper or to receive all new titles in the series, contact the associate editor, Patricia
A. Goodrich, at (401) 841-6583 or associateeditor@nwc.navy.mil.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE FOUNDATION BOOKSTORE
Press books—see our website or call the editorial office for a complete listing—
are sold in the Naval War College Foundation bookstore in Founders Hall. To order,
call 848-8306 (locally), or toll-free at 1-866-490-3334. For those who would like
to visit the store, military I.D. is needed to enter the complex; Foundation mem-
bers, however, can arrange access by calling the Foundation staff.
ERRATUM
In the print version of our Summer 2003 issue, the first name of the reviewer of
Gore Vidal’s Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace is given incorrectly. The reviewer
was Capt. Matthew Morgan, U.S. Army. Our apologies for the error, which has
been corrected in the online version.
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ARTICLE AND GRADUATION PRIZES
HUGH G. NOTT PRIZE
The President of the Naval War College has awarded this year’s Hugh G. Nott
Prize, to the authors of the best nonhistorical articles appearing in the Naval
War College Review in the 2002 publishing year. This prize is given by the gener-
osity of the Naval War College Foundation.
First Prize ($1,000): Stephen M. Walt, for “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pit-
falls,” Spring
Second Prize ($650): Phillip J. Ridderhof, for “Thinking Out of the Box: Reading
Military Texts from a Different Perspective,” Autumn
Third Prize ($350): Roger W. Barnett, for “Naval Power for a New American Cen-
tury,” Winter.
EDWARD S. MILLER HISTORY PRIZE
The President of the Naval War College has also awarded this year’s Edward S.
Miller History Prize, to the author of the best historical or history-oriented article
appearing in the Naval War College Review in the 2002 publishing year. This prize
($500) is given by the generosity of the historian Edward S. Miller through the
Naval War College Foundation. The winner this year is Richard H. Kohn, for “The
Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” Summer.
AWARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL WRITING AND RESEARCH,
2002–2003
Naval War College Foundation Award
First Prize: Lt. Col. Keith W. Moncrief, USAF, College of Naval Warfare, for “Cre-
ating a Theater-Based Operational Link between Strategic Mobility and Theater-
Level Logistics for the Joint Task Force Commander”
First Honorable Mention: Mr. David F. Blackburn, College of Naval Warfare, for “Use
of the United States National Fleet in Maritime Homeland Security and Defense”
Second Honorable Mention: Maj. Paul B. Donovan, USAF, College of Naval Com-
mand and Staff, for “JMCC: Theater C2 in Need of Sole.”
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Adm. Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize
First Prize: Lt. Col. Michael G. Dana, USMC, College of Naval Warfare, for “Shock
and Awe: America’s 21st Century Maginot Line”
Honorable Mention: Lt. Cdr. Brendan R. McLane, USN, College of Naval Command
and Staff, for “Reporting from the Sandstorm: Embedding—An Initial Appraisal.”
J. William Middendorf II Award for Student Research
First Prize: Maj. Jenny A. McGee, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff
Honorable Mention: Lt. Cdr. Christopher S. Wiseman, USN, College of Naval Com-
mand and Staff, for “Beyond Monroe: A 21st Century Hemispheric Security
Construct.”
Franklin Reinauer II Defense Economics Prize
First Prize: Lt. Cdr. Scott T. McCain, USN, College of Naval Command and Staff, for
“Bolstering U.S. Strategic Sealift through Coastal Shipping.”
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Awards:
IW Category
First Prize: Maj. Joseph H. Scherrer, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff, for
“Risks and Vulnerabilities of Network-centric Forces: Insights from the Science of
Complexity”
Honorable Mention: Maj. David P. Wells, USMC, College of Naval Command and
Staff, for “Managing the Double-Edged Sword of Network-centric Warfare.”
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Awards:
C4I Category
First Prize: Capt. Rand D. Lebouvier, USN, College of Naval Warfare, for “Extending
Operational Reach with Unmanned Systems.”
Vice Adm. James H. Doyle, Jr., Military Operations and International Law Prize
First Prize: Maj. Scott W. Rizer, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff, for
“Law Enforcement or National Security Forces? A ‘Mix-’n-Match’ Strategy for the
War on Terrorism”
Honorable Mention: Lt. Cdr. Michael D. Sutton, USN, College of Naval Warfare, for
“The International Criminal Court: Considerations for the Joint Forces
Commander.”
Marine Corps Association Award
First Prize: Cdr. G. W. H. Hatch, RN, Naval Command College, for “Should the USN
Contend the Narrower Littoral?”
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Honorable Mention: Mr. Brett M. Vaughan, College of Naval Command and Staff, for
“Operational Art and the Amphibious Assault: Will OMFTS Break the U.S. Amphib-
ious Assault Sword?”
Robert E. Batemans International Prize
First Prize: Capt. Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande, Indian Navy, Naval Command College,
for “‘Vasuki’ and the Dragon: Shaping India’s Maritime Strategy as a Counterbalance
to China”
Honorable Mention: Cdr. Juan C. San Martin, Spanish Navy, Naval Command Col-
lege, for “The Control of the Mediterranean Sea: A Key Issue in the Global War on
Terror.”
Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) Award
First Prize: Maj. Christopher L. Fatheree, USMC, College of Naval Command and
Staff, for “Intelligence Reachback Requires Analysts Forward.”
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Award
First Prize: Mr. Van W. Garraghty, College of Naval Warfare, for “Social Systems
Analysis: The Future of Operational Intelligence?”
Naval Intelligence Foundation Award
First Prize: Lt. Cdr. Michael H. Day, USCG, College of Naval Command and Staff,
for “Maritime Domain Awareness: A Modern Maginot Line?”
Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association Award
First Prize: Maj. Randy L. Kaufman, USAF, College of Naval Command and Staff, for
“Precision Guided Weapons: Panacea or Pitfall for the Joint Task Force
Commander?”
Honorable Mention: Lt. Col. George D. Kramlinger, USAF, College of Naval Warfare,
for “Synchronizing Airpower and Other Operational Fires: The Joint Force Com-
mander’s Role.”
Naval Submarine League Prize
First Prize: Cdr. William R. Merz, USN, Naval Command College, for “The Sub-
merged Battlegroup: A Synergistic Capability for the Joint Operational
Commander.”
Jerome E. Levy Economic Geography and World Order Prize
First Prize: Capt. Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande, Indian Navy, Naval Command College,
for “The Ballot Bites Deeper than the Bullet: ‘Realpolitik for Real People’”
First Honorable Mention: Lt. Col. Lamont Woody, USA, College of Naval Warfare,
for “Taming Dictators and Developing Security: The Caspian Sea Region Arrives on
the Global Economy”
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Second Honorable Mention: Cdr. Steven A. McLaughlin, USN, College of Naval War-
fare, for “Human Migration Issues and Their Economic-Political Impacts.”
2003 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition
Second Place Winner: Lt. Cdr. Grant R. Highland, USNR, College of Naval Command
and Staff, for “New Century, Old Problems: The Global Insurgency within Islam and
the Nature of the War on Terror”
Third Place Winner: LTC(P) James B. Brown, USA, College of Naval Warfare, for
“What Kind of Peace? The Art of Building a Lasting and Constructive Peace.”
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